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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the determinants of exchange market pressure and currency crises in 
Turkey over the period 1989: 09 and 2001: 04 using three empirical methodologies: the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to investigate the short-run 
and the long-run dynamics of exchange market pressure; the binary logit and ordered logit 
models in order to identify the determinants of currency crises; and third, it applies the 
signals approach to identify the leading indicators of currency crises. The findings of the 
thesis have indicated that speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market and currency 
crises in Turkey in the sample period cannot be attributed entirely to a single cause and that 
these two phenomena are a result of a diverse set of factors. The results also suggest that both 
speculative pressure in the exchange market and currency crises in Turkey are linked to the 
reversals in the capital flows. The findings have also indicated that another important factor 
which has given rise to speculative pressure in the exchange market and currency crises in 
Turkey is the weaknesses in the banking sector balance sheets, such as the overexposure to 
foreign exchange, liquidity and credit risks. The results of the thesis have also revealed that 
currency crises and speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market are linked to the 
overvaluation of the Turkish lira. Above all, the results have indicated that currency crises 
and speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market are not necessarily driven by 
common factors and that it is misleading to classify explanatory variables strictly as 
statistically significant and insignificant in the context of currency crises. Last but not least, 
the findings of this thesis have also suggests that statistically insignificant variables could still 
convey information regarding the imminence of currency crises if used in a non-parametric 
signals model. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Objectives 
The last few decades have seen a plethora of currency crises, which have swept across 
many emerging market economies such as Mexico (1994), Brazil (1995), East Asia 
(1997), Russia (1998) and, more recently, Argentina (2001-2002) and Turkey (2000- 
2001). Mostly unanticipated, these crises have imposed severe economic, social and 
political costs on the affected economies. 
The recurrence of these crises has fuelled a large number of explanations of their 
possible causes. Some theories link currency crises to weak fundamentals, whereas 
others link them to self-fulfilling expectations of the market participants. On the other 
hand, relatively more recent theories attribute them to banking sector weaknesses. In 
spite of these theories, there exists no clear-cut explanation in the existing literature as 
to what causes currency crises. As Rose (2001 a) explains: 
"... we simply do not have a very good understanding of 
what causes [currency] crises. We are therefore unable to 
provide policy-makers with good crisis prevention 
techniques, early warning systems, and soforlh. Theory is 
ahead of empirics in this area of economics, but both are 
in terrible shape. "1 
The existing literature defines a currency crisis as an episode of a speculative attack on 
the domestic currency, often, but not always, . followed by an abrupt devaluation of the 
exchange rate. A speculative attack, on the other hand, is defined as a process by which 
investors demand the Central Bank's foreign exchange reserves in exchange for their 
domestic currency. This usually happens when the investors have a reason to believe 
that the Central Bank will be unable to defend the prevailing exchange rate. Hence, their 
purpose is to precipitate a currency crisis and to make profit through buying the foreign 
'See Rose (2001 a: p. 75). 
I 
exchange reserves of the central bank at the prevailing low value of the exchange rate 
and selling them at a higher rate after the crisis 2. 
When confronted with a speculative attack, the Central Bank can defend the exchange 
rate through buying domestic currency using its international reserves or through 
increasing short-term interest rates. If these efforts prove futile, the speculators' strategy 
turns out to be successful and a currency crisis takes place 3. On the other hand, in the 
case of a successful defence, the disequilibriurn in the foreign exchange market, i. e. 
exchange market pressure, is reflected through a fall in the level of international 
reserves of the Central Bank or an increase in the short-term interest rates. 
Given these close relationships among speculative attacks, exchange market pressure, 
and currency crises, the existing literature on these three concepts is mutually inclusive. 
Although, there exists no &one-size-fits-all" explanation in the existing literature to date 
on what drives speculative attacks and currency crises, the Interriational Monetary Fund 
(IMF)-led financial liberalization policies of 1980s have been widely cited as the 
primary reason for prematurely exposing the emerging market economies to speculative 
short-term capital movements 4. 
Turkey is one of the emerging economies that bought into the promises of the IMF- 
prompted financial liberalization in early 1980s. With the rather "premature" 
liberalization of the capital account in August 1989, the economy became prone to 
chronic speculative attacks and currency crises5. Even though the country experienced 
recurring currency crises of various magnitudes in 1991,1994,1998,1999 and 2000- 
200 16, the major currency crises that the economy experienced in this period are the 
crises of 1994 and the twin crises of 2000-2001, which have had devastating economic 
and social consequences. For instance, as a result of the 1994 currency crisis, the gross 
2 See Krugman (1979. p. 312). 
3 The Central Bank may also prefer not to undertake these actions due to an inadequate level of foreign 
exchange reserves or the possible dampening impact of high interest rates on the economy. 4 41 Financial liberalization allows hot money in the form of foreign portfolio investments into the country 
and results in a large increase in private and public sector indebtedness, which increases the likelihood of 
a currency crisis. 
5 As Mariano et a] (2004) explains, "the [Turkish] capital account liberalization ofAugust 1989 could be 
considered as 'premature' in nature since political stability, transparency of the state and the 
development of key institutions were absent prior to the capital account openness. - (Mariano et al 2004: 
p. 89). 
6 See Koch and Chaudhary (200 1: p. 467). 
2 
national product fell 6 percent in 1994 and the Central Bank lost half of its reserves 
while defending the Turkish lira. Similarly, because of the 2000-2001 crisis, the gross 
national product fell 27 percent and the Central Bank lost one-third of its reserves. The 
latter crisis had more severe social consequences with hundreds of thousands of job 
losses and bankruptcies throughout the economy 7. 
Given these detrimental effects of currency crises on the economy, the need for a 
satisfactory explanation to their causes is enormous. Nonetheless, the existing literature 
falls short in providing an explanation of the dynamics behind the currency crises in the 
case ofTurkey. It is particularly essential from a policy perspective to establish what 
lies behind speculative attacks and currency crises because if they stem from weak 
fundamentals or the implementation of macroeconomic policies which are not 
consistent with the exchange rate regime, pre-emptive policies should be designed 
specifically to address these problems. In contrast, if they are caused by arbitrary 
changes in expectations and the self-fulfilling prophecies of the market agents, sound 
macroeconomic management may not suffice to preserve the exchange rate regime. In 
this case, policy-makers should focus more on the means to avert investor panic by 
adopting policies to enhance the credibility of the exchange rate regime or to impose 
controls on capital flows. On the other hand, if speculative attacks and currency crises 
are linked to the banking sector weaknesses, policies should be designed to enhance the 
regulatory and the supervisory framework of the sector. 
In this respect, an empirical examination of the past episodes of speculative attacks and 
currency crises might yield important policy implications for the prevention of their 
future reoccurrence. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to shed light on the 
dynamics behind the currency crises and exchange market pressure in the case of 
Turkey during the post-caýital account liberalization periods. The major motivation of 
the thesis lies in the increasingly popular perception among economists that the 
7 For instance, the banking sector alone incurred hundreds of thousands of job losses with the number of 
banks falling from 81 in 1999 to 54 in 2002 (See Kibritcioglu, 2005). 
8 The increased openness of countries to capital flows and the fall of the transaction costs in financial 
markets in the last few decades have made it easier for speculators to attack exchange rates. Hence, 
currencies have been frequently experiencing sustained market pressure from speculators. Based on this 
consideration, the present thesis investigates the determinants of not only the currency crises, but also the 
exchange market pressure. 
3 
likelihood of future currency crises in Turkey remains high9. Evidently, only by 
knowing what causes currency crises and speculative attacks can policy-makers take 
measures to mitigate or prevent similar experiences in the future. 
From a policy perspecti-ýe, an investigation of the causes of speculative pressure and 
currency crises in a leading emerging market economylo such as Turkey could offer 
policy implications not only for Turkish policy-makers, but also for their peers in other 
similar economies. This is because the Turkish economy constitutes an informative case 
study as it is a small open economy in which world prices and global monetary 
conditions can be taken as given. This is an assumption underlying most of the 
theoretical speculative attack models in the literature and is a feature that all emerging 
market economies share. Therefore, the policy lessons that emerge from this thesis are 
applicable to other emerging market countries, which have similar economic structures. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides an account of the 
Turkish economy in the post capital account liberalization period; Section 1.3 points out 
the contribution that the thesis proposes to make to the existing literature; and Section 
1.4 explains the organization of the thesis. 
1.2. Turkish Economy in the Post Capital Account Liberalization Period 
The moves towards financial liberalization in Turkey began with the structural reform 
programme II of 24 th January, 1980. The purpose of the programme was to liberalize the 
economy, reduce inflation permanently and to put the economy on a sustainable growth 
path through pursuing an export-led growth policy and a flexible exchange rate 
regime 12. In this respect, the post-1980 era represents a period of radical transformation 
of the Turkish economy from the heavily-protected and inward-oriented economy of the 
1960s and the 1970s to a far more open and outward-oriented economy. 
9 See, for instance, Yuksel (2006) and Kahveci (2008). 
10 World Bank lists Turkey as the fourth largest economy among the emerging market economies after 
Mexico, Argentina and Russia (see Ucturn and Uctum, 2005: p. 2). 
11 The programme was launched in the aftermath of the major debt crisis that the country had experienced 
from 1977 to 1980. 
12 See Ozatay (1996). 
4 
With the decisions taken by the government in December 1983 and January 1984, 
further radical amendments were made in order to enforce the liberal economic system. 
Accordingly, the foreign exchange regime was liberalized and banks were allowed to 
accept foreign currency deposits from citizens and to engage in foreign transactions 13 . 
Furthermore, the Central Bank's control over commercial banks was loosened with a 
reform in the liquidity and reserve requirement system. 
f 
In 1986, an interbank money market for short-term borrowing facilities was set up. 
Furthermore, the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) was opened to provide trading of 
equities. In the same year, the Turkish Government began issuing Treasury Bills and 
Government Bonds for the first time to diversify its monetary instruments and it began 
engaging in open market operations. 
In 1989, the capital account was fully liberalized and the full convertibility of the 
Turkish Lira was recognized. The opening up of the capital account was rather 
premature and the driving force behind it was the temptation of the government to reap 
the short- to medium-term political benefits, such as the availability of a cheaper source 
of finance that could be used for additional fiscal spending. 14 This was probably the 
most important event in Turkish economic history. Following the liberalization of the 
capital account, the economy experienced a massive inflow of short-term capital and the 
threat of capital flight became a dominant motive in policy-making. This necessitated a 
firm commitment to high real interest rates to secure short-term capital inflows". 
Overall, it is possible to list the main features of the Turkish economy in the post-capital 
account liberalization era as persistent inflation, a fragile banking system, unstable 
political atmosphere, enormous public sector deficits, high real interest rates, an 
overvalued Turkish lira, and volatile economic growth dependent on short-term 
international capital flows. In particular, due to the frequent government changes and 
populist fiscal policies, the successive governments failed take the necessary measures 
13 Prior to 1984, a fixed exchange rate was in effect. Between 1984 and 1993 the exchange rate changed 
daily in the context of a crawling peg exchange rate regime. After 1993, a managed-floating exchange 
rate regime was used until January 2000 when the country signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF. 
14 The capital account liberalization was premature as the political stability, transparency of the state and 
the development of key institutions were absent prior to the capital account openness. This led to 
inefficient use of the capital inflow and, combined with fiscal expansion, did not lead to the desired 
outcome of lower domestic real cost of capital (see Mariano el al, 2004). 
"5 See Table LL 
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on the fiscal front 16 and, as a result, capital inflows, persistently high inflation and a 
pegged exchange rate regime led to large and growing fiscal and external imbalances 
during this period 17 . 
On the other hand, there were also some serious problems in the banking sector, which 
constituted the major part of the financial system and carried out most of the 
transactions and activities in both the money and capital markets. During this period, the 
banking system mainly served as an intermediary, obtaining short-term credit from the 
international financial markets and lending it to the government due to the high interest 
spread caused by the government's financing needs. As a result, the banking sector 
balance sheets contained mostly uncovered short-positions in foreign exchange. Due to 
this risky strategy, monetary policy was used primarily to maintain the stability to 
secure the functioning of the domestic borrowing process. 
In 1991, due to the disturbance in the global financial markets caused by the Gulf War, 
the economy experienced a sudden capital outflow, which resulted in a short-lived 
currency crisis'8. However, the economy recovered quickly owing to the high domestic 
real interest rates which succeeded in changing the direction of the capital outflow. 
However, this resulted in an increase in the interest payments on government securities, 
which constituted a sizeable burden for the government's budget. 
As a result, the government decided to decrease the interest rates on Treasury bills in 
1993 in order to save on interest expenditures and to reduce the high levels of domestic 
public debt stock. Accordingly, it cancelled auctions of short-term maturity Treasury 
bills in the last months of 1993. This left the Treasury to depend only on cash advances 
from the Central Bank. The amount of domestic credit from the central bank, in turn, 
led to a liquidity build-up in the economy. While the cancellation of Treasury auctions 
coupled with excessive liquidity build-up in domestic financial markets caused 
increasing levels of anxiety in the financial sector, Turkey's credit rating was 
downgraded by the major credit rating agencies in international capital markets in 
January 1994. As a result, commercial banks, which had accumulated excessive short- 
16 See Boratav and Yeldan (2002). 
17 See Table 1.1. 
18 See Akay and Yilmazkuday (2008). 
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term foreign debt, rushed to the foreign exchange market to close their foreign exchange 
positions. At the same time, the banking sector was hit by a crisis as the depositors 
rushed to withdraw their foreign exchange deposits. The Central Bank intervened into 
the foreign exchange market in order to defend the exchange rate and exhausted half of 
its international reserves by selling foreign exchange to the commercial banks. The 
resulting decline in central bank reserves induced a full-fledged attack on the Turkish 
lira in April 1994. As a result, overnight interest rates jumped from 70 percent to 700 
percent, the Turkish lira depreciated by almost 70 percent against the US dollar, and 
economic growth declined by 6 percent 19 . 
A unique feature of this crisis is that it took place under a "managed float" rather than a 
pegged exchange rate regime, which was the case in almost all other emerging market 
crises that took place in 1990s. After the crisis, the Turkish Government continued to 
pursue the same exchange rate policy but it signed a new stabilization programme with 
the IMF in April 1994 20 . Due to the failure of this programme in stabilizing the 
economy and reducing inflation, the government launched yet another programme in 
July 1998 under the auspices of the IMF. This IMF stand-by agreement helped restore 
the economy, yet at the expense of extraordinarily high interest rates on the 
government's debt instruments, which was necessary to attract foreign capital flows. 
The dependence of the economy on international capital flows once again manifested 
itself as a crisis in the same year when capital flows reversed due to the global panic 
caused by the Russian debt crisis of August 1998 2 1. This time, the central bank avoided 
a liquidity crunch through sterilizing the outflow in the expense of even higher interest 
rates. 
Consequently, even though the July 1998 programme achieved some improvements 
concerning the inflation rate and fiscal imbalances, it failed to relieve the pressures on 
the interest rates. In the meantime, the general elections - in April 1999 and two 
devastating earthquakes in August and October 1999 led to a deterioration of the fiscal 
19 The economy recovered quickly and grew about 8% the following year as the banking system was 
relatively unharmed and the private sector managed to regain its external borrowing opportunities very 
quickly (see May and Yilmazkuday, 2008). 
20 However, it soon became clear that the government was not strongly behind this programme and the 
agreement came to an end in 1995. 
21 Interestingly, the economy was not affected by the East Asian crisis of 1997. This can possibly be 
attributed to the remoteness of the region from Turkey. 
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balance of the public sector. As a result of the combined effects of the earthquakes and 
the Russian debt crisis, real GNP fell by 6.1% in 1999, as can be seen in Table 1.1. This 
had a negative impact on the banking sector through an increase in the past-due loans. 
Furthermore, the full deposit insurance system that was launched in the aftermath of the 
currency crisis. of 1994, as well as lack of prudent supervision and regulation, 
contributed significantly to moral hazard problems in the banking sector, where banks 
resorted to risky banking practices. As a result, eight banks become insolvent and were 
taken over by the State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), while high interest rates 
constituted an incentive for the remaining banks to continue borrowing short-term from 
abroad in foreign currency and investing in high yielding government bonds with 
relatively longer maturities, thereby aggravating the prevailing currency and maturity 
mismatch problems. 
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In December 1999, Turkey embarked upon a three-year stand-by programme with the 
IMF to stabilize the economy". The main pillars of the programme were announced as a 
tight fiscal stance, structural reforms, and a firm exchange rate commitment23 . With this 
programme, the Turkish lira was fixed to a US dollar-German mark basket through a 
crawling peg. Through this exchange rate regime, the percent change in the Turkish lira 
value of the US dollar-German mark basket, which consisted of I US dollar plus 0.70 
German marks (Euro), was fixed for eighteen monthS24. 
The novelty of this exchange rate regime was that both the exit strategy and the date of 
exit were publicly known at the very beginning of the programme. It was announced 
that the exchange rate would be allowed to fluctuate in a continuously widening band 
after the eighteen-month period. Even though the programme seemed on track with 
steadily falling inflation and interest rates, an overvalued exchange rate and high real 
interest rates were still a problem. Also, due to the programme's reliance on speculative 
short-term capital inflows as the source of the liquidity generation mechanism, the 
economy was still highly vulnerable to reversals in capital flows. 
In the meantime, increased world oil prices and the depreciation of the euro against the 
US dollar contributed to the deterioration of the trade balance. In particular, due to the 
crawling peg in effect, when the US dollar became overvalued, the Turkish lira became 
overvalued as well, resulting in exports getting expensive and imports getting cheap. 
This, in turn, deteriorated the competitiveness of the Turkish econoMY25 . 
Meanwhile, the programme's credibility was weakened by the staggering pace of the 
implementation of structural reforms and there were growing concerns regarding the 
government's commitment to the reform policies. In November 2000, increasing 
opposition from some parties inside the government to privatization of certain state 
enterprises in the midst of the global tension caused by the ensuing currency crisis in 
Argentina, coupled with the news that some of the Turkish commercial banks had 
financial problems, led to a massive capital outflow in November 2000. In order to 
22 The purpose of the programme was to reduce inflation to single digits by the end of year 2002 (see 
Alper and Onis, 2003). 
23 See Ekinci and Erturk (2004). 
24 See OzIale and Yeldan (2004). 
25 See Eichengreen (2002). 
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defend the peg, the Central Bank lost around 5 Billion US dollars within two weeks. At 
the brink of collapse, the programme was saved temporarily by an IMF bailout of 7.5 
billion US dollars. 
Nonetheless, the ensuing turmoil devastated the market for government debt 
instruments disabling it to attract foreign or domestic capital. At the same time, the 
banking system, which was dependent on foreign funds, fell into a severe liquidity 
crunch 26 . As a result of the shortage of short-term capital in the money markets, interest 
rates soared, leading to a market-wide perception that the exchange rate regime was 
about to collapse. Eventually, on 19'h February, 2001, a dispute between Prime Minister 
Bulent Ecevit and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer over how to fight public sector 
corruption triggered a severe currency crisis. 
The magnitude of this crisis was enormous, the official reserves were depleted by one- 
third and the stock market experienced an 18 percent decline in one day, the Turkish lira 
depreciated by 40 percent in one week, and the interbank overnight interest rates 
reached 6,200 percent on an annualized basis on 21't February, 2001 from the previous 
week's level of 45 percent 27 . Hence, banks became unable to borrow in the overnight 
market, and the payments system came to a standstill. Finally, the Central Bank 
abandoned the crawling peg and switched to a floating exchange rate system on 22 
February, 2001. 
Eventually, an IMF bailout of 15 billion US dollars secured by a new stand-by 
agreement in May 2001 relieved the pressure in the market. The new programme, which 
was referred to as "Transition to a Strong Econorny"28, emphasized major restructuring 
in the economy, especially in the banking sector. The programme had three pillars: (1) 
fiscal austerity that targeted a 6.5 percent surplus for the public sector as a ratio of GDP, 
(2) a contractionary monetary policy and inflation targeting, and (3) structural reforms 
1hat consisted of privatization, large scale layoffs in public enterprises, and abolition of 
26 The banks were holding illiquid assets in the form of government debt instruments and were relying on 
short-term borrowing to finance their illiquid portfolios (See Akyuz and Boratav, 2003). 
27 See Alper and Onis (2003). 
29 See OzIale and Metin-Ozcan (2006: p. 331). 
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any form of subsidies 29 . The programme also granted the 
Turkish Central Bank 
independence from political authority in October 200 130. 
In addition to these, the Central Bank began following an implicit inflation targeting 
regime in late 2001, which involved the use of the overnight interest rates as the policy 
instrument to achieve the inflation targets 3 1. As of the period between 2001 and 2008, 
the programme seems to have produced some desirable outcomes, especially in terms of 
bringing down inflation to single digits. In addition, the government has managed to 
maintain fiscal discipline, which eased the problems on debt sustainability. 
Nonetheless, it is questionable whether these positive developments have resulted in a 
stable macroeconomic path or not. Since the Turkish Central Bank has restricted its 
monetary policies only to control inflation in this period, it has left the value of the lira 
to be determined by the speculative decisions of the market forces. As a result, when 
global financial markets suffered a wide-ranging turmoil and shortage of liquidity in 
March 2006, the Turkish economy saw sharp declines in currency, equity and bond 
markets. In just two weeks, the Istanbul Stock Exchange fell 6.5 percent and the value 
of the Turkish lira dropped by about 20 percent against the US dollar. However, the 
Central Bank succeeded in calming the market by increasing the short-term interest 
rates. As of 2008, the economy is still dependent on short-term capital flows, albeit 
being much stronger than in the past owing to the relatively more stable political 
atmosphere, which can be attributed to the single-party government as opposed to the 
multi-party coalition governments of the 1990s. 
29 See Yeldan (2006). 
Y' The government also launched a programme referred to as the "Banking Sector Restructuring and 0 
Rehabilitation Programme", the purpose of which was to restructure the state banks and to improve the 
supervision and auditing in the sector (see Kibritcioglu, 2005). 
31 See Ozlale and Metin-Ozcan (2007). 
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1.3 The Contribution of the Thesis 
The existing literature on the post-liberalization Turkish economy lacks a 
comprehensive study that investigates the dynamics behind the currency crises and the 
speculative pressure in the Turkish foreign exchange market 32 This thesis aims at filling 
this gap in the literature through making three contributions to the existing knowledge 
in this area. 
First of all, a major shortcoming of the existing empirical studies is that they focus only 
on the episodes of extreme speculative pressure that result in full-blown currency crises, 
analyzing the developments just before a certain currency crisis and widely overlooking 
episodes of mediocre speculative pressure 33 . It can be argued that such myopic 
concentration misses the long-run relationship between variables and the exchange 
market pressure in the build-up to a crisis. 
It goes without saying that, any assessment of an economic relationship must consider 
the evolution of the series over a long period since looking at a short period alone could 
give a distorted picture. On these grounds, the existing studies on the Turkish crises are 
insufficient to infer conclusions regarding the underlying dynamics of the exchange 
market pressure. Indeed, the standard econometric techniques used in the existing 
studies aim at explaining the incidence of crises rather than analyzing exchange market 
pressure 34 . Nonetheless, in order to understand the mechanics of currency crises, the 
underlying dynamics of the exchange market pressure should also be investigated 35 An 
this respect, the literature lacks an empirical investigation that systematically 
investigates the nature of the causalities surrounding the speculative pressure in the 
32 See Chapter 3. 
33 Mediocre magnitudes of speculative pressure are also important as they disrupt economic activity and 
lead to substantial losses for market participants. 
34 These approaches convert extreme speculative market pressure into a discrete event, which disregards 
possible information from the tranquil episodes as well as from the magnitude of the pressure and the 
depth of the resulting currency crisis. 35 An increase in exchange market pressure would indicate an increased likelihood of currency crises and 
vice versa. Therefore, conceptually, if a variable is in a long-run relationship with exchange market 0 
pressure, then it means that this variables is closely linked to not only the increased speculative pressure 
on the exchange rate, but is also closely linked to the likelihood of currency crises. Therefore, it is 
important to identify which variables are in a long-run equilibrium relationship with currency crises so 
that pre-emptive policies can be designed to diminish speculative pressure and, hence, the likelihood of 
currency crises. 
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exchange market and the currency crises and assessing the extent to which the 
underlying dynamics of these two economic phenomena are different. 
Therefore, the first and the foremost contribution that this thesis makes to the existing 
knowledge is that it aims at filling this gap in the literature by investigating whether the 
long-run and short-run dynamics of exchange market pressure in the Turkish foreign 
exchange market can be pinned down for the period between 1989: 09 and -2001: 04. For 
this purpose, the thesis applies the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds 
testing approach introduced by Pesaran et al (2001) for the first time in the related 
literature, employing a continuous exchange market speculative pressure index rather 
than a binary crisis index. 36 
The second contribution to the literature is to investigate whether exchange market 
pressure and currency crises in Turkey are driven by common factors in the period 
between 1989: 09 and 2001: 04. This investigation is motivated by the consideration that 
not all episodes of high speculative pressure result in a currency crisis and, therefore, 
the determinants of currency crises may differ from those of the speculative pressure in 
the foreign exchange market. For this purpose, the thesis employs a set of binary logit 
and ordered logit models in order to identify the deten-ninants of currency crises within 
the framework of the existing theories on currency crises. A novelty of this analysis is 
that it considers a categorical currency crisis index within an ordered logit framework 
for the first time in the existing literature. The advantage of this approach is that it 
addresses the shortcoming of the binary crisis index in distinguishing between crises of 
small magnitude and larger magnitude, and treats each episode in relation to its 
magnitude. In this way, it provides a more accurate investigation of which variables are 
statistically significant in explaining the currency crises than the binary choice model. 
This thesis makes a third contribution to the existing literature by applying the non- 
parametric signals approach introduced by Kaminsky et al (1998) in order to identify 
the leading indicators of currency crises in the case of Turkey for the period between 
1989: 09 and 2001: 04. This analysis is motivated by the consideration that although 
36 The continuous composite index captures all occurrences of speculative pressure in the foreign 
exchange market from the mediocre episodes to major ones, without discriminating according to duration 
and intensity. Hence, it is more informative than a binary crisis definition. 
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some variables may be statistically insignificant in explaining currency crises based on 
econometric techniques, it would be misleading to rule out the possibility that these 
variables may be useful in pointing out the weaknesses in the economy before currency 
crises. Accordingly, the purpose of this analysis is to address the shortcoming of the 
binary and ordered logit models in sorting explanatory variables strictly as significant 
and insignificant regardless of their possible effectiveness in signalling the 
vulnerabilities in the economy in the wake of currency crises. The signals approach 
examines the capability of the explanatory variables in serving as the leading indicators 
of currency crises rather than investigating specifically whether the explanatory 
variables in question are statistically significant or not. In this way, the robustness of the 
findings obtained from the binary and ordered logit models to the choice of an 
alternative empirical approach will also be assessed. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the existing theoretical models on 
speculative attacks and currency crises in the literature, laying out the theoretical 
background for the empirical applications carried out in the thesis. On the other hand, 
Chapter 3 surveys the empirical literature on exchange market pressure and currency 
crises, linking the failings of the existing studies to the present research. 
Chapter 4 analyses the currency crises in Turkey in the light of the existing theories of 
currency crises, whereas Chapter 5 introduces the data, builds the explanatory variables 
and carries out the unit root tests to shed light on the time-series properties of the data. 
Chapter 6 investigates whether the long-run and short-run dynamics of exchange market 
pressure in the Turkish foreign exchange market can be pinned down using 
cointegration techniques. On the other hand, Chapter 7 investigates whether exchange 
market pressure and the currency crises are driven by common factors. For this purpose, 
it employs binary logit and ordered logit models to find out which variables are 
statistically significant in increasing the likelihood of currency crises. 
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Chapter 8 applies the non-parametric signals approach to investigate which variables 
can be used as the leading indicators of currency by analyzing the timing of the early 
warning signals they issue. This chapter focuses on the predictive powers of the 
variables rather than sorting them as statistically significant and insignificant. 
Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the findings of the thesis, discusses some policy 
implications that emerge from the thesis and provides directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The existing literature on the theoretical models of speculative attacks and currency 
crises can be categorized into three mainstream models, namely, the first-generation 
models, the second-generation models and the third-generation models. 
The first-generation models establish a relationship between weak economic 
fundamentals and the timing of the crises. These models are based on a small open 
economy with a pegged exchange rate, where domestic credit expands continuously to 
finance a budget deficit. This expansionary monetary policy, which is inconsistent with 
the prevailing exchange rate regime, eventually results in a currency crisis. 
On the other hand, the second-generation models expand the explanatory capacity of the 
first-generation models by incorporating the role of self-fulfilling expectations of the 
market participants in giving rise to a currency crisis. When the first- and the second- 
generation models failed to explain the Mexican Tequila crisis of 1994 and the East 
Asian crisis of 1997, the need for the third-generation models became apparent. This 
more recent genre of theoretical models link the currency crises to financial sector 
balance sheet weaknesses. 
Despite these three generations of theoretical models, there exists no single model that 
can be used to explain all currency crises around the world. Each model captures a 
particular aspect of a certain crisis, while missing some dimensions of others. As Rodrik 
(1998) explains, "Every [currency] crisis spans a new generation of economic models. 
When a new crisis hits, it turns out that the previous generation of models was hardly 
adequate. " 37 
37 See Rodrik (1998: p. 5). 
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In spite of this shortcoming, the existing theoretical models have been useful in terms of 
paving the ground for the empirical research on the causes of speculative attacks and 
currency crises, as well as identifying the explanatory variables that can be used to 
investigate the causes of these phenomena. The present chapter offers a critical review 
of the existing theoretical literature on speculative attacks and currency crises and sets 
the theoretical background for the empirical research that will be conducted in the 
thesis. ' 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the first-generation 
models of currency crises. Section 2.3 provides an analysis of the second-generation 
models of currency crises. Section 2.4 reviews the third-generation models of currency 
crises. Section 2.5 points out the conclusions that emerge from the chapter. 
2.2 First-Generation Models 
The First-generation models originate from Salant and Henderson's (1978) model of 
speculative attacks on the gold market, which was adapted by Krugman (1979) to the 
case of the foreign exchange market. 
The most important strength of this genre of models is its simplicity in explaining the 
dynamics behind currency crises. In a nutshell, they point out the source of speculative 
attacks as the inconsistencies between a particular exchange rate peg and domestic 
economic fundamentals such as excess creation of domestic credit, which is typically 
prompted by a fiscal imbalance. The monetized fiscal deficit leads to reserve losses and 
when reserves fall to a critical threshold, rational speculators anticipate the depreciation. 
Hence, they shift their wealth from domestic currency to foreign currency, precipitating 
the collapse by acquiring the monetary authority's entire stock of foreign exchange 
reserves. This way a currency crisis takes place earlier than the natural point of collapse. 
The first-generation models can be criticized on the grounds that they fail to provide an 
adequate representation of the forces at work and the actions taken by the governments 
in most cases. Accordingly, various modifications have been made to Krugman's (1979) 
model in order to bring it closer to the real life and to deal with different 
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macroeconomic circumstances. For instance, Flood and Garber (1984) suggest a 
simplified linear model, where they relax the assumption of perfect foresight in 
Krugman's mode138. On the other hand, Connolly and Taylor (1984) introduce a model 
in which, instead of a fixed exchange rate regime, a crawling peg regime is considered. 
Similarly, a sub-group of alternative first-generation models is suggested by Krugman 
and Rotemberg (1990), Edin and Vredin (1993) and Otker and Pazarbasioglu (1994). 
These studies extend the model to target zones, where a Central Bank intervenes in the 
foreign exchange market to restrict exchange rate movements within a given band 
instead of pegging the exchange rate. A further modification is introduced by Flood et 
al (1996), who incorporate the role of an active sterilization policy into the analysis, 
which involves a Central Bank's intervention through open market purchases of 
domestic bonds held by the private sector. 
Overall, Flood et al's (1996) model offers the most realistic modification to Krugman's 
(1979) original model as sterilization by the Central Bank is indeed frequently observed 
in most of the real-life currency crises. Sterilized intervention is a combination of two 
transactions. First the central bank conducts a non-sterilized intervention by selling 
foreign currency and buying domestic currency. This results in a fall in monetary base. 
Then the central bank sterilizes the effect on monetary base by buying a corresponding 
quantity of home currency denominated bonds. The purpose of the sterilization is to 
keep money supply and, hence the interest rates unaffected (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
1996). The advantage of sterilization is that, in the case of a speculative attack, it 
prevents the monetary base from shrinking as the sudden drop in foreign exchange 
reserves is balanced by an equivalent rise in the domestic assets held by the Central 
Bank. 
Flood and Marion (1999) provide an elegant description of the first-generation models, 
which is based on a small open economy where the purchasing power parity is assumed 
to hold and the investors are assumed to have perfect foresight. The domestic monetary 
authority uses its international reserves to fix the exchange rate. The model is based on 
the following five equations where all variables. are expressed in logarithms except the 
domestic and foreign interest rates: 
38 The authors simplify Krugman's (1979) framework using a linear discrete-time model and explicitly 
derive a solution for the time of the collapse. 
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m -p = -a(i), a >o 
which represents domestic money market equilibrium, where output is taken to be 
constant and is normalized to zero. In Equation 2.1, m denotes the domestic supply of 
high-powered money, p denotes the domestic price level, and i denotes the domestic- 
currency interest rate. The Central Bank backs domestic money supply by domestic 
credit (d) and international reserves (r): 
m=d+r (2.2) 
Here, domestic credit means holding of government bonds. The domestic currency 
interest rate and price level are subject to international arbitrage conditions. The price 
level is governed by purchasing power parity: 
pýp*+e (2.3) 
where p* denotes the foreign price level, which is usually held constant by assumption, 
and e denotes the exchange rate representing the domestic-currency price of foreign 
exchange. In addition, it is assumed that the uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds: 
i=i*+ ý (2.4) 
where i* denotes the foreign-currency interest rate and ý denotes the expected and 
actual rate of exchange rate change. In a world of certainty and with the exchange rate 
fixed at e=F, it follows that ý=0 and i= i*. Furthermore, deficit financing requires 
domestic credit to grow at a constant rate and that, i* and p* remain constant. 
Substituting from Equations 2.2,2.3 and 2.4 into Equation 2.1 with ý=0, the 
following equation is obtained: 
d+ r--: p*-ZF= - a(i*) (2.5) 
When the exchange rate, foreign price and foreign interest rate are fixed, d grows at the 
rate p, r must fall at the same rate, so that i =-p. With a lower bound on international 
reserves and y>0, the fixed exchange rate regime cannot survive forever. This is 
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because any finite reserve stock would be exhausted in finite time as the money demand 
is constant. Domestic residents, who do not want to hold the extra money from the 
expansion of domestic credit, sell this extra domestic currency and buy foreign 
currency, thereby lowering the stock of foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank. 
The crisis occurs before foreign exchange reserves are completely exhausted. The exact 
time of the attack is determined by the so-called 'ýshadow exchange rate" (F ), which is 
defined as the "floating exchange rate that clears the market once an attack has taken 
place"39 . With the 
domestic rate of monetary growth exceeding that of the rest of the 
world, the shadow exchange rate rises over time. When the shadow exchange rate has 
risen to the fixed rate, it is Profitable for the speculators to attack as can be seen in 
Figure 2.1. 
e 
F 
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Figure 2.1 Attack time 
Source: Flood and Marion (1999: p. 4) 
In Figure 2.1, the upward-sloping curve is the shadow exchange rate (2ý) and the 
horizontal line is the pre-attack fixed exchange rate (F). This is the value of the 
exchange rate if the currency were floating. Supposing that the agents expect that the 
exchange rate will depreciate after the collapse, that is, F>Y, speculators will foresee 
the capital gain and will compete against each other for the profit. Setting i* = p* =0 
for simplicity, and assuming that r=0 after a speculative attack, the exchange rate that 
solves the post-attack money market is given by: 
39 See Flood and Marion (1999: p. 3). 
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dA d 
F =-a(F) (2.6) 
Also, assuming that i*=p*=0 and F=F in Equation 2.5, i. e. F=ý=p, actual and 
expected rate of fixed exchange rate change depends on credit growth. Also, when 
international reserves are completely exhausted, r=0. Hence, the exchange rate that 
balances the money market after the crisis can be represented as follows: 
e =au+d (2.7) 
In Figure 2.1, F and F intersect at point A, where d=e. This suggests that speculative 
attacks will take place only when d>e, where W>F, meaning that there is a capital 
gain to speculators for every unit of reserves purchased from the goverrunent. 
Speculators' competition for capital gain causes an attack and the competition continues 
until the attack is driven back to point A. Since by perfect foresight anticipated jumps in 
the exchange rate are ruled out, the attack on the Central Bank's reserves occurs when 
the shadow floating exchange rate just equals the fixed rate, W>F. 
At the time of the attack, several adjustments take place in the money market. For 
instance, the high-powered money supply drops by the size of the attack. Also, the 
demand for domestic currency drops because the domestic-currency interest rate 
increases to reflect prospective currency depreciation. Furthermore, the money-market 
balance at the instant of the attack requires a fall in money supply to match exactly the 
fall in money demand, so that Ar = -ap, where Ar denotes the change in foreign 
exchange reserves at the time of the attack, i. e. the size of the speculative attack. Since 
domestic credit follows the process d, = do + pt, reserves follow rt = ro -pt. At the time 
of the crisis, reserves fall to zero. At time T, the speculative attack triggers a fall in the 
money supply, which leads to fall in money demand. Here it is assumed that the 
reserves are exhausted at time T Rewriting Ar = -au as a function of T, the condition for 
the attack can be represented as follows: 
-Ar = ro -PT= ap (2.8) 
where T denotes the time of the crisis. Solving for Tin Equation 2.8 yields: 
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T= r'-a'u (2.9) 
p 
which shows that the higher the initial stock of reserves, or the lower the rate of 
domestic credit expansion, the longer it takes before the fixed exchange rate regime 
collapses 40 . 
Although each model has different features, on the whole, all first-generation models 
share five common features. First, currency crises arise as a result of inconsistencies 
between the exchange rate system and a budget deficit that is financed through 
monetization. Second, speculative attacks are inevitable when fiscal policy is not 
consistent with the exchange rate regime. Third, currency attacks stem from rational 
expectations so that clear predictions can be made concerning the timing of the crises. 
Fourth, crises take place before official reserves actually hit zero. Fifth, it is assumed 
that the government has a passive stance and its policy is permanent. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the most important strength of the first-generation 
models is that they are not only able to predict that a collapse will occur but also solve 
for the time at which the collapse will occur. Since they demonstrate that speculative 
attacks represent an entirely rational market response to persistent inconsistencies 
between the Central Bank's objectives and the macroeconomic fundamentals, they are 
useful in identifying the relevant macroeconomic fundamentals whose variation in a 
certain trend helps to foresee a currency crisis. 
An important Policy implication of these models is that the Central Bank can maintain 
the exchange rate only by possessing adequate foreign exchange reserves. Therefore, 
these models emphasize the importance of holding adequate reserve stocks. More 
specifically, the Central Bank must have the capability of purchasing all of its liabilities, 
41 i. e. the domestic currency in circulation, which is put up for sale by the speculators 
Nonetheless, a major shortcoming of these models is that they represent government 
policy in a very mechanical way. They assume that the monetary authorities keep on 
printing money to cover a budget deficit regardless of the external situation and remain 
40 See Flood and Marion (1999: p. 5). 
41 See Eichengreen et al (1996). 
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passive in case of speculative attacks. Obviously this assumption of seigniorage 
financing of the budget deficit is quite unrealiStiC42. In the real life, several options are 
' available for the policy-makers. For instance, the governments may engage in sterilized 
interventions through open market operations. Likewise,. Central Banks can repel 
speculative attacks by increasing short-term interest rates, which may provide them with 
enough time to adapt measures to regain credibility. 
The limitations of the first-generation models became evident particularly with the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (EMS) crisis in 1992-1993 and the Mexican peso 
crisis of 1994, when even countries with adequate international reserves, manageable 
domestic credit growth and conservative monetary policies also experienced financial 
crises 43 . The failure of 
first-generation models to explain the underlying causes of the 
currency crises in these countries initiated the development of the second-generation 
models of currency crises, which will be reviewed in the next section. 
2.3 Second-Gcncration Models 
As explained in Section 2.2, the most important shortcoming of the first-generation 
models is their assumption of a very rigid, mechanical policy rule on the part of the 
monetary authorities. This shortcoming was rectified by Obstfeld (1986,1994,1996) 
who took into account the possibility of the policy rule changing based on the perceived 
costs and benefits of a devaluation 44 . This new set of theoretical models has been 
referred to as the second-generation models. 
The most important strength of the second-generation models is that they consider the 
possibility of having multiple equilibria where a speculative attack may be profitable 
even in the presence of sound fundamentals. On the other hand, in the first equilibrium, 
no speculative attack takes place and the fundamentals remain unchanged. In the second 
42 See Calvo (1998) for an analysis of the first-generation models under the assumption of financing the 
budget deficit by domestic borrowing. The author explains that under this assumption, the crisis takes 
place earlier than that in Krugman's ( 1979) original model. Cý 4' Therefore, these crises seemed unrelated to the economic fundamentals predicted by the first- 
eI neration models. E 
Obstfeld's exposition was later refined by Ozkan and Sutherland (1995), Cole and Kehoe (1996) and 
Jeanne (1997). 
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equilibrium, a speculative attack takes place and the fundamentals change. In this case, 
the expected future fundamentals conditional on a speculative attack taking place are 
incompatible with the peg. Therefore, a shift from the first equilibrium to the second 
takes place if the market participants expect that a speculative attack will take place and 
the fundamentals will no longer be consistent with the peg, even if the current 
fundamentals are in fact healthy. Therefore, these models make a major contribution to 
the existing knowledge by suggesting that the crises can take place even in the absence 
of fiscal and monetary policies inconsistent with the exchange rate regime. 
Another strength of the second-generation models is that they are more realistic in 
considering the decision-making mechanism of the government. They suggest that the 
Central Bank views the peg as a contingent commitment, constantly trading off its Costs 
45 and benefits, and keeping the peg as long as it is favorable 
In a simple example of a second-generation type currency crisis model, Ozkan and 
Sutherland (1995) suggest that the authorities' objective function depends positively on 
the benefits derived from keeping a fixed nominal exchange, such as enhanced 
credibility in their efforts to reduce inflation, and negatively on the deviations of output 
from a certain target level. Under a fixed exchange rate, increases in foreign interest 
rates lead to higher domestic interest rates and lower levels of output, making it more 
costly for the authorities to maintain the parity. Once foreign interest rates exceed some 
critical level, the cost of keeping the exchange rate fixed surpasses the benefits, and the 
authorities abandon the parity. 
Introducing a similar model, Obstfeld (1994) proposes that the expectation of a collapse 
leads to higher wages and lower employment, which prompts the government to 
abandon the parity out of concern for output. The author also proposes an alternative 
model where the expectations of a collapse lead to higher interest rates, prompting the 
government to abandon the parity out of concern for the increased cost of servicing the 
public debt46. 
43 The commitment is limited by the existence of an exit clause, which allows the abandonment of the peg 
if economic fundamentals deteriorate. 
46 Several other authors such as De Kock and Grilli (1993), Cole and Kehoe (1996) and Velasco (1996) 
also mention domestic debt beside unemployment as one of the factors that may drive the government's 
decision of whether or not to abandon the parity. 
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On the other hand, Obstfeld (1996) and Sachs el al (1996) argue that higher interest 
rates may lead to bankruptcies in the banking system if the banking sector is fragile. In 
this case, the authorities May prefer to devalue rather than incurring the cost of a 
bailoUt47 
. Therefore, it can be concluded that any factor that may affect the authorities' 
objective function could be used as a predictor of currency crises in the second- 
generation models. For instance, since the high level of interest rates needed to maintain 
a fixed exchange rate may result in higher financing costs for the government, the 
decision to abandon the parity may depend on the stock of public debt. 
On the other hand, Ozkan and Sutherland (1995) show that if the unemployment rate in 
an economy is high, the monetary authority will be less willing to defend it's currency 
against speculative attacks by raising interest rates because it might aggravate the 
unemployment problem. An increase in unemployment or the public debt increases the 
cost to the government of defending the peg, thereby increasing the probability of a 
speculative attack on the currency. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the most important message conveyed by the second- 
generation models is that the greater the cost of devaluation, the more resistant the 
government will be against a speculative attack. In return, the degree of commitment of 
the government to the exchange rate regime may determine whether a speculative attack 
will take place or not. As Drazen and Masson (1994) suggest, if the government 
commits itself firmly to the exchange rate regime, this gives the impression that the cost 
of devaluation is too high and that the goven-iment will try to protect the peg at all costs. 
In this case, the credibility of the peg becomes higher and the likelihood of a speculative 
attack taking place decreases. These models suggest that currency crises may take place 
as a result of self-fulfilling prophecies of the market agents. If the agents believe that 
defending the parity is too costly, a speculative attack may develop purely through self- 
fulfilling prediction as well as due to a predicted future deterioration in macroeconomic 
fundamentaIS48. 
47 The cost of bailout could result from an explicit or implicit official guarantee on the banking system 
liabilities due to the lender-of-last resort function of the Central Bank. 
49 See Krugman (1996: p. 346). 
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In the light of this analysis, it can be concluded that an important strength of the second- 
generation models is that they consider the government as an active agent trying to 
maximize its welfare function by weighing the costs and benefits of maintaining the 
peg, taking account of the broad economic environment on the contrary of the passive 
role of authorities in the first-generation models. 
A typical framework of second-generation models is suggested by Krugman (1996). In 
deciding whether or not to defend an exogenously specified exchange rate parity, the 
government takes three concerns into account: First, it wants an exchange rate 
depreciation to help in decreasing high unemployment or reducing the real value of a 
heavy domestic debt burden. Second, the greater the rate of depreciation that private 
agents expect, the higher is the cost of maintaining the fixed exchange rate, leading to 
higher domestic interest rates, through uncovered interest parity. This could, in turn, 
lead to a lower output level or higher interest payments on the domestic debt. Third, it 
wants to keep the fixed exchange rate to maintain its credibility for political reasons 49 
These concerns are captured in the following loss function of the monetary authorities: 
L= [a(e* - U) + bc]2 + R(Ae) (2.10) 
where F denotes the currently fixed exchange rate, e* denotes the optimal exchange rate 
that the government would choose if it faced no credibility concerns, and C is the 
expected rate of depreciation, which is equal to e'-e. On the other hand, e is the 
logarithm of the exchange rate, and R represents the foreign exchange reserves of the 
central bank. Hence, R(Ae) takes on the value 0 if the government does not allow the 
exchange rate to change, but takes on the value C if it does. Thus, C is a fixed reputation 
cost that the government will incur if it abandons its parity. Abandoning the peg would 
eliminate the first two terms in Equation 2.10, as explained below. 
The policy-makers have to make the best of the macroeconomic trade-off among 
conflicting objectives, whereas private agents try to guess their intentions. If the 
government is currently pegging, the market might expect either that it will continue to 
do so (e'= F) or that it will abandon the peg next period (e--e*), where e' denotes 
49 See Krugman (1996: pp. 350-35 1). 
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market expectation of the exchange rate. The decision as to whether to retain the peg in 
this period depends on the comparison of the loss from staying on the peg with the 
credibility cost of leaving it. If the government devalues, it will set the exchange rate 
equal to its optimal level e* and private agents will expect no future change in the 
exchange rate, so that c=0. Hence, the first two terms in the loss function shown in 
Equation 2.10 will disappear. If the government maintains the peg, then the last term in 
the function will disappear. Hence, the decision as to whether to abandon or maintain 
the peg will depend on the following condition: 
a [(e* -F) + b(e" _F)]2 >C 
If the market does not expect a devaluation, then the second term in Equation 2.11 will 
disappear, and the government will want to maintain its peg, fulfilling the market's 
expectations, as long as: 
[a (e* -ZF)] < (2.12) 
If the market expects a devaluation, then the second term will become positive, and the 
government will abandon the peg, again fulfilling the expectations as long as: 
[(a + b)(e *- F)f >C (2.13) 
Combining these two inequalities, the following multiple disequilibria can be obtained: 
[a (e* -F)]2 < C< [(a + b)(e* _ ZF )]2 (2.14) 
where three ranges of equilibria exist. In the first equilibrium, the government will 
always devalue, even if private agents do not expect a devaluation, as long as: 
[a (e* -U)]2> C (2.15) 
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This could be caused by strong exchange rate misalignments producing very negative 
effects on economic fundamentals. In the second equilibrium, the government will 
never devalue, even if private agents expect a devaluation, as long as: 
[(a + b)(e* _y)]2,,: ý C 
In this case, the fixed cost of devaluation always exceeds its positive effect on economic 
fundamentals. In the third case, there is a range of multiple equilibria, described by 
Equation 2.14, where the government will fulfill private agents' expectations. This 
range is described as follows: 
[a (e* _ iF)]2 <C< [(a + b)(e* - ýw )]2 
In this region, the government will devalue only if private agents expect a devaluation. 
In this intermediate range, there are multiple equilibria. The outcome is determined by 
the market expectations, i. e. self-fulfilling prophecies. In the intermediate range, the 
authorities will make a decision that will fulfill private agents' expectations. The 
expectations of market participants may be driven by "sunspots", which are defined as 
"events that for whatever reason are taken by private agents as a signal that the currency 
regime is about to collapse" 50 . 
Krugman (1996) makes a major contribution to the existing knowledge by suggesting 
two important points. First, he argues that, rather paradoxically, the likelihood of having 
multiple equilibria is higher when the fundamentals are healthy. This is because, if the 
fundamentals are clearly bad, the currency crisis takes place anyway. However, if the 
fundamentals are good, there remains uncertainty about whether a crisis will take place. 
This results in multiple equilibria. Second, if the market participants do not know the 
preference of the authorities as to whether to maintain the exchange rate at all costs or 
not, they may often test them with unsuccessful attacks in the hope of obtaining 
information about their determination in protecting the currency. 
50 See Krugman (1996: p. 362). 
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An obvious shortcoming of the second-generation models is that they simply suggest 
that there are multiple possible equilibria given certain fundamentals without explaining 
the factors that might provoke the jumps from one equilibrium to another. Addressing 
this issue, Sachs et al (1996) suggest a more parsimonious second generation type 
model that considers the possibility of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling prophecies 
in the financial markets. The model suggests that an economy is more likely to 
experience a currency crisis if the real exchange is overvaluated, the banking system is 
fragile, and the level of international reserves does not sufficiently cover. liquid 
liabilities. The model considers a small open economy with a pegged exchange rate. 
The real exchange rate is shown as EOIP, where EO denotes the nominal exchange rate 
and P denotes the ratio of the domestic price level to the foreign price level, which is 
taken as predetermined in the short term. For simplicity, P is set to unity (P--I). As long 
as net capital outflow (K) is smaller than or equal to international reserves (R), no 
devaluation occurs. Otherwise, a devaluation takes place and the government 
establishes a new nominal exchange rate (e) in order to achieve a target real exchange 
rate. Thus, 
Ei = 
Eo, if K: 5 R JET, 
if K>R 
(2.18) 
where E, is the next-period exchange rate. The size of the devaluation is shown as: 
D= 
(E 
_I (2.19) 
Eo 
) 
Thus: 
0, ifK: 5 R 
Dý' E'*-E 0 ifK >R 
(2.20) 
Eo 
where e reflects, inter alia, the health of the banking system. If the banking sector is 
not fragile, the government will set kr= e, where e denotes the long-run real exchange 
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rate since P=I. On the other hand, if the banking sector is fragile, the government will 
refrain from setting high interest rates to defend the exchange rate. In the latter case, it 
will choose a real exchange rate more depreciated than e in order not to cause 
bankruptcies among banks. e will therefore depend on: 
ET= e»SF), f '(BSF» 0, J(0)=l (2.21) 
where BSF denotes banking sector fragility". Thus the potential course of the exchange 
rate can be shown as: 
e f(BSF) - 1, if K>R D=ý Eo (2.22) 
0, i fK<R 
which suggests that a devaluation occurs when there is a capital outflow in excess of 
reserve levels. The size of the devaluation is the highest when the exchange rate is 
initially appreciated relative to its long-run average so that e 1EO is high, or ifj(BSP) is 
large. In the model, the possibility of multiple equilibria arises because capital 
movements depend on anticipated exchange rate behaviour52. The capital outflow 
depends on the expectation of a devaluation, whereas the devaluation depends on a 
capital outflow. 
Sachs el al (1996) provide an illustration where there are N small investors who each 
hold assets, k, in the banking system of the country. If all investors flee the country with 
all of their funds, the size of the incipient capital outflow would be K= Nk. Investors 
decide to withdraw funds in the event that a devaluation (D) is expected to exceed a 
percentage (0) and maintain funds in the country as long as D is expected to be less than 
or equal to 0. Therefore, for investorj, capital outflow can be represented as: 
0, if D':! ý 0 kj = k, if D" >0 
(2.23) 
51 Sachs et al (1996) use lending boom as a proxy for banking sector fragility. 0 52 See Sachs et al (1996). 
31 
where kj represents capital outflow attributed to investori. 
By symmetry, total capital outflows will be: 
K=10' 
if D:: 5 0 (2.24) 
Nk, if D>0 
If the fundamentals are healthy: 
-L)f(BSF) - 1:! ý, 0 (2.25) Eo 
If the real exchange rate is not overvalued and banks are not bankrupt, (eIEO)I(BSF)-l 
could be very close to zero. Therefore the condition (elEo)I(BSF)-l :50 could be 
satisfied even if 0 is small. When this condition applies, any devaluation would be 
smaller than the investors' threshold for capital flight. Tberefore, even in the event of a 
devaluation, K=O. Since K=O < R, there would be no devaluation. On the other hand, if 
the fundamentals are unhealthy: 
(_eo )f(BSF) 
-I >0 (2.26) Fý 
In this case, a devaluation would be larger than the investors' threshold. Therefore K=Nk 
if a devaluation does in fact occur. 
Sachs el al (1996) explain that there is a region of multiple equilibria where a 
devaluation may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If K=Nk<R, then the government 
would be able to defend the exchange rate against a capital outflow and a speculative 
attack would be warded off. On the other hand, if K=Nk>R, the occurrence of 
devaluation depends on the expectations of the investors. If each investor expects 
exchange rate stability (D--O), then each keeps k equal to zero, and no devaluation 
occurs. But if each investor expects a devaluation, however, then K=Nk>R and D>O. 
Therefore, there exists a region of multiple equilibria wh ere a devaluation may be a self- 
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fulfilling prophecy. To summarize, a devaluation (D > 0) is possible only if Equation 
2.26 holds and R< Nk. 
The model can be summarized as, if an economy has bad fundamentals, i. e. an 
overvalued real exchange rate and a fragile banking system, as well as a low level of 
international reserves relative to liquid liabilities, it will be "the likely victim of a 
currency crisis"53 - 
Based on this analysis it can be concluded that the second-generation models are more 
realistic than the first-generation models. This is because, contrary to the passive role of 
the authorities in the first-generation models, the second-generation models consider the 
government as an active welfare-maximizing agent that weighs the costs and benefits of 
maintaining the peg, while the speculators, believing that their attack may be profitable 
even in the face of sound fundamentals, may attack unexpectedly. In reaction to a 
speculative attack, the government might be reluctant to defend the peg by raising 
interest rates due to concern about the effect of this policy on the probability of a 
banking crisis and the associated fiscal costs of a bailout. On the other hand, the 
government may as well choose to devalue voluntarily if its domestic debt is too high as 
a devaluation would reduce the value of the debt. 
Despite their virtues, the second-generation models can be criticized on the grounds that 
they explain the abandonment of the peg as an optimal decision made by the policy- 
maker and not simply the outcome of a macroeconomic policy inconsistent with the 
peg. Although these models do not reject the role of the fundamentals in the economy, 
they emphasize that financial crises are not always necessarily &termined by the weak 
fundamentals and they may develop even without any significant change in such 
fundamentals. Therefore, the major implication of the second-generation models is that 
the timing of a speculative attack can not be determined. 
53 Sachs et al (1996, p. 9). 
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2.4 Third-Generation Models 
The third-generation models consider some important factors that have been ignored by 
the previous generations of models, most notably the role of financial sector weaknesses 
in giving rise to currency crises. Nonetheless, a shortcoming of the third-generation 
models is that they are too broad to be summarized in a single model. For instance, 
some models focus on the role of balance-sheet mismatches and moral hazard, whereas 
others consider herding behavior, contagion and capital flows 54 . 
The major strand of the third-generation models make an important contribution to the 
existing knowledge by stressing the role of the imbalances that arose from currency and 
maturity mismatches in the balance sheets of commercial banks and firins in paving the 
way to currency crises. These models highlight the role that liability dollarization, i. e. 
the predominance of foreign currency liabilities in the banks' balance sheets, plays in 
the upsurge of currency criseS55 . This genre 
is regarded as the balance sheet approach to 
currency crises and it suggests that liability dollarization can affect banks' balance 
sheets by undermining the quality of their foreign currency loan portfolios 56 . Realizing 
that assets may no longer be sufficient to service liabilities in case of a shock, investors 
sell domestic claims in anticipation of default, which in turn exerts pressure on the 
exchange rate 57 . 
On the other hand, liability dollarization may also severely constrain the operation of a 
floating exchange rate and often. lead to a pervasive "fear of floating" in the emerging 
market economieS58 . As a result, in the presence of substantial currency mismatches in 
the banks' balance sheets, the monetary authorities engage in heavy intervention in the 
I 
54 See, for instance, Diaz-Alejandro (1985), McKinnon and Pill (1996) and Allen and Gale (2000) for the 
role of balance-sheet mismatches and moral hazard; Bichchandani el al (1992) and Calvo and Mendoza 
(1997) for herding behaviour; and Masson (1998), Gerlach and Smets(1994), Drazen (1999), Burnside ei 
al(2001 a, 2001b, 2004), Kodres and Pritsker(2002) and Pasquariello (2007) for capital flows. 
" See, for instance, Krugman (1999); Corsetti el al (1999); Cespedes el al (2000); Aghion el al (2000, 
200 1); Gertler el al (2003); and Caval lo et al (2005). 
" The role of liability dollarization in 
' 
currency crises has been empirically documented by Allen and 
Gale (2000); Cespedes el al(2000); Aghion et al(2000,2001); Burnside el al(2001b); Bris and Koskinen 
(2002); Choi and Cook (2002); Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) and Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001). 
57 See Aghion el al(2001) and Goldstein and Turner(2004). 
58 See Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
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exchange market and in the management of interest rates to keep the exchange rate 
stable59. 
An interesting aspect of the third-generation models is that they are very similar to the 
second-generation models in the sense that they place emphasis on self-fulfilling panic. 
These models consider the currency crises as the international variants of bank-run 
models introduced by Diamond and Dybvig (1983)60 . They suggest that balance sheet 
weaknesses render commercial banks in emerging markets vulnerable to self-fulfilling 
runs 61 . 
A typical third generation model that highlights the role of balance sheet effects is 
introduced by Aghion et al (2001). The model is a monetary model based on a small 
open economy where goods prices are determined at the beginning of each period and 
remain fixed for the entire period. The nominal prices are rigid in the short-run. Hence, 
a currency depreciation leads to an increase in the foreign currency debt repayment 
obligations of the firms, and consequently a fall in profits. Since lower profits reduce 
net worth, it may result in less investment and lower output in the next period. This, in 
turn, brings a fall in the demand for money, and thus a currency crisis. 
The model has a number of underlying assumptions. First, there is a single good and 
purchasing power parity (PPP) holds ex ante, i. e., Pt = e, ' for each t, where Pt denotes 
the domestic price, e, denotes the expected nominal exchange rate. Second, the prices 
are sticky so that a shock to PPP causes the nominal exchange rate to move. Third, the 
firms are credit constrained and are limited in the amount of domestic currency 
borrowing, forcing them to borrow abroad. Fourth, the Central Bank follows interest 
rate targeting only from period 2 onwards. Fifth, the interest rate parity is shown as: 
I +it = (I +i*)(e, +, )let 
(2.27) 
59 See Calvo and Mishkin (2003) and Goldstein and Turner (2004). 
60 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) theorize that financial intermediation's instability can lead to financial 
crises. 
61 See, for instance, Jeanne and Wyplosz (200 1). 
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where i and i* denote the domestic and foreign interest rates, respectively. e denotes the 
nominal exchange rate and e' denotes the expected exchange rate. Money market 
equilibrium relates the nominal money supply (Ms) to money demand which is 
proportional to the price level (P), while real money demand (Md ) depends on real 
output (y) and the nominal interest rate (i). 
MIS=p1. 
. Mdo,, ý i 1) (2.28) 
Equations 2.27 and 2.28 yield the IPLO2 curve which links the period I exchange rate 
with period 2 output 63 . This relationship can 
be shown as: 
s 
(2.29) 
which provides a negative relationship between el and y2. i, is endogenous for given 
M, s and predetermined PI, whereas i2 is given by monetary policy. The maximum 
amount that can be borrowed (d) by the private agents is proportional to their cash flow 
(w): 
d, :5 pwt (2.30) 
wherep denotes the rate of credit expansion. The amount of domestic currency debt is 
limited to d, ' :5 dt. Working capital is the only input to production and it fully 
depreciates within one period so that capital is given by: 
kt= ivt + dt 
and if the credit constraint is binding, the production function can be written as: 
Yt =f((I +it) wt) (2.32) 
62 IPLM refers to an interest parity condition (IP curve) and money market condition (LM curve). IPLM 
can be shifted by monetary policy. For instance, monetary contraction leads to appreciation. 
6' As the Central Bank follows interest rate targeting from period 2 onward, expected PPP holds so that P2 
= e' = e,. 
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Nominal profits net of debt repayments (I-I, ) can be represented as: 
Py, - (I + i, -, 
)P, 
-Id, 
' - (I + i) 
e'P, 
-, 
(d, - d, ) (2.33) 
Assuming that a proportion (I - a) of profits is used to finance future investments, 
W2 = (I - a)I-I ,/P, . Assuming that a proportion (a) of the private agents' profits is 
consumed or distributed, then output in period 2 can be written as: 
y, -(I+r,, )d, c-(I+i*)- P, - 
(d, 
- d, c (2.34) 
where ro denotes the real interest rate. An increase in el leads to a reduction in future 
income through the effect of the credit constraint. All variables on the right-hand side of 
this equation are fixed at the beginning of period 1. The only exception is el. PI 
represents the prices which is held constant during period 1. The equation shows that an 
increase in el results in a fall in the profits through an increase in the foreign currency 
debt burden of domestic entrepreneurs. Figure 2.2 shows the case where multiple 
equilibria exist. If a large depreciation is expected, money demand is lowered which 
will lead to a depreciated currency. The intersection of TV and IPLM gives the short-run 
equilibrium. Here IV denotes "wealth" curve which describes the period 2 output 
response of credit-constrained entrepreneurs (y2) to variations in the period I exchange 
rate. W curve captures the effect of imperfect credit markets. 
ei 
Y2 
Figure 2.2 Multiple equilibria 
Source: Masson (2007: p. 50) 
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For a given output level, the domestic currency appreciates after a monetary 
compression in the first period due to a shortage of liquidity and it depreciates after a 
monetary compression in the second period due to an expected reduction in inflation. 
Finally, increases in i2 also shift the IPLM upwards. As in second-generation models, a 
currency crisis does not take place independently from fundamentals. A negative 
productivity shock64 that shifts the f function or a tightening of credit constraints 
represented by a lowery would shift the TV curve down and might move the economy 
from one-equilibrium to the multiple equilibrium case by shifting 1PLM curve upwards. 
The model suggests that the crisis should be seen as a result of a shock that occurs in 
period 1. The shock may be real such as a change in productivity or it may be a pure 
shift in expectations. Since prices cannot move during period 1, the nominal exchange 
rate has to move to absorb the shock. Hence the shock causes a deviation from 
purchasing power parity. 
An advantage of this model is that it can also be used to analyze the joint occurrence of 
currency crises and banking crises as the banks would suffer the same balance sheet 
effects. It also directs attention to moral hazard and information asymmetries as they 
result in more foreign currency borrowing 65 . Because of such problems, creditors may 
lose confidence in the health of the balance sheets of either the banking sector or the 
corporate sector in a country. This confidence loss may prompt sudden and large-scale 
outflows of capital, exerting pressure on the exchange rate or official reserves and 
ultimately resulting in a currency crisis 66 . 
In this respect, the third-generation models explain the ways through which the banking 
sector weaknesses and the occurrence of currency crises are related. Indeed, several 
authors have suggested different models to explain this phenomenon. For instance 
Goldfajn and Valdes (I 997a) explain that a run on a currency is associated with a run on 
the banks as the deposits constitute a significant portion of the domestic assets the 
For example a shock that lowers the production technolog ff 
65 See Masson (2007: p. 51). 
16 This phenomenon is formally explained by sudden stop theory introduced by Calvo (1998), Calvo and 
Mendoza (1999), Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Calvo and Mendoza (2000), and Schneider and Tornell 
(2000). This genre of theoretical models of currency crises tend to be diverse combinations of the 
concepts such as balance sheet effects, investor panic, capital outflow and contagion, to explain the joint 
occurrence of sudden stops, credit crunches, output contractions and currency crises. Overall, these 
models emphasize the liquidity problem in emerging economies due to sudden and massive stops and/or 
reversals in capital inflows. 
38 
private agents will convert into foreign assets in the case of a panic. On the other hand, 
Bumisde el al (2001a) explain that the government implicitly assumes the potential 
costs of the banking system by providing a deposit insurance scheme. Hence, a possible 
banking sector crisis would imply a potentially immense burden on the government's 
budget in case of a bail-out. As a result; the speculators realization that the government 
will be too weak to support the exchange rate will manifest itself as a speculative attack. 
In fact, Bumisde et al's (2001a) model can also be linked to the first-generation models 
in the sense that the Central Bank may choose to bail-out the banking system through 
seigniorage. In this case, excessive money creation may lead to a currency crisis as 
proposed by the first-generation models. However, the model differs from the first- 
generation models in that, at the time of a currency crisis, the fundamentals are not 
necessarily weak. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the third-generation models convey two important 
messages. First, a currency crisis can take place in the presence of banking sector 
problems even if the fundamentals are strong and the government does not resort much 
to monetary expansion through seigniorage. Second, currency crises can take place not 
. only under currency pegs but also under flexible exchange rate regimes. In this respect, 
the third-generation models are very similar to the second-generation models. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the theoretical literature on speculative attacks and currency 
crises. It first analyzed the first-generation models, which depict how a fixed exchange- 
rate policy combined with excessively expansionary pre-crisis fundamentals push the 
economy into crisis with the speculators trying to profit from the inconsistent policies. 
The most important feature of these models is that they can be used to predict the exact 
timing of speculative attacks and currency crises. In the light of the review of the 
various first-generation models, it can be concluded that these models convey the policy 
implication that fiscal and monetary discipline is necessary to prevent currency crises. 
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The review then focused on the second-generation models, which widen the explanatory 
capacity of the first-generation models by incorporating the role of self-fulfilling 
expectations and shifts between different monetary policy equilibria in causing currency 
crises. The most important feature of these models is that they focus on expectations 
rather than the fundamentals and suggest that a currency crisis may take place even if 
fundamentals are not unfavorable. In this respect, they are more realistic. As a result of 
the analysis of these models, it can be concluded that their most important shortcoming 
is that they can not be used to predict the exact timing of the speculative attacks and 
currency crises. 
The last group of models reviewed in this chapter is the third-generation models, which 
link currency crises to banking sector weaknesses. In particular, these models point out 
the role of balance sheet effects, moral hazard, herding behavior and contagion in 
currency crises. The most important feature of these moaels is their postulation that 
currency crises can take place not only under currency pegs but also under flexible 
exchange rate regimes, without any significant deterioration in the fundamentals. 
Overall, these models emphasize the importance of a healthy banking sector in 
preventing currency crises. 
This chapter has revealed that despite a plethora of alternative models, no convincing 
single theoretical framework exists to explain all currency crises. All theories on 
currency crises capture a particular dimension of crises, while missing some elements of 
the real currency crises. Nevertheless, they still offer some mechanisms that are useful 
for explaining, at least partially, why and how these crises emerge. Furthermore, they 
point out the explanatory variables that are used in the empirical literature, which will 
be reviewed in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER3 
REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
3.1 Introduction 
There exists a vast empirical literature on the studies that investigate the mechanics of 
currency crises and the speculative pressure in the exchange market. This chapter 
provides a critical review of the existing literature. 
In the literature, currency crises are not necessarily defined as a sudden devaluation of 
the domestic currency. Instead, they are defined as instances of extreme speculative 
pressure in the exchange market that do not necessarily result in a devaluation of the 
currency. This is because, even if the Central Bank succeeds in fending off a speculative 
attack, the resulting loss in foreign exchange reserves or the increase in interest rates 
disrupts the econoMy. 67 Therefore, the analysis of speculative pressure in the exchange 
market is as important as the analysis of currency crises. 
Accordingly, a strand of the literature focuses on the identification and the analysis of 
speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market rather than restricting itself 
exclusively with the episodes of currency crises, whereas another group of studies 
focuses on the detenninants of the past episodes of currency crises and aim at 
identifying their common causes. On the other hand, a third group of studies aims at 
devising early warning systems (EWS) to predict future currency crises. 
The most interesting feature of the existing empirical studies on the causes of currency 
crises and the speculative pressure in the exchange market is that they tend to differ 
vastly in terms of their methodologies, explanatory variables, sample of countries, and 
operational crisis definitions. 
A major shortcoming of the existing literature is the lack of consensus on what causes 
currency crises and speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market. 
67 See Eicheingreen el al (1995). 
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Notwithstanding a growing literature, to date, there exists no empirical methodology 
that successfully models all aspects of currency crises. As Tarashev (2004) explains, 
"despite the existence of well-established theoretical explanations of violent speculative 
attacks, the theory-based empirical analysis ofsuch attacky is still at an early stage "6ý 
The present chapter provides a critical review of the existing empirical studies, 
assessing the relative merits and drawbacks of alternative approaches used in the 
literature. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the studies that 
investigate the causes of speculative pressure in the exchange market. Section 3.3 
provides an analysis of the studies that focus on the currency crises using various 
techniques such as the logit and probit models, the signals approach and other 
approaches. Section 3.4 critically reviews the empirical studies on currency crises in 
Turkey. Section 3.5 presents the conclusions that emerge from the chapter. 
3.2 Studies that Investigate Speculative Pressure in the Foreign Exchange Market 
As discussed in Chapter 1, speculative attacks refer to episodes where currencies come 
under severe pressure of devaluation due to a sudden and massive restructuring of 
portfolios by the market participants in the hope of making profit from an imminent 
. SIS69 currency cri . Accordingly, speculative pressure 
in the foreign exchange market 
refers to the disequilibrium, in the foreign exchange market that stems from a selling 
pressure on the domestic currency and an excessive demand for foreign currency. 
Following Eichengreen et al (1995), this phenomenon is shortly referred to as 
69 970 exchange market pressure . In the existing literature, exchange market pressure 
is 
measured by an index which is referred to as the "exchange market pressure (EMP) 
index" or the "index of speculative pressure". Values of the index that exceed a certain 
threshold value are identified as episodes of 
68 See Tarashev (2004: p. 2). 
'9 See Aschheirn et al (1996). 
70 The existing literature uses the terms of speculative pressure and exchange market pressure 
synonymously. 
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currency crises. In this respect, the most important shortcoming of the existing literature 
is the arbitrariness of the threshold values used in the operational definitions of currency 
crises. To date, this shortcoming has not been addressed in the literature. 
A strand of the related literature focuses on the investigation of the factors that cause 
speculative pressure in the exchange market rather than focusing specifically on the 
currency crises. These studies have used a number of approaches to capture speculative 
pressure in the exchange market. Obviously, in the case of a floating exchange rate 
regime, capturing speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market is uncomplicated 
as the fluctuations in the exchange rate fully reflect the pressure in the market, provided 
that there is no intervention by the Central Bank. Nonetheless, in the case of a currency 
peg or a managed float, monetary authorities may choose to fully or partially ward off 
speculative attacks using several policy tools such as the international reserves or the 
short-term interest rates. In this case, the episodes of speculative pressure may not 
always result in a currency criSiS71 . Based on this consideration, different variants of the 
EMP indices used in the literature include interest rates and reserve changes in addition 
to changes in the exchange rate. Some studies use a simple index consisting of exchange 
rate alone 72 , whereas others exclude interest rates and use an index consisting of 
weighted averages of exchange rates and reserveS73 . Therefore, the existing literature 
can be criticized on the grounds that it lacks a consensus on how to proxy exchange 
market pressure. However, a strength of the literature is that the approaches suggested 
for capturing exchange market pressure generally recognize the importance of both the 
exchange rate changes and the foreign exchange interventions of the central bank. 
71 In this case, the speculative attacks are said to be "unsuccessful". 
72 See, for instance, Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998), Esquivel and Larrain 
ý1998) and Mang (2001). 
' See, for instance, Girton and Roper (1977), Dombusch et al (1995), Kaminsky el al (1998), Sachs et al 
(1996), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Vlaar (1999), Tanner (2001), 
Komulainen and Lukkarilla (2003) and Peltonen (2006). These authors exclude interest rates mostly 
based on data unavailability. 
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3.2.1 Studies that Apply Model-Dependent Indices 
The existing literature on the exchange market pressure contains two main approaches 
to building EMP indices: the model-based indices and model-independent indices. 
Model-based indices are based on structural models of the economy, whereas the latter 
are not. 
The seminal idea of measuring speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market 
based on an economic model is suggested by Girton and Roper (1977), who introduce 
an approach that is based on the monetary approach to the balance of payments. The 
authors refer to exchange market pressure as the magnitude of money market 
disequilibria that must be removed either through reserve or exchange rate changes to 
keep the money market in equilibrium under a managed floating exchange rate system. 
Accordingly, their EMP index consists of a simple sum of percentage changes in the 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves, which are weighted equall 4. 
Girton and Roper's (1977) approach has been used in many studies as the dependent 
Variable75. These studies generally identified a negative relationship between 
expansionary monetary policy and the pressure in the exchange market. 
This approach can be challenged on the grounds that it is based on a highly restrictive 
monetary model, which limits its applicability in empirical work. Indeed, for this 
reason, it has been subject to several modificationS76 . For instance, Wohar and Lee 
(1992) applied a less restrictive version of the Girton and Roper's (1977) model to 
Japan allowing for deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP) and incorporating 
foreign disturbances. The authors report empirical evidence that domestic credit growth 
has a negative impact on exchange market pressure. This model is tested by Pollard 
(1999) for Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. The author reports similar 
results to Wohar and Lee (1992). 
"' The authors use this index as the dependent variable in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to 
investigate the determinants of exchange market pressure and the independence of monetary policy in 
Canada from 1952 to 1974. 
" See, for instance, Connolly and Silveira (1979), Hodgson and Schncck (1981), Kim (1985), Burdekin 
and Burkett (1990), Mah (1998), Tanner (2002), Taslim (2003) and Parlaktuna (2005). 
76 See, for instance, Connolly and Da Silveira (1979), Roper and Tumovsky (1980), Wohar and Lee 
(1992), Shiva and Bahmani-Oskooee (1998), Mah (1998), Mathur (1999), Pollard (1999) and Tanner 
(2001). 
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, 
ýmong the modifications made to Girton and Roper's (1977) original model, those 
suggested by Connolly and Da Silveira (1979) and Roper and Turnovsky (1980) have 
been particularly novel as they introduce the idea of substituting the simple monetary 
approach by an IS-LM framework. Roper and Turnovsky (1980) suggest a further 
innovation by allowing Central Bank intervention to take the form of changes in 
domestic credit in addition to the changes in the foreign exchange reserves. Despite its 
novelty, this approach did not gain much popularity in the existing literature. 
Among the model-dependent approaches to capturing EMP, Weymark (1995,1997a, 
1997b 1998) makes the most important contribution to the literature by introducing a 
novel approach that could be applied to any exchange rate model to capture exchange 
market pressure. The author defines exchange market pressure as the exchange rate 
change which would have been required to remove this excess demand in the absence of 
money or foreign "change market intervention, given the expectations are generated by 
the exchange rate policy actually implemented 77 . The author suggests a simple model of 
a small-open economy with rational expectations to track the exchange rate elasticity of 
reserve changes. Her approach involves the use of these elasticity estimates as the 
weights in constructing an EMP index consisting of the changes in exchange rates and 
international reserves. Nonetheless, this approach can be criticized on the basis of its 
complexity. More specifically, the derivation of the elasticities involves very lengthy 
calculations. Indeed, possibly for this reason, this approach did not gain much 
popularity in the literature is spite of its virtues. 
In the light of this review, it can be concluded that the dependency of both Girton and 
Roper's (1977) original approach and its extensions by other authors on a particular 
structural model of the economy, has severely restricted their application in empirical 
research. For this reason, these approaches did not gain much popularity, whereas the 
model-independent approaches to capturing EMP have been used quite widely in the 
existing literature. 
77 See Weymark (1995: p. 278). 
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3.2.2 Studies that Apply Model-Independent Indices 
A strand of the existing literature challenges the issue of model-dependency of the 
existing EMP indices. For instance, Eichengreen et al (1995) propose a straightforward, 
model-independent approach to measuring exchange market pressure. This index 
consisted of the changes in interest rate differentials, exchange rates and international 
reserves. The most important feature of this approach is that it weights each component 
of the index by the inverse of its standard deviation to prevent the most volatile 
component from dominating the index 78 . 
Nonetheless, this weighting scheme is subject to criticism on the grounds that the 
relative volatilities of observed changes in the exchange rate, in the central bank's 
foreign reserves and in the interest rate differentials depend on the structure of the 
economy as well as on the intervention activities of the central bank. Hence, it is 
doubtful that the volatility-smoothing weights ensure that the components of the index 
of speculative pressure are commensurate 79 . 
A major advantage of Eichengreen et al's (1995) EMP index is its applicability in the 
case of all exchange rate regimes. For this reason, this index has been used directly as a 
dependent variable in many econometric applications in the literature. These 
applications have usually been in the context of vector autoregression (VAR) models, 
which investigate the determinants of speculative pressure in the foreign exchange 
market8o. Some of these studies offer a noteworthy contribution to the literature by 
investigating the relationship between monetary policy and exchange market pressure. 
For instance, Tanner (2001) investigates the interrelations between EMP and monetary 
policy proxied by observable in changes in domestic credit and the interest rate 
differential for Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand from 1990 to 
1998. The author reports empirical evidence that a contractionary monetary policy eases 
EMP, while an increase in EMP translates into higher credit growth. In a similar study, 
Gochoco-Bautista and Bautista (2005) investigate the relationships between monetary 
78 Eichengreen et al (1995) converted this EMP index into a dichotomous currency crisis variable using a 
threshold and used it in a probit model to investigate currency crises. 
79 See Weymark (1998: pp. 113-114). 
" See, for instance, Krkoska (2001), Karfakis and Moschos (1999), Tanner (2001,2002) and Gochoco- 
Bautista and Bautista (2005). 
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policy and EMP in the Philippines before and after the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. The 
authors find that the responses of monetary policy to EMP were more contractionary in 
the crisis period and that the impact of interest rates on EMP was negative in the 
tranquil period, but positive in the crisis period. 
Although these two studies are novel in the sense that they are the first applications of 
the EMP indices in examining the impact of monetary policy on exchange market 
pressure, they can be criticized on the grounds of their narrow focus and their omission 
of potentially relevant variables, such as fiscal sector variables. Therefore, they offer 
only a limited contribution to the existing literature. 
The EMP indices estimated following Eichengreen et al's (1995) approach have also 
been used in the context of other econometric applications. For instance, Modeste 
(2005) used it in cointegration and error correction models (ECM) to investigate the 
impact of foreign debt on exchange market pressure for Guyana from 1968 to 200081. In 
a more recent empirical study, Bird and Mandilaras (2006) used this index in the 
context of a least squares dummy variables (LSDV) technique for Latin American, 
Caribbean, East Asian and Pacific countries from 1970 to 200082 . Despite their 
originality in terms of their research objectives and the econometric approaches, these 
studies can be challenged on the grounds that they are too mechanical and their 
empirical models contain only a limited number of variables. 
Another model-independent approach to estimating an EMP index is suggested by 
Pentecost et al (2001). The authors introduce a quite novel methodology, which 
involves the estimation of the weights of the index's components using principle 
components analysis 83 . The authors use their EMP index to investigate the determinants 
of exchange market pressure in the case of five members of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) from 1980 to 1994 and report empirical evidence that exchange 
market pressure is determined by monetary expansion, long-term interest rates, real 
S' The author reports empirical evidence that growth in the foreign debt burden increases exchange 
market pressure. 
82 The authors report empirical evidence that fiscal imbalances have a significant effect on exchange 
market pressure in the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean but not those in the East Asian and 
the Pacific regions. 
83 The authors use the same components as Eichengreen et al (1995) in the construction of the EMP 
index. I 
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depreciation, budget deficit and the current account balance. Although this approach to 
capturing exchange market pressure is quite straightforward and is theoretically 
justified, it has not gained much popularity in the existing empirical literature. This can 
possibly be attributed to the dominance of the Eichengreen et al's (1995) approach in 
the related literature. 
Based on the review of the studies that apply model-independent and model- 
independent exchange market pressure indices, it can be concluded that both of these 
approaches comprise a wide array of exchange market indices using various 
combinations of the changes in international reserves, exchange rate, and interest rates 
with different weighting schemes. Although judging which index captures speculative 
pressure in the foreign exchange market most accurately is not trivial, it can be argued 
that model-independent indices are more practical as they can be used in the case of all 
exchange rate regimes 84 . Table 3.1 summarizes the selected empirical 
literature on 
exchange market pressure. 
84 Indeed, this is evident from a broader empirical literature using model-independent indices. 
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3.3 Studies that Investigate Currency Crises k5 
There exists a broad literature studying the mechanics of different crisis episodes around 
the world. The earliest work in this genre is the empirical analysis of the Mexican crises 
of 1976 and 1982 by Blanco and Garber (1986). This study has been one of the most 
seminal empirical studies in the related literature as it undertakes an empirical 
application of the first-generation models of currency crises for the first time 19 . 
The empirical model of Blanco and Garber (1986) has been adopted by several other 
studies to investigate the causes of the currency crises of the 1980s and early 1990s. For 
instance: Goldberg (1994) studied the Mexican crises from 1980 to 1986; Cumby and 
van Wijnbergen (1989) studied the Argentine crises from 1978 to 1981; Grilli (1990) 
studied the US crises from 1894 to 1996; Edin and Vredin (1993) studied the Nordic 
crises from 1978 to 1989 and Otker and Pazarbasioglu (1995) studied the Mexican crisis 
of 1995. This genre of studies has made a significant contribution to the existing 
literature by liroviding empirical support for the first-generation models of currency 
crises. In this respect, they have yielded useful implications for the policy makers by 
emphasizing the role of inconsistent economic policies in precipitating currency crises. 
Owing to the recent advancement in econometric techniques, the. existing empirical 
literature on the causes of currency crises is continuously expanding. The more recent 
literature on the empirical models can be broadly categorized into binary choice models, 
the signals approach, Markov regime-switching models and the artificial neural 
networks (ANNs). 
'9 The authors examine the role of monetary policy in precipitating currency crises. Their model 
successfully predicts crises and reveals that they can be explained by the first-generation models. 
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3.3.1 Studies that Apply Limited Dependent (Binary Choice) Models 
Limited dependent models, also known as the binary choice models, consist of probit 
and logit models. In these models, the EMP index is converted into a 0-1 dichotomous 
dependent variable using a certain threshold value, and is used in regression models to 
explain currency crises 20 . 
3.3.1.1 Studies that Apply Probit Models 
The earliest application of probit models in the currency crisis literature is Eichengreen 
et al (1995) who investigate the determinants of currency crises for a panel of twenty 
industrial countries from 1959 to 1993. The authors define currency crises as the 
occasions where the EMP index is at least two standard deviations above its mean. 
Although the authors fail to obtain early warning signals to predict crises, they identify 
several variables, such as political instability, budget and current account deficits, 
inflation and monetary expansion as the determinants of crises. 
This study can be challenged on the grounds that the operational definition of currency 
crises comprises an arbitrarily determined threshold. Indeed, as discussed earlier, the 
issue of the arbitrariness of the thresholds in the operational definitions of currency 
crises is the most important shortcoming in the existing literature. Nonetheless, this 
approach has been one of the pioneering works in the existing literature and has paved 
the way to many other similar studies. 
In a similar application of the probit models, Frankel and Rose (1996) introduce a novel 
crisis index that differs from that of Eichengreen el al (1995) in that it focuses only on 
large exchange rate movements 2 1. The authors study a panel of annual data for over a 
20 Another group of studies uses linear probability models to predict the timing of crises. These models C, 
resemble logit and probit models in that they also define currency crises as a discrete event. The first 
application is offered by Tornell (1999) who analyzes the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995 and the Asian 
crisis of 1997. fie reports empirical evidence that lending boom, the real appreciation of the domestic and 
international liquidity account for both crises. Bussiere and Mulder (1999) supplement Tomell's (1999) 
model with four measures of political instability to study the effect. of political instability on crisis depth. 
The authors conclude that political instability partially accounts for the crises. 
21 The authors set their crisis index at a level that represents at least a 25 percent depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate and that also exceeds the previous year's depreciation level by at least 10 percent. 
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hundred developing countries from 1971 to 1992, and report empirical evidence that 
foreign direct investment, international reserves, domestic credit, output, foreign interest 
rates, and exchange rate overvaluation account for the majority of currency crises 22 . 
Despite being an original research in terms of its definition of currency crises, this study 
can be criticized on the grounds that it offers limited contribution to the existing 
knowledge as it fails to report the policy implications of the findings. Another 
shortcoming of the study is that the validity of the regression results can be challenged 
on the grounds that the authors do not report the time series properties of their data or 
provide any robustness tests. 
A number of other studies have used probit models to analyze currency crises in various 
sets of countries. Nonetheless, these studies do not offer any noteworthy novelty in 
terins of methodology or their operational definitions of currency crises 23 . This group of 
studies consists of rather mechanical econometric investigations of currency crises for 
different panels of countries. For instance, Pazarbasioglu and Otker (1997) study five 
European countries from 1979 to 1995; Esquivel and Larrain (1998) examine a group of 
thirty countries from 1975 to 1996; Edwards (1998) study seventeen developing 
countries from 1962 and 1982; Kamin et al (2001) study twenty-six emerging markets 
from 1981 to 1999; and Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) study thirty-one emerging 
market countries from 1980 and 2001. 
On the other hand, Cartapanis et al (2002) and Glick and Moreno (1999) use probit 
models to investigate the causes of the Asian crisis of 1997. These two studies identify 
overvaluation of domestic currency, weak financial sectors, and fiscal sector deficits as 
the common reasons for the crisis. Although these studies have shed some light on the 
causes of the Asian crisis, they can be challenged on the grounds that their narrow focus 
have limited their contribution to the literature. Furthermore, these studies can be 
criticized on the grounds that they seem to lack any policy implications or in-depth 
interpretation of their empirical findings. 
22 An advantage of this study is that the use of annual data permits the authors to use variables such as the 
composition of external debt that are only available at that frequency. An extension of this study to a 
longer period by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) has verified Frankel and Rose's (1996) findings. 
23 The only exception is Eichengreen el al (1996) who use probit models from 1959 to 1993 for twenty 
industrial countries. The authors report novel empirical evidence that contagion appears to spread more 
easily to countries which are closely tied by international trade linkages. 
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In addition to these multi-country studies, the literature also includes a few single- 
country applications of probit models. These studies have generally yielded very 
conflicting findings, suggesting that the currency crises in different countries have 
different causes 24 . These studies can be challenged on the grounds that the 
generalizability of their results is questionable in the absence of any supporting 
evidence for more than one country. This severely undermines their contribution to the 
existing knowledge. Furthermore, a noteworthy shortcoming of these studies is that 
their choice of explanatory variables does not seem to be based on any theoretical 
foundation. Quite the opposite, they seem to have selected their explanatory variables 
rather haphazardly without any proper justification. For this reason, these articles offer 
rather limited contribution to the literature. 
3.3.1.2 Studies that Apply Logit Models 
The earliest applications of logit models in the existing literature are the complementary 
empirical studies of Goldfajn and Valdes (1997b) and Klein and Marion (1997). The 
application of Goldfjan and Valdes (1997b) is quite robust since it considers three 
separate crisis definitions for a panel of tvýenty-six countries from 1984 to 1997. The 
authors report empirical evidence that overvaluation of the exchange rate is a common 
cause of currency crises. On the other hand, Klein and Marion (1997) study a different 
set of countries consisting of seventeen Latin American countries and Jamaica from 
1957 to 1991. The authors end up with similar results to Goldfan and Valdes (1997b) in 
the sense that they obtain evidence that real exchange rate appreciation and the loss of 
Central Bank reserves are the determinants of crises. These two studies make an 
important contribution to the literature by revealing that exchange rate misalignment 
accounts for most of the currency crises. Nonetheless, they can be criticized on the 
grounds that they have omitted some potentially relevant variables in their empirical 
24 For instance, Gochoco-Bautista (2000) studies the Philippines from 1980 to 1997 and finds that the 
short-term interest rate differential, change in international reserves, real exchange rate, and the growth of 
domestic credit account for crises. On the other hand, Karfakis (2002) studies the crises of the Greek 
Drachma from 1990 to 1998 and finds that exchange rates, international reserves, interest rates, money 
supply, bank loans, terms of trade, and capital flows are at the root of the crises. On the other hand, 
Krznar (2004) analyzes the crises in Croatia and reports evidence that the real exchange rate appreciation, 
current account deficit, inflation and external debt are the main causes of crises. 
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models, such as the banking sector indicators, which may have also played a role in the 
occurrence of crises. 
The existing literature contains a number of rather mechanical applications of logit 
models on different panels of countries, such as: Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002), who 
study thirty-two countries from 1993 to 2001; Lau and Yan (2005), who study thirteen 
emerging market economies; Kumar et al (2003), who study nineteen developing 
countries from 1985 to 1998; and Jacobs et al (2005), who study the Asian crisis of 
1997. Overall, it can be argued that these studies offer not much novelty in terms of 
their methodologies and findings 25 . Furthermore, since they offer rather 
inconsistent 
results for different panels of countries, the generalizability of their findings are 
questionable. 
In the light of this review, it can be concluded that the related literature contains a 
diverse variety of different applications of logit and probit models, often with 
conflicting results. This makes it difficult to generalize the findings and to pinpoint 
some common determinants of currency crises. Nonetheless, it can be summarized that 
some variables, such as exchange rate misalignment, current account deficits, domestic 
credit expansion, fiscal imbalances, and financial sector fragility stand out as the 
common determinants of the crises.. Table 3.2 summarizes the selected literature on the 
logit and probit models. 
2 5Several other studies have used logit models to investigate different aspects of currency crises using rý logit and probit models. For instance, Weller (2001) reports empirical evidence that financial 
liberalization renders economies vulnerable to currency crises; Saqib (2002) studies the Brazilian real 
crisis of 1999 reporting empirical evidence that political factors are significant; Caramazza el al (2004) 
study the transmission of currency crises across forty-one emerging markets and twenty industrial 
economies and report evidence of a strong trade spillover effect for countries with weak extemal 
positions. 
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3.3.2 Studies that Apply the Signals Approach 
The signals approach consists of a bilateral model where an individual threshold is set 
for each indicator. When the variable exceeds its threshold level within a predetermined 
crisis window, this is identified as an early warning signal. The variables are then 
analyzed based on several criteria, such as the ratio of correct predictions to false 
predictions, average lead times and conditional probabilities. 
The origin of the signals approach is the seminal work by Kaminsky el al (1998) and 
Kaminsky (1998). Kaminsky et al (1998) study the currency crises in twenty countries 
from 1970 to 1995. Using a 24-month crisis window and fifteen leading indicators, the 
authors find that the real exchange rate, the growth rate of domestic credit and exports 
growth successfully signal the crises. However, this approach can be criticized on the 
grounds that the crisis window is determined rather arbitrarily. Also, since the 
methodology involves the use of the binary signals extracted from each indicator, it 
incurs a loss of potentially-important information. 
On the other hand, Kaminsky (1998) combines the information provided from all of the 
leading indicators into a composite index of fragility. She introduces four versions of 
the index. The first one records the number of indicators used in signalling. The larger 
the number of indicators used in signalling, the higher is the likelihood of a crisis. The 
second one classiries crises as "mild" or "severe". The third one counts the signals 
issued in a certain period instead of each month. The fourth one weighs each indicator 
with the reciprocal of its so-called noise-to-signals ratio 26 . 
Using the signals approach, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Goldstein el al (2000) 
make a novel contribution to the literature in terms of focusing on not only the currency 
crises but also the banking crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) extend the work of 
Kaminsky el al (1998) and investigate the link between currency and banking crises 
using a wider sample period from 1970 to 1995. They report empirical evidence that 
banking sector weaknesses typically precede Currency crises and that the currency crises 
26 The concept of composite index, can be challenged on the grounds that, by counting the number of 
signals issued, it misses important information. Hence, the effectiveness of the composite leading 
indicator is questionable. Indeed, possibly for this reason most applications of the signals approach in the 
existing literature do not to adopt this methodolog C'y- 
58 
deepen the banking crises. On the other hand, Goldstein et al (2000) expand both the 
country sample and the sample period, studying twenty-five countries from 1970 to 
1997. The authors report empirical evidence that a slowdown in economic activity, an 
overvalued exchange rate and a high ratio of M2 to international reserves can be used as 
the reliable predictors of crises. These two studies yield consistent results in the sense 
that they both report convincing empirical evidence that banking and currency crises 
have common causes. Overall, these studies can be criticized on the grounds that they 
fail to discuss the economic interpretation of their findings in detail. This seems to have 
severely limited their contribution to the existing literature. 
Other applications of the signals approach do not'offer much contribution to the 
literature either since they only apply the existing methodology to different countries, 
offering not much novelty. For instance, Edison (2003) extends Kaminsky el al's (1998) 
work to eight additional emerging economies and reports empirical evidence supporting 
Kaminsky et al's (1998) findings 27. On the other hand, Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten 
(2004) analyze whether the signals approach could have predicted the Argentinean 
currency crisis of 2002 at an earlier point in time. The authors report that the forecasting 
quality of the signals approach is quite poor in the case of Argentina. In a similar 
application, Zhuang and Dowling (2003) investigate the causes of the 1997 Asian crisis. 
The authors identify real appreciation of domestic currencies, banking sector 
weaknesses and excessive growth of domestic credit as the most potent leading 
indicators of currency crises. 
In other applications of the signals approach: Berg and Pattillo (1999a, 1999b) study a 
panel of thirteen European and emerging market economies from 1970 to 1995; Herrera 
and Garcia study several Latin American countries from 1980 to 1998; and Bruggeman 
and Linne (2002) study the Central and Eastern European countries, Turkey and Russia 
from 1993 to 2001. On the other hand, a few studies employ the signals approach in a 
single-country analysis. For instance, Ucer el al (1998) and Kibritcioglu el al (2001) 
study the crises in Turkey, whereas Ahec-Sonje (1999) and Krznar (2004) study the 
crises in Croatia. Notwithstanding the mixed and often contradictory empirical evidence 
suggested by these studies, it can be concluded that they have identified several factors, 
27 A strength of this study is that the author also runs sensitivity tests to verify the robustness of the results 
to changes in crisis definition. 
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such as the overvaluation of currency, loss in international reserves, and domestic credit 
growth as the common causes of currency crises. 
The most important advantage of the signals approach over the binary choice models is 
that it facilitates the evaluation of the predictive powers of each variable and identifies 
their suitability for use as the leading indicators of currency crises 28 . Nonetheless, this 
approach has two major shortcomings, namely, the arbitrariness of the crisis window 
and the loss of information incurred by converting the observations into dichotomous 
signals. Based on this consideration, it can be concluded that the signals approach can 
be regarded more as a handy diagnostic tool to accompany a more thorough 
econometric investigation than an extensive statistical tool on its own. Table 3.3. 
summarizes the selected literature on the application of the signals approach. 
28 Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Berg and Pattillo (1999a), focus on the comparison of the predictive 
powers of the signals approach and probit models. The authors evaluate the predictive powers of the 
probit models of Frankel and Rose (1996), Sachs el al (1996), and the signals model of Kaminsky et al 
(1998) in terms of predicting the Asian crisis of 1997. Both studies report convincing , empirical evidence that the signals model have a stronger predictive power than that of the probit models. 
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3.3.3 Studies that Apply Other Approaches 
The empirical literature on currency crises also contains a number of other, less popular, 
empirical efforts focusing on the causes of currency crises. These are the Markov 
regime-switching models and the Artificial Neural Networks (ANNS)29. 
The major group of these studies consist of the Markov regime-switching models. These 
studies focus on particular crisis episodes around the world. For instance, Mariano et al 
(2002), Cerra and Saxena (2002), Arias and Erlandsson (2004) and Chauvet and Dong 
(2004) focus on the Asian currency crisis of 1997 30; Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten 
(2006) and Boinet et al (2005) investigate the Argentine crisis of 2002 31 ; Peria (2002) 
studies the European Monetary System (EMS) crisis of 1992-1993 32 , and Mariano el al 
33 (2004) and Akay and Yilmazkuday (2008) investigate the crises in Turkey 
These studies have made a contribution to the existing literature by offering an 
alternative econometric approach and suggesting new empirical results. They have 
generally yielded empirical results which are in line with the earlier studies in the 
literature. Nonetheless, they can be challenged on the grounds that their narrow subject 
focus have limited their contribution. Furthermore, a common shortcoming of these 
models is that they seem to have frequently omitted some potential ly-relcvant data, such 
as fiscal sector and banking sector indicators. 
In addition to the Markov regime-switching models, there is also a growing literature on 
the applications of artificial neural networks (ANN) in building an early warning system 
(EWS) to predict currency crises. The examples of this group of studies are Nag and 
Mitra (1999), Franch and Schmied (2004), Kim el al (2004a, 2004b) and Lin and Khan 
29 The related literature also comprises two approaches that have not gained much popularity in the 
literature on currency crises. These are the event study methodolog (see Glick and Moreno 1999; Wilson CY 
et al 2000 and Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000) and the Poisson models (see Moreno and Trehan 2000 and 
Kai lberg et al 2005). 
30 The authors generally report successful forecasts for the East Asian crisis. 
31 The authors report empirical evidence that market expectations and self-fulfilling prophecies played an 
important role. 
32 The author reports evidence that expectations have an impact on the crisis probabilities. 
33 Mariano et a] (2004) consider the period 1953-2002 and report empirical evidence that real exchange 
rate, international reserves, and domestic credit growth are the most important determinants of financial 
vulnerability. On the other hand, Akay and Yilmazkuday (2008) consider the period 1987-2002 and 
report evidence that reserves and domestic credit perforni well as the leading indicators. 
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(2006). These studies generally report convincing findings suggesting a high success 
rate in predicting crises based on historical data. However, in terms of policy 
implications, these studies do not offer much contribution to the existing literature in the 
absence of any supporting empirical evidence on the roles of the individual explanatory 
variables in the occurrence of currency crises. 
3.4 A Critical Review of the Empirical Studies on Currency Crises in Turkey 
The existing studies on the Turkish economy are generally oriented towards the 
investigation of the causes of the past currency crisis episodes rather than analyzing the 
dynamics of the speculative pressure in the exchange market. These studies generally 
focus on the currency crises of 1994 and 2000-2001, ignoring the dynamics of the 
speculative pressure, which do not always lead to full-scale currency crises. 
An exception to this is a study by Parlaktuna (2005) who applies Girton and Roper's 
(1977) exchange market pressure model to Turkey from 1993 to 2004. The author 
reports strong empirical evidence of a negative relationship between domestic credit 
expansion and exchange market pressure 34 . This study has a pioneering nature 
in the 
existing literature on the Turkish economy as it does not convert exchange market 
pressure into a dichotomous crisis index. Nonetheless, it can be challenged on the 
grounds that it employed limited data to investigate different possible factors behind the 
speculative attacks. Another shortcoming of this study is that it excludes data before 
1993, which may contain important information in the build up to the crisis of April 
1994. 
The rest of the studies in the existing literature focus on the identification of the causes 
of currency crises using various empirical methodologies. A noteworthy feature of this 
group of studies is that they have yielded mixed results that mostly contradict each 
other. 
For instance, Ucer et al (1998) and Kibritcioglu ef al (1998) use similar approaches for 
almost the same sample period, but report conflicting findings. More specifically, Ucer 
34 The author also reports evidence that the Turkish Central Bank absorbs most of the speculative pressure 
by using up its foreign reserves. 
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et al (1998) apply Kaminsky et al's (1998) signals approach for the period from 1989 to 
1997, reporting empirical evidence that short-term foreign debt and weak exports 
relative to imports increase the economy's vulnerability to currency crises, whereas 
Kibritcioglu et al (1998) use the so-called leading indicators approach for the period 
from 1986 to 1998, identifying the terms of trade and the exchange rate misalignment as 
the leading indicators of currency crises 35 . 
In addition, these studies can be criticized for their use of the standard leading indicators 
rather than original variables specific to Turkey. This has limited their contribution to 
the literature in terms of the originality of data. Another shortcoming of these studies is 
that they do not cover the currency crisis of 2000-2001. It goes without saying that the 
inclusion of this crisis episode with variables unique in the case of Turkey would have 
resulted in a more comprehensive analysis of the Turkish experience with currency 
crises. 
This shortcoming has been addressed by Ozkan (2005) in a relatively-less rigorous 
empirical investigation using a broad set of explanatory variables. The author aims at 
investigating the causes of the currency crisis of 2001 using data from 1990 to 2001. 
Mostly based on a graphical analysis, the author presents empirical evidence that a weak 
external position, weak fiscal position and financial sector weaknesses account for the 
crisis. Notwithstanding its use of a broad sample period and a variety of different 
macroeconomic indicators, this study can be criticized based on the author's excessive 
use of graphical analysis rather than econometric investigation to permit the assessment 
of the validity and reliability of her conclusions. Needless to mention, a visual 
inspection of the variables alone may not accurately reveal the underlying dynamics in a 
complex economic phenomenon such as a currency crisis. Although the author provides 
an in-depth analysis of the factors leading up to the crisis, her use of very limited 
econometric analysis to support her arguments seems to have limited its contribution to 
the literature. It can be argued that the use of a complementary probit or logit model 
would have been particularly useful to address this shortcoming. 
In a more comprehensive study, Mariano el al (2004) implement a Markov regime- 
switching model from 1990 to 2002 in order to devise an early warning system to 
33 The leading indicators approach used by the authors is quite similar to the signals approach as it D involves the comparison of the behavior of a number of indicators with that of a currency crisis index. 
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predict currency crises. The authors report convincing empirical evidence that their 
model successfully forecasts currency crises in Turkey. A major strength of this study is 
that it not only investigates the predictability of currency crises, it also identifies the 
leading indicators of currency crises. Using this model as an early warning system, the 
authors identify the real exchange rate, international reserves, and domestic credit 
growth as the most important determinants of crises. 
In a very recent application of the same methodology for the period between 1987 and 
2002, Akay and Yilmazkuday (2008) obtain strong evidence that the deterioration of net 
international reserves and domestic credits are the most useful predictors of currency 
crises. The authors also report that their model has successfully captured all the 
currency crises in their sample period. 
Notwithstanding being the most comprehensive econometric investigation of the 
currency crises in Turkey, these two studies can be challenged on the grounds that they 
lack any tests of robustness to verify their empirical findings. Should the authors have 
tested the sensitivity of their findings to alternative crisis dating schemes, their analysis 
would have been more prudent. 
More recently, OzIale and Metin-Ozcan (2007) and Boduroglu and Erenay (2007) have 
designed early warning systems to predict currency crises in Turkey. Although the main 
purpose of these studies is not to investigate the determinants of past crisis episodes, 
they still pointed out some indicators that seem to account for currency crises in Turkey. 
The early warning model devised by Ozlale and Metin-Ozcan (2007) measures the 
likelihood of currency crises in a non-linear state space framework using data from 
2000 to 2006. The authors report strong evidence that domestic currency overvaluation, 
current account deficit and the increase in the default risk increase the likelihood of a 
crisis 36 . On the other hand, Boduroglu and Erenay 
(2007) design a scalar composite 
leading indicator that predicts a financial crisis in Turkey about six months in advance 
using the so-called 'pattern recognition paradigm. Focusing on the 1998-2000, the 
authors report evidence that the capital adequacy ratio of banks and the ratio of 
international reserves to short-term outstanding external debt are the precursors of 
36 The authors also report that their model successfully explains the path that the Turkish economy 
followed between 2000 and 2006. 
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currency crises. Notwithstanding their novelty in terms of their methodologies, these 
two studies make a rather limited contribution to the literature due to their short sample 
periods. 
The broader literature reviewed in the previous sections of this chapter also contains a 
large number of comprehensive multi-country studies that take Turkey into 
consideration 37 . The results of these studies suggest a number of variables, such as 
overvalued exchange rates and excessive credit growth, as the causes of currency crises. 
Nonetheless, due to the heterogeneity of the currency crises in each country, the results 
of these existing studies are not very helpful for drawing specific conclusions regarding 
the crises in Turkey. Besides, there exist significant discrepancies between the results of 
multi-country studies and country-specific studies as far as Turkish currency crises are 
concerned. 
In the light of this review, it can be concluded that the major shortcoming of the existing 
literature on currency crises in Turkey is that its findings are far from being conclusive 
and it lacks a comprehensive investigation of the determinants of speculative attacks 
and currency crises. In this respect, a significant gap remains in the empirical literature. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the existing empirical studies in the literature on currency 
crises and speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market. As can be seen from the 
survey, the results of the studies vary vastly depending on which methodology has been 
used, which countries have been considered, and which sample period has been studied. 
Given the wide range of studies reviewed above, the current position is that the 
literature has so far failed to provide a consensus on what causes currency crises and 
what factors relate to speculative pressure in the exchange market. Nonetheless, having 
reviewed the existing empirical studies in the related literature, it is possible to draw a 
number of general conclusions: 
37 See, for example, Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003), Manasse et al (2003), and Bruggeman and Linne 
(2002). 
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First, variables that help to explain exchange market pressure or currency crises in one 
country or a panel of countries may fail to explain the crises in other countries even if 
the countries have similar economies. Thiýs is because the majority of the studies have 
been typically carried out on a panel of countries with implicit homogeneity 
assumptions about crisis behaviour across countries. However, in reality, currency 
crises and speculative exchange market pressure in each economy is often unique with 
different underlying dynamics. Hence, a conclusion that holds for one economy may 
fail to hold for another. Nonetheless, a comparison of the results obtained from multi- 
country studies and single-country studies point out some common factors that seem to 
have played a role in the majority of crises. In particular, variables that show large 
macroeconomic- imbalances, such as current account and fiscal deficits, are found 
significant in most of the studies. In addition, excessive monetary expansion, through 
which these deficits are financed, is also found significant in many studies. Also, 
variables indicating balance sheet problems of the banking sector have been found 
significant in many cases including the case of Turkey. 
Second, a shortcoming of the existing -empirical work seems to be the choice of the 
dependent variable. The majority of the studies consider only episodes of extreme 
speculative pressure and ignore speculative pressure of less magnitude. Studies 
generally define crises on the basis of threshold values and convert exchange market 
pressure into a dummy variable, which results in a loss of information about the 
intensity of crises as well as the unsuccessful speculative attacks. This practice also 
complicates econometric analysis since the number of crisis observations after such 
transformation often is very small, resulting in low explanatory power in regressions. 
Therefore, these studies are often questionable as they disregard the depth of the crisis 
and possible information from tranquil periods. 
Third, an interesting observation is that the studies in the literature generally ignore the 
time-s eries properties of the variables. However, development in times series 
econometrics suggests that non-stationary data may cause some econometric problems, 
such as spurious regression, and estimated results may not be valid unless time series 
are stationary. Furthermore, the existing studies do not aqdress the problem of possible 
structural breaks in the time series data which may affect the results of the unit root tests 
and the stability of the coefficient estimates in cointegration analyses. Therefore, failure 
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to investigate the time series properties of the data is an important weakness of the 
existing studies. 
Fourth, the survey has shown that the signals approach and the binary choice models are 
dominant in the currency crisis literature. Despite the merits of these approaches, they 
can be challenged on the grounds that they are often not based on the existing 
theoretical models and they test a very broad set of variables, which seems to be 
selected rather haphazardly. In this respect, a frequent shortcoming of the existing 
empirical studies isý that they often lack a theoretical foundation. 
Last but not least, the survey has revealed that the empirical findings obtained for one 
country or a group of countries, often do not apply to another country. In light of this 
observation, it seems to be a futile effort to build a large-scale early warning system to 
predict crises and speculative pressure. 38 Instead, focus should be directed towards the 
identification of the determinants of speculative pressure and crises in the context of 
single-country studies. In this respect, it can be argued that it is not possible to predict 
crises reliably because, particularly after the liberalization of capital flows, currency 
crises have been increasingly arising from self-fulfilling panic or pure contagion effects. 
In addition, even if a successful global EWS model can finally be devised, the signals 
issued by this model would presumably affect the behaviour of both the policymakers 
and the financial market participants, which would eventually render the model 
obsolete. It is therefore more feasible to direct efforts towards the identification of 
weaknesses that typically render economies vulnerable to crises, rather than trying to 
devise an early warning system. 
38 Criticizing the predictive power of the existing empirical work, Dombusch (1998) reports that "of six 
[currency] crises predicted by experts, five never happen" (cited in Saquib2002: p. 3). 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TURKISH CURRENCY CRISES IN THE LIGHT OF 
THE EXISTING THEORIES ON SPECULATIVE ATTACKS 
4.1 Introduction 
The theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 suggests a 
large number of explanatory variables that can be used in the analysis of speculative 
attacks and currency crises. As discussed in Chapter 2, some theoretical models 
emphasize the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals such as monetary expansion 
and fiscal sector variables, whereas others focus on the information provided by the 
banking sector balance sheets and the movement of international capital flows. 
Although it is certain that the information provided by all of these indicators is of 
potential value, it is practically not possible to consider all of the possible explanatory 
variables in the empirical models. 
Therefore, it is necessary to select the most relevant and potentially informative 
explanatory variables before moving on to carrying out an empirical analysis. A priori, 
the variables which are the most relevant ones in the case of the currency crises in 
Turkey are not certain. For this reason, it is necessary to carry out an introductory 
analysis to facilitate the selection of explanatory variables. Therefore, the purpose of 
this chapter is to analyse the possible causes of currency crises in Turkey in the period 
between 1989 and 2001 in the light of the existing theoretical models of currency crises. 
In this respect, this chapter serves as a link between the existing theoretical models and 
the econometric investigations that will be carried out in the rest of the thesis by 
identifying the most relevant set of explanatory variables in the case of Turkey. 
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4.2 Analysis of the Crises in the Light of the First-Generation Models 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the first-generation models of currency crises explain 
currency crises through speculative attacks that take place due to inconsistencies 
between an exchange rate peg and domestic economic fundamentals. In particular, they 
depict a government that runs a persistent fiscal deficit, which is financed through 
domestic credit expansion. According to these models, the collapse of the fixed 
exchange rate system is inevitable because the monetary authorities must eventually run 
out of reserves. These models consider lax fiscal policies as the source of domestic 
credit expansion. Therefore, the present analysis begins with the examination of the 
variables related to fiscal sustainability, namely the primary balance' 05 and budget 
balance. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in the case of Turkey, lack of fiscal discipline in the post- 
capital account liberalization period resulted in persistent fiscal imbalances. Until the 
06 
crisis of 1994, the Treasury relied heavily on cash advances from the Central Bank' . 
At the same time, the public accounts continuously deteriorated and the economy failed 
to achieve sustained fiscal austerity. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the primary balance 
was in deficit in the pre-1994 period, particularly in 1991. The budget balance, on the 
other hand, was in deficit throughout the whole sample period. The largest deficit is 
observed in 2000-2001. As can be seen in Figure 4.2, there was a large deficit in 1993, 
just before the crisis of 1994, and in 1996 and 1999. 
As Celasun (1998) and Ekinci (2000) argue, the underlying reason behind the primary 
deficits in the pre-1994 period was the surge in public expenditures stemming from the 
total wage bill of the government, generous agricultural support policies, worsening 
performance of the state owned economic enterprises, the increased cost of military 
operations in the south-eastern region of the country, persistent problems in the taxation 
system and increased interest payments on existing debt, especially after 1992. During 
105 The primary balance shows the extent to which the expenditures, excluding interest payments on 
existing debt, are covered by revenues. 
106 Through the Short Term Cash Advance (STA) facility, the Central Bank extended domestic credit to 
the Treasury, i. e. the public sector, and received interest free paper in return (see Celasun, 1998). 
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this period, the official estimate of the military spending was about 4.5 percent of GNP, 
which is quite high according to international standards 107 . 
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Figure 4.1 Primary Balance (% of GNP) 
Source: The Central Bank ofthe Republic of Turkey 
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Figure 4.2 Budget Balance (% of GNP) 
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
As can be seen in Figure 4.3, in the same period, domestic debt rose sharply due to high 
primary deficits of the public sector in 1993. Indeed, in order to service the debt, 
government was engaging in ponzi financing, where new debts equalled 50 percent of 
107 Gunluk-Senesen (2000) argues that this is an understatement of the military expenditures in Turkey. 
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108 
the existing stock of debt over the decade . Moreover, real interest rates on 
domestic 
borrowing were increasing constantly which constituted a source of further deterioration 
in public balances. 
High real interests can be attributed to the fear of capital outflows, which necessitated 
keeping domestic interest rates high to encourage inflows of short-term capital and to 
discourage outflows'09. The domestic debt problem seems to be relatively worse 
especially in 1994 and 1999. On the other hand, in 2000, there seems to be an 
improvement. The domestic debt problem in Turkey in the 1990s can also be attributed 
to the fragmented political system with successive weak coalition governments, which 
reduced the time horizon of governments and lead to populist concerns. This, in turn, 
led to a continuous debt burden and a resultant severe fiscal imbalance' 10. 
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. Figure 4.3 Domestic Debt (% of GNP) 
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
In the post-1994 period, the unsustainable nature of domestic debt forced the 
polieymakers to keep the primary balance in surplus. In order to strengthen the 
consolidated public stance permanently and to create a sustainable debt structure, tile 
government adopted disinflation programmes that put limits on the primary balance of 
the public sector. In particular, a stabilization programme, referred to as "April 5 
log See Boratav et al (2002) and Voyvoda and Yeldan (2002). 
109 See Alper and Onis (2003). 
110 See Alper and Onis (2003). 
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decisions", was launched immediately after the crisis of 1994. The program involved 
tight monetary and fiscal policies aimed at achieving a comprehensive macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural reform, reducing the macroeconomic imbalances in the 
economy and re-establishing the conditions for sustainable growth"'. In particular, it 
involved reducing the inflation rate, improving the external balance and restoring 
stability to the foreign exchange market. 112 The program was also supported by an IMF 
stand-by program designed to reduce the macroeconomic imbalances in the economy. 
The devaluation of the Turkish lira in 1994 in the framework of the April 5 decisions 
had given a substantial boost to competitiveness to Turkish exporters. In addition, 
official foreign currency reserves increased and exceeded pre-crisis levels, and stability 
in the foreign exchange market was restored. Hence, as plotted in Figure 4.1, the 
primary balance was generally in surplus in the post- 1994 period. 
In addition to this, the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) was consistently 
high prior to the crises of 1991 and 1994, and fell dramatically during 1994. Figure 4.4 
plots PSBR as a share of GNP, which measures the true stance of fiscal policy and the 
extent of fiscal adjustment needed. Again, the major reason behind the high PSBR was 
the ponzi financing policy of the government. The obligation of paying high interest 
payments on the existing debt necessitated the government to issue new debt. Based on 
Figure 4.4, it can be argued that the continuous increase in the public sector borrowing 
requirement after 1995, at least until 1999, can be attributed to the interest payments on 
domestic debt. 
111 An important clement of the April 1994 programme was the pre-announced exchange rate path, 
according to which an exchange rate basket, formed of I US dollar and 1.5 Deutsche Marks, was allowed 
to rise at a certain monthly rate. 
112 Efforts to reduce public expenditure and increase tax revenues were supported by structural reforms 
such as privatization, tax reform, a change in agricultural support policy and structural reforrns in banking 
sector. 
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Figure 4.4 Public Sector Borrowing Requirement / GNP 
Source: The Central Bank ofthe Republic of Turkey 
In order to show the burden of the existing debt, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 plot the interest 
payments on domestic debt as a share of GDP and the maturity structure of domestic 
borrowing. The figures suggest that interest payments continuously increased especially 
after 1994. On the other hand, the maturity of the outstanding debt was shortening just 
before 1994, indicating the burden of the debt before the crisis of 1994. 
An observation that suggests that the crisis of 2000-2001 does not seem to fit the first 
generation models is that the public sector borrowing requirement as a share of GNP 
was in fact healthier in 2000 compared to 1999, reflecting the discipline imposed on the 
public finances by the IMF-led stabilization program that was launched in 1999 
11 3. 
Similarly, as can be seen in Figure 4.1, there was a very significant increase in primary 
surplus in 2000 compared to 1999. Consequently, the debt to GNP ratio also decreased 
(see Figure 4.3). It is therefore rather counter-intuitive that the crisis burst at the end of 
2000 and not in 1999. 
113 The programme involved a crawling peg against a dollar-curo basket and a pre-specified timetable of 
devaluation rates until the end of 2002. 
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Figure 4.5 Interest Payments on Domestic Borrowing / GDP 
Source: The Treasury of the Republic of Turkey 
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Figure 4.6 Maturity of Domestic Debt (in days) 
Source: The Treasury of the Republic of Turkey 
Overall, in the light of the evidence reviewed so far, it can be concluded that the pre- 
1994 period suffered more from fiscal imbalances, while the conditions got better after 
the currency crisis of 1994, which can be attributed to the April 5 decisions adopted in 
the wake of the 1994 crisis. 
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The first generation models also emphasize the role of expansionary monetary policies 
in paving the way to speculative attacks and currency crises. Conceptually, in the 
presence of primary deficits, the goverriment must either expend its foreign exchange 
reserves, or borrow in order to finance the deficit. Since it is usually not desirable for 
the government-to borrow or to expend its reserves, it chooses to finance the deficit 
through seigniorage. Since printing money is inconsistent with keeping the exchange 
rate fixed, first-generation models predict that the regime must collapse. 
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Figure 4.7 M2 Growth (%) 
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
Figure 4.7 plots annual percentage M2 growth in Turkey, which is a broad measure of 
the amount of money in circulation. The figure reveals that there was indeed a rise in 
liquidity before 1991,1994 and 2001 in line with what the first generation models 
postulate. On the other hand, before 1998 and 2000, there seems to be less liquidity in 
the economy. From the figure it is clear that the excess liquidity creation through 
extension of the central bank advances to the treasury was stopped in the post-1994 
period with the 1995 stabilization program. Hence, the extent of the financing of budget 
deficits through Central Bank resources diminished. In addition, no significant growth 
was observed in overall domestic credit during this period. Furthermore, there was a 
decrease in domestic credit in 1999. Therefore, a major element of the first generation 
models seems to be absent in the crisis of 2000-2001. As argued by Ozatay and Sak 
I 
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(2002) and Ozkan (2005), this shows that the tight money control, as specified by the 
stabilisation programme of 1994, was strictly adhered to. 
Another key indicator of monetary expansion suggested by the first generation models 
is domestic credit expansion. This variable is used to analyze how the government 
finances its deficits. Before 1994, monetary expansion was fuelled by the domestic 
credit expansion, especially through credit to the public sector. Figure 4.8 plots the 
evolution of this indicator. Analyzing the structure of domestic credit in the pre-1994 
period, it can be concluded that domestic credit gradually increased before the crisis of 
1991 but it fell just before 1994. Also, the figure shows that there was a fall before 1998 
and 2001. 
Figure 4.8 Domestic Credit / GNP 
Source: The Central Bank of1he Republic of Turkey 
Figure 4.9 shows a clearer picture regarding the domestic credit policy of the Central 
Bank before the crisis of 1994. As can be seen, the Central Bank financed the deficits 
through excessive creation of domestic credit in the form of cash advances to the 
Treasury during this period, indicating the extent of excess liquidity that was pumped in 
to the system before the 1994 crisis 114 . This was mainly caused by the government's 
114 In fact, the CBRT had announced a monetary programme in 1990 in which it tried to control the credit 0 
extended to the public sector and it had agreed with the Treasury on restricting its provision of cash 
advances to the Treasury. Yet, due to the volatility in financial markets and the elections in 1991, the 
Central Bank's provision of advances to the Treasury continued. 
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attempt to decrease the cost of domestic borrowing by cancelling Treasury auctions in 
1993, which left the Treasury to rely heavily on central bank resources. As can be seen 
in Figure 4.9, the Treasury's access to cash advances from the Central Bank was 
brought to a halt with a with a change in the central bank law within the framework of 
the stabilization program of 1995, which was introduced to improve fiscal discipline. 
With the new policy, the Central Bank began creating money through foreign exchange 
transactions and using open market operations to stabilize the short-term pressures on 
the availability of liquidity. 
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Figure 4.9 Central Bank Cash Advances to the Treasury (% of GNP) 
Source: The Central Bank ofthe Republic of Turkey 
As Figure 4.10 shows, there was a fall in central bank reserves in the pre-1994 period, 
which can be attributed to the fact that, in the pre-1994 period, the budget deficit was 
mostly financed by monetary expansion through domestic credit creation using up the 
reserves. Indeed, Figure 4.10 shows a sharp increase in reserves after 1994 reflecting the 
IMF stabilization program which required the Central Bank to accumulate reserves and 
the sterilized intervention policy of the Central Bank which led to a surge in reserves, 
which also enhanced the Bank's resistance to domestic and foreign speculative attacks 
after 1995. 
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Figure 4.10 Central Bank's International Reserves (% change) 
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
Overall, the evidence presented in this section suggests that the crises of 1991 and 1994 
indeed seem to carry the elements of the first g eneration models of currency crises in 
the sense that deteriorated fiscal fundamentals and domestic credit expansion through 
cash advances from the Central Bank to the Treasury eventually led to the depreciation 
of the Turkish lira. 
On the other hand, although fiscal imbalances were not completely eliminated in the 
post-1994 period, the crisis of 1998 and the twin crises of 2000-2001 seem to be less 
related to the first generation models, primarily because most of the fundamentals seem 
to be healthier in 2000 compared to their levels in 1999. The fact that the crisis burst at 
the end of 2000 rather than 1999 brings to mind the possibility of a self-fulfilling crisis. 
The vulnerability of the economy in the absence of the elements of a first generation- 
type crisis and the improving stance in macroeconomic fundamentals due to the 
stabilization program of 1999 suggests that the twin crises of 2000-2001 could indeed 
be a result of second- or third-generation type self-fulfilling expectations. 
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4.3 Analysis of the Crises in the Light of the Second-Generation Models 
As discussed earlier, second generation models link currency crises to market 
expectations and argue that speculative attacks can take place due to a sudden shift in 
market expectations, not necessarily coupled with any sizable worsening in the 
fundamentals. 
Since the speculative attacks are based on market sentiment and the policy choice of the 
government, it is difficult to identify variables to use in the context of second- 
generation models. Nonetheless, the existing literature suggests a few variables that can 
be used in the context of second generation models, such as inflation, output growth, 
competitiveness, interest rates and unemployment. These variables can be used to 
quantify the cost of the peg to the government. For instance, a rise in the interest rates 
required to maintain the peg could lower investment and consequently lead to poor 
output performance. 
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Figure 4.11 Real Interest Rates 
Source: The Central Bank ofthe Republic of Turkey 
In the case of Turkey, the real interest rates in the pre-1994 period (at least after 1990) 
were generally on a decreasing path except just before 1994, whereas, they were 
constantly high in the post-1994 period until 2000 as can be seen in Figure 4.11. In 
particular, there was a noticeable growth in real interest rates in 1999 and 2000 
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compared to 1998. On the other hand, there seems to be a sharp fall in 2000. Overall, it 
is evident from the figure that high real interest rates played a major role in the rapid 
accumulation of public debt in the late 1990s, as evident from Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.12 Real GNP (% change) 
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
Turning to the overall performance of the economy, GNP growth, as shown in Figure 
4.12, fell sharply in 19ý1 and 1994, increasing the possibility of a second-generation 
type crisis that would stem from a poor output performance. The sharp fall in 1994 can 
be attributed to the IMF programme, which was introduced in 1994. The programme 
involved a cut in expenditures, which resulted in a contraction of the economy. In 1998 
and 1999, on the other hand, the economy was undergoing a contraction, as evident 
15 from the negative growth rate' . However, there was a significant growth 
in GNP in 
2000, which can be attributed to the IMF-supported stabilization program launched in 
December 1999. This is in line with the stylised facts of exchange rate-based 
stabilisation programmes where the initial period is usually associated with output 
expansion as opposed to money-based programmes where output contraction follows 
the adoption of the programme 116 . On the other hand, the sharp fall in GNP in 2001 can 
be attributed to the effects of the currency crisis of 2001. In the light of this analysis, it 
seems counter-intuitive that the crisis took place in 2000 rather than 1999, when the 
113 This episode of recession can be attributed to the impact of the Russian crisis and the two devastating, 0 
earthquakes in 1999. 
116 See, for example, Rebelo and Vegh (1995). 
81 
economy was in a deep recession. Also, the twin crises of 2000-2001 took place in the 
midst of an economic recovery period, which suggest that the confidence of the market 
agents were not very firm. Hence, self-fulfilling prophecies were more likely. On the 
other hand, there seems to be no clear evidence before the 1994 crisis that could justify 
a self-fulfilling speculative attack. 
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Figure 4.13 Unemployment Rate 
Source: The Central Bank ofthe Republic of Turkey 
Second generation models suggest that the expectation of a devaluation is also likely to 
lead to higher wage demands and, therefore, to lower employment, which in turn, 
increases the pressure on the government to abandon the peg. As can be seen in Figure 
4.13, the unemployment rate in Turkey was also following an increasing trend just 
before 1991,1998 and 2001, which suggests that maintaining the peg was more costly 
for governments before the crises. Deterioration of output and employment was likely to 
alter the balance of perceived costs and benefits of the peg for the Central Bank in 
favour of abandonment. In this respect, the crises in Turkey seem to carry some 
elements of the second-generation models. 
Another variable that can be analyzed in conjunction with the second-generation models 
is inflation. In high inflation countries with a currency peg, inflation is a key 
deten-ninant of competitiveness 117 .A loss of competitiveness may prevent policy- 
117 See Ozkan (2005). 
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makers from taking the necessary measures, such as increasing interest rates to defend 
their currencies. Economic agents, being aware of this reluctance, may attack the 
domestic currency. If domestic inflation is above the foreign one, competitiveness of the 
home country deteriorates since the exchange rate cannot adjust. This, in turn, damages 
the credibility of the peg. Figure 4.14 shows that, in the pre-1994 period, inflation was 
lower in 1994 than in 1993. In the post-1994 period, on the other hand, inflation was 
consistently high until 1998 and it was lower consistently thereafter. 
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Figure 4.14 Consumer Price Index - 
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
Another important indicator of competitiveness is the real effective exchange rate. An 
overvaluation of the domestic currency leads to a loss of competitiveness. Given the 
exchange rate peg, real appreciations distort the relative prices in favour of imports 
versus exports leading to a worsening trade balance and current account balance. As can 
be seen in the graphic of the CPI-based real effective exchange rate shown in Figure 
4.15, between 1989 and 1993, there was a sustained tendency for the real exchange rate 
to depreciate until 1993. On the other hand, there was an increase in this indicator until 
2000, suggesting a loss of compositeness. Especially in the post-1994 period, as the real 
exchange rate was appreciating, the government was unwilling to abandon the peg and 
devalue as this would trigger a sharp reversal of capital flows. But this aggravated the 
currency misalignment problem. In this respect, it can be said that the currency crises 
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experienced in this period, to some extent, seem to carry the elements of the second 
generation models of currency crises. 
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Figure 4.15 Real Exchange Rate 
Source: The Central Bank ofthe Republic of Turkey 
4.4 Analysis of the Crises in the Light of the Third-Generation Models 
As discussed earlier, third generation models focus on the role that capital flows and 
banking sector weaknesses play in giving rise to currency crises. One of the indicators 
of banking sector weaknesses is the volume of bank credits. This is because the banks 
usually have imperfect information regarding the creditworthiness of borrowers. Figure 
4.16 shows the level of credits as a ratio of GNP. As can be seen, there was a sharp 
increase before the crisis of 1994. Overall, the level of credits was much higher in the 
post-1994 period, which can be attributed to increased deregulation of the banking 
sector due to financial liberalization. On the other hand, there was a sharp growth in real 
credits before the crises of 1994 and 2000 (see Figure 4.17). This indicates an increase 
in the credit risk in the balance sheet structures of the banks before the crises. Combined 
with the delays in banking sector reforms, this led to a fragility in the banking sector. 
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Figure 4.16 Total Credits / GNP 
Source: The Central Bank ofthe Republic of Turkey 
The increase in the volume of credits in the post-1994 period can be attributed to the 
full deposit insurance system introduced by the government after the 1994 crisis, which 
also created a prevalent moral hazard problem in the Turkish banking sector, where the 
credits were often distributed without a proper credit analysis. Hence it is clear that the 
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sector was deregulated and granted deposit insurance without effective supervision . 
Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 4.18, this had resulted in a sharp increase in non- 
performing loans in bank portfolios starting from 1997. Consequently, it can be argued 
that the currency crises in Turkey during the sample period carry the elements of the 
third generation models of currency crises. 
Another indicator of banking sector fragility is the predominance of foreign currency 
liabilities in the banks' balance sheets. As can be seen in Figure 4.19, especially in the 
post-1994 period, Turkish banks had explicit currency mismatches on their balance 
sheets as they borrowed in foreign currency and lent in local currency. During this 
period, banks replaced commercial lending with lending to government. They borrowed 
from foreign markets and sold these short-term funds to the Treasury in return for 
government securities. Hence, the banking system was heavily dependent on the 
arbitrage margins offered by the high interest spreads between deposit rates and T-bills 
"s See Akyuz and Boratav (2003). 
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caused by rapid inflation' 19. The sector had mostly unhedged high exposure to exchange 
rate risk which was also encouraged by the fixed devaluation rate built in the currency 
peg. This affected their balance sheets by undermining the quality of their foreign 
currency loan portfolios. 
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Figure 4.17 Real Credit (% growth) 
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
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Figure 4.18 Past-due Loans (% of Total Loans) 
Source: The Central Bank of1he Republic of Turkey 
119 See, Akyuz and Boratav (2003). 
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Figure 4.19 Foreign Liabilities / Foreign Assets 
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
As Figure 4.19 shows, the ratio of foreign exchange denominated liabilities to foreign 
exchange denominated assets was high in 1993,1998 and 2000 indicating an increase in 
the foreign exchange risk before the crises. It is noticeable that the risk was more 
pronounced in the post-1994 period. Particularly in 2000i the foreign open positions of 
banks were the highest, indicating the rise in the exchange-rate risk, which also 
rendered the system vulnerable to sudden reversals. Figure 4.20 shows the banks' liquid 
reserves to total assets ratio. As evident from the figure, the liquidity position of the 
sector deteriorated significantly in the post-1994 period. 
Given the weaknesses discussed above, the major problem in the banking system can be 
attributed to the inefficiency in the supervision and the regulation of the system. The 
high borrowing requirement of the public sector, as evident from Figure 4.4, as well as 
the unstable macroeconomic and political environment hindered the development of a 
healthy banking system in the case of Turkey especially because the Treasury, which 
was involved in the regulation and supervision of the banking sector along with the 
Central Bank, was also involved in financing the public sector deficits. Hence, it had 
less incentive to regulate the banks very strictly as they held a sizeable amount of 
government securities' 20 . 
12') See Ozkan (2005). 
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Figure 4.20 Banking Sector Liquid Reserves / Total Assets 
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
The third-generation models also give a special importance to self-fulfilling prophecies, 
as in the second-generation models. These models consider that capital flies for some 
reason and the banking sector collapses pushing the economy into a deep recession. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Sudden Stop theory suggests that a sudden stop in capital 
inflow or a sudden capital outflow can trigger crisis in an emerging economy by 
pushing the economy into insolvency and inducing bankruptcies. In this respect, it is 
important to analyse the nature of short-term capital flows. In the case of Turkey, after 
the liberalization of the capital account in 1989 there was an injection of liquidity into 
the domestic asset markets in terms of short-term foreign capital. Hence, the banking 
system was vulnerable to a shock in the exchange rate that a capital reversal could 
cause 121 . 
As can be seen in Figure 4.21, short-term portfolio investments, which were easily 
reversible, were high before both 1994 and 2000-2001. This further exposed the 
fragility of the banking sector to capital reversals. Also, a significant capital outflow is 
noticeable in 1998 due to the panic in emerging markets and the uncertainties regarding 
the sustainability of the existing exchange rate regimes caused by the Russian crisis. 
12 ' Balkan and Yeldan (1998), Alper (200 1), and Ekinci (2002) argue that the surge in capital inflows has 
rendered the Turkish economy dependent on hot money and vulnerable to speculative pressure and 
currency crises. 
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Figure 4.21 Net Short-Tenn Portfolio Investments (millions US dollars) 
Source: The Central Bank ofthe Republic of Turkey 
Therefore, the evidence presented in this section suggests that the crises seem to carry 
the elements of the third generation models. The analysis has also revealed that the 
Turkish economy was vulnerable to capital reversals due to the weaknesses in the 
banking sector. The analysis of the banking sector has shown the risk accumulation in 
the banking system in the period preceding the crisis such as the increase in currency 
mismatches and a rise in non-perfon-ning loans. Hence, the banking system was highly 
vulnerable to exchange rate risk and capital reversals. In this respect, the crises in 
Turkey seem to carry the elements of the third generation type of crises. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the twin crises of 2000-2001 
carried the elements of the third-generation models. The analysis has also revealed that 
the Turkish economy was vulnerable to capital reversals due to the weaknesses in the 
banking sector in the post-1994 period. The analysis of the banking sector has 
highlighted the risk accumulation in the banking system in the period preceding the 
crisis, including the increase in currency mismatches and a rise in nonperforming loans. 
Hence, the banking system was highly vulnerable to exchange rate risk and capital 
reversals. In this respect, the twin crises of 2000-2001 seem to carry the elements of the 
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third-generation type of crises. The analysis has also shown that the crisis of 1994 fits 
the first-generation models of speculative attacks, but it does not carry the elements of 
second-generation and third-generation models of currency crises. However, the twin 
crises of 2000-2001 do not quite fit the first-generation models, but carry the elements 
of both the second and third-generation models, albeit with more elements of the third- 
generation models. Although the fiscal imbalances were not completely resolved, the 
main vulnerability in the post-1994 period seems to be the banking sector fragility 
stemming from risk accumulation in the balance sheets. 
In the absence of the elements of the first-generation crises, the presence of a weak 
banking'sector might have set the stage for a self-fulfilling attack, inducing speculators 
to anticipate that the government would not dare to increase interest rates to defend the 
currency. In this respect, it is possible to argue that the twin crises of 2000-2001 had 
features relevant to the third-generation models of currency crises. It can therefore be 
concluded that the crisis of 1994 carried the elements of the first-generation currency 
crises with persistent fiscal deficits and monetary expansion, whereas the twin crises of 
2000-2001 carried the elements of the second- and the third-generation type currency 
crises with persistent weaknesses in the banking sector but with improvement in fiscal 
balances owing to the financial stabilization programmes followed in the aftermath of 
the 1994 crisis. 
In the light of the analysis carried out in this chapter, it can be concluded that currency 
crises in Turkey have a diverse set of underlying causes. Evidence suggests that the 
crises are related to fiscal imbalances and expansionary monetary policies, as well as to 
the fragility of the banking sector. Therefore, the crises seem to carry the elements of all 
three generations of currency crisis models and the econometric analysis of the currency 
crises and exchange market pressure in post capital account liberalization Turkey can 
justifiably include explanatory variables representing all three generations of currency 
crisis models. In particular, the analysis carried out in the present chapter has 
highlighted the importance of considering explanatory variables that proxy fiscal 
imbalances, exchangerate overvaluation, excessive monetary expansion and banking 
sector weaknesses. The next chapter will introduce the explanatory variables that are 
derived in the light of the analysis carried out'in the present chapter and will investigate 
their time-series properties. 
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CHAPTER 5 
VARIABLES USED AND THEIR TIME SERIES PROPERTIES 
5.1 The Data Used in the Thesis and its Sources 
Although speculative attacks and currency crises usually have long-lasting effects on 
the economy, they usually have very short durations. Also, they generally take place 
suddenly and, most of the time, the Central Bank intervenes immediately to ward off the 
speculative attacks. For this reason, higher frequency data more accurately captures 
smaller and shorter duration episodes of increased speculative pressure, whose effects 
would have disappeared long before quarterly or annual figures are aggregated. 
Consequently, the present thesis employs monthly time series data. The ability of 
monthly data to capture short-duration attacks allows a more comprehensive study of all 
occasions of speculative pressure instead of just extraordinary crashes because monthly 
data captures short and medium run dynamics of the exchange market pressure and the 
build-up prior to a crisis better than quarterly or annual data. Besides, as Civcir (2003) 
argues, monthly data is more informative in the case of high inflation economies like 
Turkey, where "economic agents tend to make their decisions quitefrequently in small 
intervals" 122 . 
The time series data used in the calculation of the variables span the period between 
1989: 09 and 2001: 04. This period begins immediately after the capital account 
liberalization in Turkey that took place in August, 1989. The end of the data coincides 
with the end of the currency crisis of February, 2001. The data series are obtained from 
the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey's Electronic Data Delivery System and the 
IMF's International Financial Statistics Database. 
The constructed variables are used in natural logarithms to easily allow interpretation in 
terms of elasticities. Nonetheless, this was not possible for some variables given that 
122 See Civcir (2003: p. 520). 
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they take negative values 123 . Throughout the thesis, variables used in natural logarithms 
will be denoted by In. For instance, InEXR indicates that EXR is expressed in natural 
logarithms. Table 5.1 shows the sources of the time series data used in the construction 
of the dependent and independent variables used in the thesis. 
Table 5.1 Sources of the Data Used in the Thesis 
Data Source 
MI (TL thousands) CBRT 
US MI (USD billions) IFS line 34* 
Turkish lira-US dollar exchange rate CBRT 
3-month deposit interest rate CBRT 
3-month US T-Bill rate IFS line 60 
Central Bank foreign exchange reserves excluding gold (USD millions) CBRT 
Budget Expenditures (TL thousands) CBRT 
Budget Revenues (TL thousands) CBRT 
Non-interest Budget Expenditures (TL thousands) CBRT 
Foreign Borrowing (TL thousands) CBRT 
Domestic Borrowing (TL thousands) CBRT 
Gross Domestic Product*(TL thousands, current prices) CBRT 
Consumer Price Index (1987=100) CBRT 
US Consumer Price Index (2000= 100) IFS line 64 
Wholesale Price Index (1987=100) CBRT 
US Wholesale Price Index (2000=100) IFS line 63 
Industrial Production Index (1992=100) CBRT 
Central Bank Cash Advances to Treasury (TL thousands) CBRT 
Domestic Credit (TL thousands) CBRT 
Monetary Base 124 (TL thousands) CBRT 
Reserve Money (TL thousands) CBRT 
Banking Sector Total Loans (TL thousands) CBRT 
Banking Sector Total Assets (TL thousands) CBRT 
Banking Sector Capital Equity (TL thousands) CBRT 
Banking Sector Total Liabilities (TL thousands) CBRT 
Banking Sector Liquid Assets (TL thousands) CBRT 
Banking Sector Deposits (TL thousands) CBRT 
Banking Sector Credits to Domestic Private Sector (TL thousands) CBRT 
Banking Sector Foreign Assets (TL thousands) CBRT 
Banking Sector Foreign Liabilities (TL thousands) CBRT 
Import price index (1994=100) IFS line 74 
Export price index (I 994= 100) IFS line 75 
Portfolio Investments" (USD millions) CBRT 
Notes: CBRT denotes the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Electronic Data Delivery System, IFS 
denotes International Financial Statistics Database of the lAfF. * denotes that series have been 
interpolated from quarterly series. ** portfolio investments contain data on non-residents' portfolio 
investments in Turkey. *** only annual data was available until 1991: 12. Hence, missing series have 
been interpolatedfrom annual data. 
12' Also, the graphical representations of these variables indicate no evidence of exponential trend in any 
of the variables. 
124 Monetary base is also referred to as high-powered money. 
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5.2 Estimation of EMP and the Definition of Currency Crises 
Capturing the speculative pressure on the exchange rate and finding an operational 
definition for the currency crises is not a straightforward task. The efforts of capturing 
crises empirically involve two conceptual issues. First, which variables should the EMP 
index consist of? Second, above what threshold value should the exchange market 
i pressure (EMP) index be labelled a currency crisis? 
In a typical currency crisis, a sudden loss of confidence in a country's currency, or pure 
speculation, leads to a rapid rise in the exchange rate, i. e. the value of foreign currency. 
As discussed earlier, in order to prevent exchange rate fluctuations, the central bank 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market through either depleting its foreign exchange 
reserves or increasing the interest rates. Hence, an effective EMP index should ideally 
incorporate, in addition to exchange rate changes, changes in the foreign exchange 
reserves of the Central Bank and the short-term interest rates in order to capture the 
reaction of the Central Bank in defending a speculative attack. 
Even after estimating the EMP index, pinning down the currency crisis episodes is not a 
straightforward task. A priori, there exists no clear-cut definition of what value of the 
index should constitute a currency crisis. As discussed in Chapter 3, the existing 
literature empirically defines currency crises as the instances of extreme speculative 
pressure which go beyond an arbitrarily chosen threshold. Hence, inevitably, there 
remains an element of arbitrariness in defining a specific date for the currency crises. 
As pointed out in Chapter 3, the literature contains various approaches to estimating the 
EMP index, which can then be used to identify the episodes of currency crises. In this 
chapter, four major approaches to estimating EMP will be considered and the resulting 
EMP indices will be analyzed with the help of the threshold values used in the existing 
literature to assess if they would accurately pinpoint the currency crises of 1994 and 
2000-2001, as well as the relatively minor episodes of excessive speculative pressure 
that the economy experienced in 1991 and 1998. The four approaches that arc used in 
this chapter are those introduced by Girton and Roper (1977), Eichengreen et al (1995), 
Pentecost et al (2001) and Weymark (1995). Based on the analysis of these four 
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measures, the EMP indices that best capture the speculative attacks and currency crises 
most accurately in the case of Turkey will be identified. 
5.2.1 Girton and Roper (1977) Approach 
Girton and Roper (1977) referred to exchange market pressure as the magnitude of 
money market disequilibria that must be removed through changes in either foreign 
exchange reserves or the exchange rate to keep the money market in equilibrium under 
a managed floating exchange rate system. The authors suggest estimating an EMP 
index consisting of a simple sum of percentage changes in the exchange rate and in 
foreign exchange reserves, which are weighted equally 125 . 
Since Girton and Roper's (1977) purpose was not to use this index to identify currency 
crises using a threshold, they simply summed percentage changes in the exchange rate 
and in foreign exchange reserves to obtain the net magnitude of the equilibria in the 
exchange market. However, in order to be able to identify the crisis episodes as the 
months in which the index goes above a certain threshold, the percentage change in 
foreign exchange reserves should appear with a negative sign so that the exhaustion of 
the reserves in reaction to a speculative attack would be represented by the upward 
movements of the index. This way, a positive value of the index indicates an increased 
pressure in the exchange market that can stem from any combination of a devaluation or 
a loss of international reserves. Therefore, the index is estimated as follows: 
EMPt = w, (Aet )- w2 (A rt) (5.1) 
where A denotes percentage change, el and r, denote the Turkish lira-US dollar 
exchange rate 126 and the foreign exchange reserves as a proportion of reserve money, 
respectively, and w, ý W2 = 1. A positive value of the index indicates an increased 
pressure in the exchange market that can stem from any combination of a change in 
125 See Girton and Roper (1977: p. 537). 
126 The exchange rate is represented in terms of Turkish liras per US dollars so that an increase in the 
exchange rate represents the depreciation of the Turkish lira. The nominal exchange rate has been used 0 following the earlier studies. The possibility of real effective exchange rates has also been considered but 0 
since the correlation coefficient between nominal and real exchange rates during the sample period is 0 0.887, the choice of which series is to use would clearly not affect the robustness of the empirical results. 
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international reserves and international reserves. Figure 5.1 shows the graph of the EMP 
index calculated using the Girton and Roper's (1977) approach with four estimated 
threshold values, which are calculated as fOllOWS: YEMP + 1-5(OrEMP), PEMP + 2.0(aEmp), 
PEMP + 2.5(aEmp) and PEMP + 3.0(uEmp), where p and a denote, respectively, the mean 
and the standard deviation of the estimated EMP index. 
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Figure 5.1 Girton and Roper (1977) Approach to Estimating EMP 
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, the EMP index estimated based on the approach suggested 
by Girton and Roper (1977) barely captures the crisis of 1991 and misses the crisis of 
November 2000. This emphasizes the importance of the inclusion of the interest rates in 
the construction of the EMP indices. As discussed earlier, in the case of these crises, 
interest rates increased dramatically in a very short period while the Turkish Central 
Bank was trying to defend the Turkish lira. As can be seen in Figure 5.1 this effect is 
not captured by the EMP index estimated based on the approach suggested by Girton 
and Roper (1977). Immediately after the crisis of 1994, the index shows another spike 
in 1996 possibly caused by a loss in international reserves in defending an unsuccessful 
speculative attack. 
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5.2.2 Eichengrccn et al (1995) Approach 
Although the weighting scheme used by Girton and Roper (1977) is simple to use, it has 
the drawback that the resulting index will be driven by the more volatile component, i. e. 
the changes in the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank. This shortcoming is 
addressed by Eichengreen et al (1995). The authors also suggest the inclusion of the 
short-term interest rates in the estimation of the EMP. Therefore, their approach 
provides a more general measure of the exchange market pressure. In the case of Turkey, 
the Turkish Central Bank used short-terrn interest rates extensively as a monetary policy 
tool in the sample period especially in the case of a reversal in capital inflows 127 . 
Therefore, it is not possible to ignore the possible impact of this policy tool on exchange 
rates. The EMP index introduced by Eichengreen et al (1995) is calculated as follows: 
EMPt = aAet +, 8A (ir 1: )- YA rt (5.2) 
where A denotes monthly percent change. et denotes the Turkish lira-US dollar nominal 
exchange rate, i denotes the domestic short-term interest rate (3-month deposit rate)' 18, 
i, * corresponds to the same variable but for the US (3-month US T-Bill rate). rt denotes 
the foreign exchange reserves as a proportion of M, 129, and a, P and 7 are the weights of 
the components. In Equation 5.2, the component 7Art is represented with a negative 
coefficient because Eichengreen et al (1995)'s methodology involves the observation of 
the upward movements of the overall EMP index. The authors identify currency crisis 
episodes as the months in which the EMP index goes above a certain threshold. 
Table 5.2 Volatilities of the Comoonents of the Exchanp-e Market Pressure Index 
Component Standard Deviation 
(1989: 09-1994: 05) (1994: 06-2001: 03) (1989: 09-2001: 04) 
et 0.00 0.18 0.00 
it- i: 13.66 12.68 17.40 
rt 890.34 4296.57 9983.19 
127 See Balkan and Yeldan (2002) and Demir (2004). 
128 The 3-month deposit rate has been used as a proxy for short-term interest rates for Turkey as 3-month 
T-Bill rates are not available. 
129 Eichengreen et al (1995) compares the domestic reserves with those of a reference country, However, 
why reserve changes in another country would be of interest in the case of Turkey is questionable. 
Clearly, this approach would render the EMP index subject to any idiosyncratic fluctuations in the 
reference country's international reserves. Therefore any reference country's reserves arc not included in 
the present analysis. 
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As can be seen in Table 5.2, each component of the index has different volatilities. 
Reserve changes seem to be the most volatile component in all three periods and it is 
likely to dominate the index. Eichengreen et al (1995) suggest weighting the 
components of the index by the inverse of their standard deviations in order to equalize 
the weights of the three components to prevent the most volatile component dominating 
the index. Accordingly, the weights assigned to each component are estimated as 
follows: 
(5.3) 
ae 
p=1 (5.4) 
al 
(5.5) 
cr, 
where, cre, ai and a, denote the standard deviation of et, (it- i, * ) and rt, respectively. Hence, 
if a component has higher variance, a lower weight would be assigned to it, 30. Likewise, 
a component with a lower variance would gain a higher weight. A positive value of the 
index indicates an increased pressure in the exchange market that can stem from any 
combination of a devaluation, an expansion of the interest rate spread, or a loss of 
international reserves. Figure 5.2 shows the graph of the EMP index calculated using 
the Eichengreen et al's (1995) approach with the four estimated threshold values, 
which are calculated as explained in the previous section. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the EMP index estimated using Eichengreen el al's (1995) 
approach is relatively more useful in terms of capturing the currency crisis of 1991 and 
November 2000. In addition, it also captures several other episodes of increased 
speculative pressure. For instance, the spike observed in 1998 can be attributed to the 
increase in the interest rates by the Turkish Central Bank while defending the Turkish 
Lira in the global panic caused by the Russian debt crisis of 1998. 
130 The standard deviations are assumed constant from - 1989: 09 to 2001: 04. This is a shortcoming of the 
model as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 5.2 Eichengreen et al (1995) Approach to Estimating EMP 
5.2.3 Pentecost et al (2001) Approach 
The weighting scheme used in building the EMP following Eichengreen et al (1995) is 
clearly an ad hoc practice. Pentecost et al (2001) suggest the use of principal 
components analysis to derive the weights and signs to be attached to the three 
components of the EMP index. This approach is similar to that of Eichengreen et al 
(1995) in the sense that it ensures that no single variable dominates the index. I lowever, 
the advantage of the approach suggested by Pentecost el al (2001) is that it allows for 
checking the consistency of the signs of each of the components. 
The technique of principal components analysis is used to obtain three uncorrelated 
linear combinations between the three standardized variables. The first linear 
combination or principal component accounts for the largest proportion of the variance 
in the set of original variables and can be interpreted as an overall index summarizing 
the information contained in the original variables 131 . Table 5.3 ranks the first two 
principal components according to their eigenvalues. As can be seen from Table 5.3, the 
first component's cumulative variance is 1.262, which represents 46.4% of the 
13 ' The objective of principal component analysis is to reduce the dimensionality (number of variables) of 
the dataset but retain most of the original variability in the data. In econometrics, it has been used for C, 
reduction of 'large data collections into more manageable form, especially to deal with problems of Cý 
multicol linearity and shortage of degrees of freedom (Klein and Ozmucur, 2003). 
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explanation of the variances. Using the so called Kaiser criterion, only the first principal 
component, whose eigenvalue is greater than 1.0, has been retained 132 . 
Table 5.3 Principal Components Analysis to Estimate EMP 
Eigenvalue % Variance et It- It rt 
1 st principal component 1.262 0.464 0.564 0.302 -0.592 
2 nd principal component 0.964 0.325 0.305 0.282 -0.543 
Accordingly, the first component is used as the EMP index. Figure 5.3 shows the graph 
of the EMP index calculated using the Pentecost et al's (2001) approach with the four 
estimated threshold values, which are calculated as explained in Section 5.3.2. 
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Figure 5.3 Pentecost et al (200 1) Approach to Estimating EMP 
Clearly, the index provides a plausible description of the Turkish currency crises of 
1994 and 2001 in the sample period. The index also reflects the effect of the liquidity 
crunch on the interest rates caused by the Gulf war of 1991. However, it seems to miss 
the crisis of 1998. 
132 The Kaiser criterion suggests that only the factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 are retained (See 
Kaiser, 1960). 
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5.2.4 Weymark (1995) Approach 
Weymark (1995) considers a simple log-linear small open economy model with rational 
expectations to track the exchange rate elasticity of reserve changes. She then uses this 
elasticity estimate to weight changes in international reserves in constructing the EMP 
index consisting of the changes in exchange rates and the foreign exchange reserves. 
She suggests the following formula for estimating the EMP: 
EMP = Ae (5.6) tI+ IIAYý 
where Ae, is the percentage change in the exchange rate (domestic currency/foreign 
currency), A. ý is the percentage change in foreign exchange reserves expressed as a 
proportion of the monetary base, and 77 is the conversion factor, which stands for the 
relative weights of exchange rate changes and the intervention of the Central Bank. The 
conversion factor is estimated as follows: 
77 = -aAe, / aAr, (5.7) 
As Weymark (1995) suggests, q is the elasticity measure that "converts observed 
reserve changes into equivalent exchange rate units" 133 . Accordingly, EMP can be 
interpreted as the exchange rate change that would have been required to remove the 
excess demand for a currency without intervention from the central bank 134 . 
Obviously, the major building block in the estimation of this EMP index is the 
calculation of )7. As Weyrnark (1995) points out, "because q varies with the model 
specification, calculated values of exchange market pressure it'ill not, in general, be 
model independent" 135 . The structure of the representative small-open economy is 
described, in logarithms, as follows' 36 : 
AMId , I ": A+ Apt +A Ac, _J6 2Ail (5.8) 
133 See Weymark (1995: p. 279). 
134 See Weymark (1995,1997a, 1997b, 1998). 
135 See Weymark (1995: p. 279). 
136 The summary of Weymark's (1995) model by Stavarek (2007) is used. 
100 
which suggests that money demand is a positive function of domestic inflation and 
changes in real domestic income, and a negative function of changes in the domestic 
interest rate: 
Apt =a, + a, Ap, * +a, e, (5.9) 
which defines the purchasing power parity condition 137 attributing the primary role in 
domestic inflation determination to exchange rate changes and foreign inflation; and 
Ai = A'* + E, (Ae,., ) - Ae, (5.10) it 
which describes uncovered interest rate parity. 
Am, ' = Ad, 
a+ (I 
_ 
A)Ar, (5.11) 
Equation 5.11 suggests that changes in the money supply are positively influenced by 
autonomous changes in domestic lending and unsterilized changes in the stock of 
foreign reserves. 
Ar, = -j5, Ae, 
Equation 5.12 states that changes in foreign exchange reserves are a function of the 
exchange rate and a time-varying response coefficient, j5,. 
Adja :- 70 + AYIren't +0- 71 )API - Y2 Ylg(lp (5.13) 
Equation 5.13 describes the evolution of the central bank's domestic lending. Whereas 
domestic inflation and changes in trend real output changes are positive determinants of 
the domestic lending the gap between real output and its trend has a negative impact on 
domestic lending activity. 
137 Only if a, =a2ý I- 
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AMd = AMs 11 (5.14) 
Equation 5.14 defines the money market clearing condition that assumes money 
demand to be continuously equal to money supply 138 . 
In the above equations, p, denotes the domestic price level, p, * is the foreign price level, 
e, denotes the exchange rate, in, is the nominal money stock, c, is real domestic income, 
i, is the nominal domestic interest rate, 1: denotes the nominal foreign interest rate, 
E, (Ae,., ) is the expected exchange rate change 139 and X represents the proportion of 
sterilized intervention. All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. On the other 
hand, d, ' is autonomous domestic lending by the central bank and r, is the stock of 
foreign exchange reserves, both divided by the one period lagged value of the money 
base. YIrend denotes the potential level of output which is estimated as the long-run 
trend component of the real domestic output (y, ) and, y, "P is the difference between 
y, and ytrend .A denotes a change in the respective variable. 
By substituting equations (5.9) and (5.10) into equation (5.8) and substituting equation 
(5.13) into equation (5.11) and then using the money market clearing condition in 
equation (5.14) to set the resulting two equations equal to one another, it is possible to 
obtain the following relationship: 
X, +fl2E(Ae,,, ) + (I - A)Ar, Ae, =. 
y, a2 +*, 62 
(5.15) 
where 
70 _ Ylao _)60 + 
Aytrend gop 71 al P: - Y2 yl - #61 
ACI +2 Al: (5.16) 
and the elasticity needed to estimate EMP can be calculated as: 
131 The superscripts d and s represent demand and supply, respectively. 
139 E, (Ae,,, ) is held constant when exchange market pressure is imputed (see Weymark, 1995: p. 279). 
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17 
aAe, 
--": - 
(I - A) 
aAr, YI a2 +A 
In order to calculate the conversion factor q, it is necessary to estimate the sterilization 
coefficient A, the elasticity of the money base with respect to the domestic price level 
r,, the elasticity of the domestic price level with respect to the exchange rate Cr2, and 
the elasticity of the money demand with respect to the domestic interest rate 82 . The 
parameter estimates can simply be obtained by estimating the following three equations: 
Am, - Ap, =, go +A Act-, 62 Ai, + cl,,, (5.18) 
Ap, =ao+al +aAe +c,, and Apt 212 
ABI 
Ar _A trend _A 70 +4Ar, + Yl A+ Y2 Yl gap I yl pA +63t 
(5.20) 
where Bt denotes the monetary base. Equation 5.18 and Equation 5.19 are obtained 
directly from Equation 5.8 and Equation 5.9. Equation 5.20 is derived by substitution of 
Equation 5.12 into Equation 5.10 and noting that the change in the money supply 
( AB, / BI-, ) equals the change in the money base assuming that the money multiplier is 
constant. 
As mentioned earlier, Ar, is the change in foreign exchange reserves of the Central 
Bank scaled by the one-period-lagged value of the monetary base (denoted as RMB in 
Table 5.15). On the other hand, e,, c,, m, andy, are proxied by the Turkish lira-US 
140 dollar nominal exchange rate, GDP , MI and the 
industrial production index (IPI), 
respectively. The domestic and foreign price levels, p, and p, * I are proxied by the 
Turkish and the US consumer price indices, respectively. In addition, for i, and i, *, the 
3-month deposit rate for Turkey and the 3-month T-bill rate for the US, respectively, are 
140 GDP is interpolated from quarterly series. 
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used. Finally, y, "' is obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and a smoothing 
parameter of 14400 
141 
142 Following Stavarek (2007), the variables are separated as endogenous and exogenous . 
The endogenous variables are Am,, Ap,, Ae,, Ai, and A. B, / B, -, and 
A. ý . The exogenous 
trend 
variables are Act, Apt, Ail, Ayt and Ay, "P. Although, Ae, does not appear on the left- 
hand side of any of the equations, it is classified as the endogenous variable as the 
exchange rate is the variable determined by the model 143 . 
Following Weymark (1995), the two-stage least square regression (2SLS) technique is 
used to obtain the parameters as the endogenous variables are on both sides of the 
Equations 5.8 through 5.14 144 . 
This technique is useful in models where the researcher 
must assume that the disturbance terrn of the dependent variable is correlated with the 
cause(s) of the independent variable(s). 145 In the models, I(l) series are first-differenced 
to render them stationary 146 . 
The 2SLS requires the incorporation of instrumental variables into the estimation. Thus, 
the first step of the analysis is to find the appropriate instrumental variables. For this 
purpose, the first stage regressions are run on endogenous variables having all possible 
instrumental variables as regressors. As possible instrumental variables, the 
contemporaneous and one-month lagged values of exogenous variables and one-month 
lagged values of all endogenous variables are chosen. Finally, the regressors with 
sufficient statistical significance are selected as instrumental variables. According to the 
model specification the expected signs of the parameters are: A>O , a, >0 , 
a2 >0 9A 
<0ý Y1 'ýý 09 Y2 <0 and A<0. Since ), is a fraction, its absolute value is 
14 1 The Hodrick-Prescott Filter is a smoothing method that is used to obtain a smooth estimate of the Cý 
long-term trend component of a series (See Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). Eviews 5.0 software uses 14,400 
as the default smoothing parameter. 0 142 Weymark (1995) does not provide a detailed account of her estimation of the related parameters. 
143 See Stavarek (2007). 
144 Endogenous variables on the right-hand side of the equation are likely to correlate with the disturbance 
term. Thus, using the ordinary least square method would lead to biased estimates (Stavarck, 2007). 
., e of 
2SLS to create the new variables are called instrumental 145 The variables used in the first stag 
variables, which are uncorrelated with the disturbance term and replace the problematic causal variables. 
This is accomplished using OLS regression with the problematic causal variable as the dependent and 
instrumental variables as the independents. 
146 See Table 5.19 for the unit root properties of the data. 
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expected to be between 0 and 1147 . The 2SLS estimation results for the Equations 5.18, 
5.19 and 5.20 are presented in Tables 5.4 to 5.6. 
Table 5.4 The 2SLS Estimation of Eciuation 5.18 
trend Instruments: Ay, '-, 
Parameters Value Standard Errors Prob. 
A 0.082 0.013 0.203 
A 0.142 0.074 0.026 
A 0.031 0.018 0.031 
R2 0.43 2 XRESET (4) 1.75(0.743) 
DW-statistic 1.94 2 0.01(0.452) ZNORM (4) 
2 (4) 10.34(0.433) 2 (4) 0.01(0.321) LA4 ZHFTFR 
2222 
Notes: ZLIf I XRESET I XNORM, and XHETER are, respectively, Lagrange multiplier statistics 
for tests of 
residual serial correlation, Ramsey's RESET test using the square ofthefitted valuesforfunctionalform, 
normality based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals, and heteroskedasticity based on the 
regression ofsquared residuals on squaredfitted values. DW denotes Durbin-Watson. 
Table 5.5 The 2SLS Estimation of Eauation 5.19 
Instruments: e, 
trend 0 
-jqAr, -jqy, -j qAp, 
Parameters Value Standard Errors Prob. 
ao 0.032 0.031 0.436 
cri 1.245 0.702 0.043 
Cr2 0.928 0.308 0.056 
R2 0.55 2 1.54(0.743) XRrSET (4) 
DW-statistic 1.97 2 (4) 0.02(0.452) NOlUf 
22 XLAj (4) 8.23(0.433) XH[. *7.1..,? (4) 0.03(0.321) 
2222 Notes: ; rl_kf, XREMYT, ZNC)I? M, and ZHP. 7'1., R are, respectively, Lagrange multiplier statistics 
for tests of 
residual serial correlation, Ramsey's RESET test using the square ofthefilled valuesforfitnctionalform, 
normality based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals, and heteroskedasiicity based on the 
regression ofsquared residuals on squaredfitled values. DW denotes Durbin-Watson. 
Table 5.4 shows the estimation of Equation 18. As can be seen in the table, the 
parameters A and, 82 are significant with correct signs. Besides, the estimation passes 
the diagnostic tests of the serial correlation, functional form, normality and 
heteroskedasticity. Although R2 seems to be quite low, this does not invalidate the 
147 See Stavarek (2007). 
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parameter estimates as "R 2 really has no statistical meaning in the context of 2SLS" 
(Sribney et al, 2005). The 2SLS results of Equation 5.19 are reported in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.6 The 2SLS Estimation of Equation 5.20 
_I 
Instruments: Ap, *, Ay9'P, Arý A! rend 
Parameters Value Standard Errors Prob. 
ro -0.054 0.053 0.475 
-0.043 0.012 0.025 
-0.834 0.303 0.032 
72 -0.586 0.564 1.125 
R2 0.23 x2 (4) 1.36(0.633) RESET 
DW-statistic 1.94 2 XNORM (4) 0.04(0.631) 
2 (4) 10.24(0.531) 2 0.05(0.446) Im 
ZHhTFR (4) 
Notes: X2, ;r222 
L" RESET I XNORM, and ; rHETER are, respectively, 
Lagrange multiplier statistics for tests of 
residual serial correlation, Ramsey's RESET test using the square ofthefitted valuesforfunctionalform, 
normality based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals, and heteroskedasticity based on the 
regression ofsquared residuals on squaredfitted values. DW denotes Durbin-Watson. 
As can be seen in the table, the signs of all parameters are consistent with the theoretical 
assumptions and the parameters a, and a2 are significant. The model also passes the 
diagnostic tests. Finally, the 2SLS estimates of the Equation 5.20 are reported in Table 
5.6. Again, the low value of R2 reported in the tables does not matter in the case of the 
2SLS technique. 
The parameter y, has the correct sign and the absolute value of the sterilization 
coefficient A is indeed between 0 and 1. Based on the coefficient estimates, the 
conversion factorq is estimated using Equation 5.17: 
77 
aAe, (I - A) _ 
(1+0.043) 
= 1.409 
148 (5.21) 
aAr, Yl a2 + 182 - 0.834(0.928) + 0.031 
Weymark's (1995) purpose was not to use this index to identify currency crises, hence 
the author simply summed percentage changes in the exchange rate and in foreign 
14' This result is not similar to the elasticity estimated by Weymark (1995) (as -3.089) for the Canadian 
economy. This can be attributed to the differences between the Canadian and Turkish economies. Indeed, 
the result is more consistent with the findings of Stavarek (2007) - 1.838 0.906 and 0.899, respectively, 
for Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia - which have a more similar economy to that of Turkey. 
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exchange reserves. However, in order to be able to identify the crisis episodes using a 
threshold value as the months in which the index goes above a certain threshold, the 
percentage change in foreign exchange reserves should appear with a negative sign so 
that the exhaustion of the reserves in reaction to a speculative attack would be 
represented by the upward movements of the index. This way, a positive value of the 
index indicates an increased pressure in the exchange market that can stem from any 
combination of a devaluation or a loss of international reserves. Therefore, Weymark's 
(1995) index shown in Equation 5.6 is modified by assigning a negative sign for j7Art. 
Accordingly, the graph of the EMP index calculated using the formula 
EMP, = Ae, - 1.409(Ar, ) is shown in Figure 5.4 with the four estimated threshold values, 
which are calculated as explained in Section 5.3.2. 
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Figure 5.4 Weymark (1995) Approach to Estimating EMP 
As can be seen in Figure 5.4, Weymark's (1995) approach also provides a very 
plausible measure for the exchange market pressure as it clearly captures the currency 
crises of 1991,1994 and 2000-2001. However, it misses the crisis of 1998. 
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5.3 Dependent Variables used in the Thesis 
Figure 5.5 shows all four different EMP indices on the saine graph. In the figure, 
EMP(GR), EMP(E), EMP(TV) and EMP(P) denote the EMP indices following the 
approaches of Girton and Roper (1997), Eichengreen et al (2001), Weymark (1995) and 
Pentecost et al (2001), respectively. As can be seen, there seems to be a co-movement 
among the indices and they generally do not deviate from each other very widely. Table 
5.7 summarizes the crisis episodes captured by each of the indices based on the four 
estimated thresholds. 
Table 5.7 Crisis eDisodes caDtured bv the estimated EMP indices 
Threshold I Threshold 2 Threshold 3 Threshold 4 
EMP(E) 1991,1994, 1991,1994, 1994,2001 1994 
1996,1998, 2000,2001 
2000,2001 
EMP(P) 1991,1994, 1994,2000,2001 1994,2001 1994,2001 
2000,2001 
EMP (W) 1991,1994, 1994,2001 1994,2001 1994 
1996,2000, 
2001 
EMP(GR) 1991,1994, 1994,1996,2001 1994,2001 1994,2001 
1996,2001 
Notes: Threshold lý, uEmp+L-50Emp), Threshold 2=juEuP+2.0(qEmp), Threshold 3 +2.5 and 
Threshold 4=pEmp+3.0(qEmp 
=PEMP (aEMP) 
), where p and a denote, the mean and the standard deviation of the 
estimated EMP index respectively. EMP(GR) , EMP(E) , EMP(W) and EMP(P) denote the EMP indices following the approaches of Girton and Roper (1997), Eichengreen et al (2001), lVeymark (1995) and 
Pentecost et al (2001), respectively. 
As can be seen in Table 5.7, the EMP indices that accurately identify the currency 
cruises in the sample period are EMP(E) and EMP(P). Even using the threshold of 2.0 
standard deviations above the mean, they pin down the crises in 1994 and 2000-2001. 
The most efficient index seems to be EMP(E) as it captures also the episode of 
excessive speculative pressure experienced in 1998 due to the Russian crisis. 
In order to indicate the extent of co-movement among the estimated EMP indices, Table 
5.8 reports the correlation matrix of the four EMP indices. As can be seen, EMP(P) and 
EMP(W) are highly correlated. Also, EMP(JV) is highly correlated with EMP(E). 
Therefore, in this thesis, EMP(P) and EMP(E) will be considered to test the sensitivity 
of the econometric results to the selection of these two different indices. 
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Table 5.8 Correlations of the four EMP measures 
EMP(GR) EMP(E) EMP(JV) EMP(P) 
EMP(GR) 1.00 0.53 0.39 0.07 
EMP(E) 1.00 0.76 0.51 
EMP(TV) 1.00 0.87 
EMP(P) 1.00 
Notes: EMP(GR) , EMP(E) , EMP(W) and EMP(P) denote the EMP indices following the approaches of Girton and Roper (1997), Eichengreen et al (2001), Weymark (1995) and Pentecost et al (2001), 
respectively. 
On the other hand, EMP(W) and EMP(GR) will not be used as they fail to capture the 
crisis of November 2000 using the threshold of 2.0 standard deviations above the mean. 
Also, EMP(TV) will not be considered as it is highly correlated with EMP(P) and 
EMP(E) and would, therefore, not be very useful for the purposes of sensitivity analysis. 
Furthermore, Girton and Roper's (1997) and Weymark's (1995) EMP indices do not 
provide a realistic measure of the exchange market pressure in the case of Turkey 
because they are based on the assumption that all intervention takes the form of 
purchases or sales of foreign exchange reserves. However, it is known that the Turkish 
Central Bank also used interest rates as a tool for intervention. 
5.4 Explanatory Variables used in the Thesis 
A considerable number of variables can be considered as indicators of vulnerability to 
speculative attacks and currency crises. The choice and the construction of the 
explanatory variables used in this thesis are based on the identified possible causes of 
currency crises pointed out in Chapter 4 in the light of the three generations of currency 
crisis models. 
As explained in Chapter 3, the second-generation models do not directly suggest any 
explanatory variables since the measurement of qualitative variables such as self- 
fulfilling changes in investor sentiment, especially in time-series format, is very 
diff icult 149 . Nonetheless, the second-generation models suggest that any variable that 
may affect the government's decision whether or not to defend the exchange rate regime 
against a speculative attack can be used as a second-generation variable. Based on this 
149 The existing literature suggests a few variables that can be used in the context of second generation 
models such as interest rates and unemployment. Unemployment is not used in the empirical analysis as it 
is not available in monthly frequency. Interest rates, on the other hand, are not used because they are 
already used in the construction of the dependent variable, exchange market pressure index. 
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consideration, banking sector indicators can be considered as not only third-generation 
but also second-generation variables since a weak banking system increases the 
probability of speculative attack because the investors know that the government will be 
reluctant to resist an attack by increasing interest rates since this would result -in 
bankruptcies and a recession (Sachs et al, 1996). 
In a similar vein, government borrowing can also be considered as a second-generation 
variable because highly-indebted goverranents with mostly short-term debt will find 
their fiscal burden increased sharply if market expectations of depreciation drive up 
domestic interest rates. This may affect the government's decision whether or not to 
defend the exchange rate regime in case of a speculative attack. Similarly, an6ther 
variable used in the thesis, the short-term portfolio investments, capture the expectations 
of international investors and, hence, its negative values may proxy a self-fulfilling 
panic. In this respect, this variable can also be considered as not only a third-generation 
but also a second-generation variable. 
Due to the nature of the econometric investigations carried in this thesis, the number of 
explanatory variables has to be kept at a minimum. In particular, due to the short span 
of the data used in the thesis and the length of lags of the variables considered in the 
cointegration tests, a number of potentially useful variables, such as stock market data, 
current account as a share of GDP, and unemployment rate have not been used in this 
thesis. In fact, time series data on unemployment was not available in monthly 
frequency. On the other hand, since portfolio investments quite closely represent the 
condition of the stock market in the case of Turkey, the absence of stock market data is 
not as severe as the absence of current account data. Likewise, current account balance 
is generally used to capture the loss of competitiveness of the country and current 
account deficit is usually regarded as a sign of weakness if it is financed through 
borrowing. Since this thesis uses overvaluation of the real exchange rate as a proxy for 
competitiveness, and total borrowing as a share of budget revenues to proxy the level of 
indebtedness, the absence of current account data has, to some extent, been 
compensated. 
Table 5.9 lists the explanatory variables used in the thesis according to the sectors of the 
economy they represent. 
III 
Table 5.9 Ext)lanatorv Variables Used in the Thesis 
Fiscal Sector Indicators Monetary Policy Banking Sector Other Variables 
Indicators Indicators 
Budget expenditures Excess real M1 Foreign assets Portfolio 
Budget revenues balances Foreign liabilities investments 
Non-interest budget Domestic credit Total liabilities Real exchange rate 
expenditures /Budget GDP Capital equity overvaluation 
revenues 
(Domestic borrowing + Total loans 
foreign borrowing) Capital Equity 
Budget revenues 
Liquid assets 
Total assets 
5.4.1 Fiscal Sector Indicators 
First-generation models of sPeculative attacks suggest that variables proxying fiscal 
imbalances can be used as explanatory variables. These models suggest that, in the 
presence of fiscal imbalances, speculators who have rational expectations, anticipate 
that a crisis is imminent and they attack the exchange rate by shifting their wealth out of 
domestic currency and into foreign currency thus putting pressure on the exchange rate. 
Their purpose is to buy the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank at the 
prevailing low value of the exchange rate and to sell them at a higher rate after the crisis. 
Chapter 4 has pointed out that fiscal variables may have played a role in the occurrence 
of currency crises in Turkey. Accordingly, this thesis uses indicators capturing fiscal 
imbalances and the effectiveness of fiscal policy. In the literature, the consolidated 
budget balance of the government, also referred to as the fiscal balance, has usually 
been used as a share of GDP or GNP to proxy fiscal policy. Since GDP and GNP are 
not available in monthly frequency, this thesis considers all budgetary variables as a 
share of the total budget revenues of the government in order to obtain a more accurate 
account of the fiscal policy. 
As the analysis in Chapter 4 has revealed, the Turkish economy experienced a surge in 
public expenditures, especially in the early 1990s, due to the total wage bill, generous 
agricultural support policies, worsening performance of the state-owned economic 
enterprises and the increased cost of military operations in the south-eastern region of 
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the country. On the other hand, persistent problems in the taxation system restricted the 
150 budget revenues of successive governments . In order to capture the imbalance 
between the budget revenues and budget expenditures, the ratio of budget expenditures 
to budget revenues (EXR) is used: 
EXR =Budget expenditures/ Budget revenues (5.22) 
EXR is expected to be in a positive relationship with exchange market pressure and the 
likelihood of currency crises. Figure 5.6 shows the evaluation of EXR. It can be seen 
that the variable generally follows an upward trend with a sharp fall in 2000. 
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Figure 5.6 Budget expenditures / Budget revenues 
As an alternative indicator of fiscal imbalances, non-interest budget expenditures to 
budget revenues ratio (NIE) is also used: 
NIE = Non-interest budget expenditures /Budget revenues (5.23) 
The motivation behind the exclusion of the net interest payments from budget 
expenditures in analysing the current fiscal performance is that net interest payments 
150 Indeed, Turkey's tax capacity was the lowest among OECD countries (See OECD, 1993). 
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reflect the debt built-up in the past, possibly by the previous governments"', which can 
not be directly controlled by the present fiscal policy and are exogenously determined 
by interest'rates and the stock of debt inherited. Hence, non-interest budget expenditures 
reflect the discretionary budget policy of the current government more accurately. 
This is indeed relevant in the case of Turkey because, as reviewed in Chapter 4, there 
was a significant surge in interest payments on the existing debt, particularly after 1992. 
Therefore, in the case of Turkey, ME is a key variable to analyse the dynamics of 
public debt and the medium-term fiscal sustainability. NIE is also expected to be in a 
positive relationship with exchange market pressure and the likelihood of currency 
crises. Figure 5.7 shows the evaluation of NIE. It can be seen that the variable generally 
follows s horizontal path with a sharp fall inl994 and 2000. 
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Figure 5.7 Non-interest budget expenditures / Budget revenues 
The analysis in Chapter 4 has also revealed that the Turkish government relied heavily 
on borrowing in the period under study, especially until the crisis of 1994. This was 
primarily due to Turkey's limited tax capacity, which made it difficult to finance 
government expenditure. Consequently, in order to finance the gap between revenue 
and expenditures, successive governments relied heavily on domestic and foreign 
borrowing. In order to capture the impact of borrowing, total borrowing consisting of 
151 The use of this variable is inspired by the primary budget balance, which is derived by adding back net 
interest payments to the overall budget balance. 
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domestic borrowing and foreign borrowing is considered relative to budget revenues 
(TBR). 
TBR = (Domestic borrowing + Foreign borrowing) /Budget revenues (5.24) 
TBR is expected to be in a positive relationship with exchange market pressure and the 
likelihood of currency crises. Figure 5.8 shows the evaluation of TBR. It can be seen 
that the variable generally follows a slightly upward trend with a sharp increase in early 
1996 and a significant fall in 2000. 
1.4 
1.2 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 
Figure 5.8 (Domestic borrowing + Foreign borrowing) / Budget revenues 
5.4.2 Monetary Policy Variables 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the first-generation models suggest that fiscal deficits 
financed by excessive creation of domestic money lead to speculative attacks against 
the currency as printing money is inconsistent with keeping the exchange rate stable. 
This leads the speculators to believe that the regime would eventually collapse. Hence, 
they attack the currency to profit from the forthcoming crisis. 
Monetary expansion is indeed relevant in the case of the Turkish economy. As pointed 
out in Chapter 4, in the presence of budget problems, the successive Turkish 
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governments mostly relied on printing money to raise seigniorage revenue in order to 
finance the fiscal deficits. This resulted in the release of excess liquidity into the 
152 
system 
The stance of monetary policy can be proxied by excess real MI balances (ERM. The 
literature frequently uses excess real MI balances to capture excess money creation 
over the demand for real money balances in the system. In order to estimate the supply 
in excess of demand, a real money demand model is used. The recent literature (Civcir, 
2003 and Owoye and Onafowora, 2007) suggests the following log-linear real money 
demand function, modified to take account of foreign currencies and foreign assets as 
alternatives to domestic money. 
p 
(5.25) In 
(ýL) 
= ßo + ßiln Yt - 
ß2it 
- 
ß31n zt - 
ß4 In ee t- ßs + et pf 
where, In denotes natural logarithm, Mt denotes'the nominal MI, Pt is the domestic price 
level, Yt is the real income, it is the domestic interest rate, 7rt is the inflation rate, e, " is 
the expected exchange rate depreciation, i, * is the foreign interest. rate and ct is a white 
noise disturbance tenn 153 . 
The motivation behind the use of the explanatory variables in the model is as follows: 
Real income is used because as real income increases, individuals will want to hold 
increased money balances, and vice versa. Inflation captures expectations of future 
exchange rate movements. The response of money demand to inflation reflects the 
currency substitution effect 154 . The domestic interest rate is used to capture the 
impact 
of interest rates on the demand for money. Interest rates represent the opportunity cost 
of holding money. If interest rates increase, demand for money falls as residents prefer 
to keep their wealth invested in assets or as savings in banks. Also, when the interest 
152 The related literature also provides evidence for the existence of a relationship between budget deficit 
and monetary expansion in the case of Turkey. See, for instance, (Ozatay 1997), Ozmen (1998), Metin 
(1998) and Koru and Ozmen (2003). 
153 Foreign interest rates are used to capture the substitution between domestic currency and foreign 
bonds. 
154 See Ozdemir and Turner (2004: p. 3). 
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rates are high, the real economic activity diminishes resulting in a decrease in the 
demand for money. 
On the other hand, foreign interest rates and the expected rate of depreciation of the 
domestic currency arc used to capture the effects of foreign monetary developments and 
capital mobility on the residents' money holdings. Civcir (2003) suggests that "in an 
open economy with a liberalized capital account, foreign currency denominated assets 
form an appropriate investment alternative. There will be portfolio shifts between 
domestic andforeign currency, in which case the expected exchange rate should be 
155 included in the money demand function" . Since the sample period 
follows the 
liberalization of capital flows in 1989, in the case of Turkey, the domestic demand for 
money cannot be realistically estimated without considering the impact of foreign 
monetary developments. With capital mobility, an increase in the foreign interest rate 
increases the return on foreign assets relative to'those on domestic assets. Hence, an 
increase in foreign interest rates causes agents to decrease their demand for domcstic 
money holdings. Accordingly, the coefficients are expected to take the following signs: 
fil > 0, fl2 < 0,, fl3 < 0, fl4 < 0, and fl5 < 0156. 
In Equation 5.25, MI is used for Mt, the wholesale price index is used for Pt, the real 
industrial production index 157 is used for Yt, the 3-month interest rate on TL deposits 158 
is used for it and the 3-month US T-bill rate is used for i: - 
On the other hand, the 
monthly rate of inflation which is derived as the monthly percentage change in the 
wholesale price index is used for z, and the real exchange rate misalignment is used for 
e, ' following Civcir (2003)159. Excess real MI balances are then estimated as the 
160 residuals of this regression 
155 See Civcir (2003, p. 516). 
156 Results of the unit root tests of the variables are reported in Table 5.19. 
157 Rather than using interpolated GDP series, monthly industrial production series are used following the 
-' Civcir, 2003 and Owore and existing literature (See, for instance, Calomiris and Domowitz, 1989, 
Owafowora, 2007). 
158 There exists no consensus in the literature as to whether to use long-term or short-term interest rates to 
proxy the opportunity cost of holding money. According to Wong (1977), people in developing countries 7 rD 0 
live near subsistence level and hold money for precautionary purpose over shorter periods. Hence, the 
short-term interest rates are used. 
159 The measure of exchange rate misalignment (OVE) estimated in Section 5.4.5 is used fore,. 
160 See Kaminsky et al (1998), Berg and Patillo (1999) and van Horen et al (2006). 
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Since the money demand equation is an equilibrium relation, Equation 5.24 is estimated 
using the Johansen cointegration technique The unit root results show that all the 
variables are I(l) except Inx, which is stationary in levels 161 . Hence, they can be 
included in the cointegration analysis. In the estimations, up to four lags are considered 
and the lag order is selected as 2 by both the Akaike Information Criterion and the 
Schwarz and Bayesian Criterion. The results of the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests 
are reported in Table 5.10. As can be seen in the table, both trace and maximal 
eigenvalue test statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. in favour 
of one cointegration. relationships at the 5% level. Hence, an economic interpretation of 
the long-run demand function can be obtained by normalizing the estimates of the 
cointegration vector on the real Ml. As reported in Table 5.11, all of the coefficients in 
this vector have anticipated signs with sensible magnitudes. 
Table 5.10 Cointearation Tests 
Null Altemative Statistic 5% C. V. 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
r=O rý: 1 92.975 83.937 
rý: I rý: 2 49.400 60.061 
r: 5 2 r 2: 3 28.592 40.175 
r: S 3 r 2: 4 15.633 24.276 
r: S 4 rýý 5 6.941 12.321 
r: S 5 r ?. - 6 0.386 4.130 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
r=O r=1 43.576 36.630 
r: 5 I r=2 20.807 30.440 
r: 5 2 r=3 12.959 24.159 
r<3 r=4 8.692 17.797 
r<4 r=5 6.556 11.225 
r<5 r=6 0.386 4.130 
Notes: r is the number of cointegrating vectors under the null hypothesis. 5% critical values are given in 
parentheses. Cointegration is estimated with no intercept or trend in VAR selected using the Pantula 
Principle (Johansen, 1992) 162 . Tests have 
been carried out using Aficrofit 4.0. 
161 ln7r is therefore used as an exogenous variable in the cointegration model. 
162 The pantula principle suggests a testing procedure which starts from the most restrictive model, i. e. no 
deterministic components, and then compares the rank test statistic with the chosen quantile of the 
corresponding table. If the model is rejected, it continues to the model that restricts the constant to the 
cointegration space. If this model is also rejected, it goes to the model with an unrestricted constant. In 
the case of rejection, it proceeds to the model with linear trends in the variables and the cointegration 
space. If this is also rejected, it repeats the procedure for the next rank. The procedure continues until the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the first time (see Johansen, 1992). 
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Therefore, the residuals of this vector are chosen as a proxy for excess real MI balances 
(ERM. The estimated series of excess real MI balances is expected to be in a positive 
relationship with exchange market pressure and the likelihood of currency crises. 
Table 5.11 Cointearatiniz coefficients 
PI P2 P3 P4 P5 
0.078 -0.394 -0.289 -0.769 -0.033 
(0.042) (0.149) (0.134) (0.086) (0.021) 
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses 
Figure 5.9 shows the evaluation of ERM. It can be seen that the variable generally 
follows a mean-reverting trend with sharp ups and downs during the entire sample 
period. 
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Figure 5.9 Excess real MI balances 
Another variable reflecting the monetary policy of the Central Bank is domestic credit, 
which represents the amount of domestic government bonds the Central Bank holds 
against the money it maintains in circulation, i. e. the monetary base I. 63 . Through the use 
of open market operations, the Central Bank may sell these bonds to reduce the 
domestic component of the monetary base. At the same time, the Central Bank also 
holds official foreign exchange reserves against the base money. Hence, equilibrium in 
the Central Bank's balance sheet can be represented as: 
163 The monetary base is the currency held by the public plus the reserves held by private banks with the 
central bank, i. e. MB =C+ ODs. 
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MB=DC+R (5.26) 
where M& DC and R denote the monetary base, domestic credit and the foreign 
exchange reserves, respectively. The changes on either side of the balance sheet must be 
matched by corresponding, change on the other. Hence, from Equation 5.26, it follows 
that if the increase of the domestic credit portion of the monetary base increases, either 
the monetary base has to increase or the foreign exchange reserves have to decrease. 
The first-generation models of speculative attacks suggest that the speculators know that 
an increase in the domestic credit through open market operations (i. e. purchases) may 
lead to the depletion of the foreign exchange reserves and the exchange rate regime will 
collapse. Hence, an increase in domestic credit is expected to increase the amount of 
speculative pressure on the exchange rate. As discussed in Chapter *4, the Turkish 
Central Bank frequently followed a monetary expansionary policy through the use of 
domestic credits. In order to capture the impact of domestic credit expansion, the 
domestic credit to GDP ratio (DCG) is considered. 
DCG = Domestic credit/ GDP (5.27) 
DCG is expected to be in a positive relationship with exchange market pressure and the 
likelihood of currency crises. Figure 5.10 shows the evaluation of DCG. It can be seen 
that the variable generally follows an downward trend with a sharp increase in 2001. 
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Figure 5.10 Domestic credit / GDP 
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5.4.3 Banking Sector Variables 
The third-generation models of speculative attacks suggest that currency crises may 
originate from the banking sector weaknesses. Furthermore, as discussed in the 
introduction of the present chapter, it has been discussed that the banking sector 
weaknesses can also be related to the second-generation models of speculative attacks. 
First, since higher interest rates may increase loan defaults and threaten bank solvency, 
the speculators know that the government will avoid increasing the interest rates to 
defend the currency in the presence of severe weaknesses in the banking sector. 
Realizing that, with the prospect of bank insolvencies, the government would opt for a 
quick devaluation rather than increasing the interest rates to avoid a costly bailout, the 
speculators attack the exchange rate 164 . 
Second, severe banking sector weaknesses may lead to a loss of confidence in the 
banking sector which may ultimately spark a financial panic as investors flee domestic 
assets and capital outflows follow. The situation may be worsened if doubts arise about 
the government's ability or commitment to maintain full deposit guarantees. This has 
the potential to result in a sharp decline in reserves which, in turn, may fuel speculative 
attacks. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, following the liberalization of the capital account, Turkish 
banks embarked upon borrowing in foreign exchange, while lending to domestic 
borrowers in Turkish liras. During this period, failure to implement the financial sector 
reforms and inadequate regulatory oversight of the banking sector resulted in severe 
balance sheet weaknesses, such as exposure to credit, liquidity and exchange rate risks. 
I lence, in order to measure balance sheet weaknesses in the Turkish banking sector, this 
thesis considers four types of risks: (1) currency mismatches; (2) capital inadequacy; (3) 
credit risk; and (4) liquidity risks 165 . 
As Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) explain, banks in emerging market countries 
have explicit currency mismatches on their balance sheets as they borrow in foreign 
164 See Sachs el al ( 1996). 
165 Maturity mismatches are also important but time series data is not available on the structure of debt of 
the banking sector in Turkey. Therefore this type of risk is not considered in the analysis. 
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currency and lend in local currency. This may lead to severe losses when there is a 
sharp change in the exchange rate. Hence, concerns about the banks' ability to service 
their liabilities denominated in foreign currency may lead to a bank run. Allen et al 
(2002) explain that currency mismatches can trigger shifts in capital flows that create 
pressure on reserves as net foreign currency debtors often seek to protect themselves 
against further real depreciation by purchasing additional foreign currency assets. In 
order to capture the extent of liability dollarization, the ratio of foreign currency- 
denominated assets to foreign currency-denominated liabilities (FAL) on the balance 
sheets of commercial banks is used. 
FAL = Foreign assets I Foreign liabilities (5.29) 
FAL is expected to be in a negative relationship with exchange market pressure and the 
likelihood of currency crises. 
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Figure 5.11 Foreign assets/ Foreign liabilities 
Figure 5.11 shows the evaluation of FAL. It can be seen that the variable generally 
follows a downward trend, except during 1994.1 
Turning to the capital adequacy of the banking sector, it can be argued that the higher 
the size of equity capital, the larger is the buffer to absorb any financial distress, such as 
unexpected losses due to customers' defaults on loans. Hence, capital adequacy risk 
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stems from a heavy reliance on debt financing rather than equity financing. It goes 
without saying that, the higher the amount of liabilities, the more shareholders' funds 
are required to build up a buffer against shocks. Consequently, the ratio of total 
liabilities to capital equity (LIQ is used to proxy capital adequacy. 
LIC = Total liabilities / Capital equity (5.30) 
LIC is expected to be in a positive relationship with exchange market pressure and the 
likelihood of currency crises. Figure 5.30 shows the evaluation of LIC. It can be seen 
that the variable generally follows a horizontal trend with a sharp increase in 1994,2000 
and 2001. 
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Figure 5.12 Total liabilities / Capital equity 
Another important indicator of banking sector strength is credit risk. According to 
Burnside et al (2008) "banks face credit risk because their inconze is related to the 
production of non-traded goods whose price, evaluated in foreign currency, falls after 
166 devaluations" . As loans are the riskiest assets, banks' exposure to credit risk 
increases as their volume of credits increase. Because banks usually hold little equity 
capital relative to the aggregate value of their assets, even if a small percentage of total 
loans turns bad, this may push the banks to the brink of failure 167 . Therefore, loans 
166 See Bumside ei al (2008: p. 5). 
167 See Rose (2001 b- p. 17 1 ). 
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require a cushion of capital against potential losses. In order to capture this sensitivity, 
the ratio of total loans to capital equity (LCA) is used. 
LCA = Total loans / Capital equity 
LCA is also expected to be in a positive relationship with exchange market pressure and 
the likelihood of currency crises. Figure 5.13 shows the evaluation of LCA. It can be 
seen that the variable generally follows a downward trend with several sharp increases 
in the early 1990s, 2000s and in 1994. 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
1 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 
Figure 5.13 Total loans / Capital equity 
Turning to the liquidity risk of the banking sector, it can be argued that banks are 
exposed to liquidity shocks because their liabilities are usually short-term and liquid 
while their assets are longer-term and are relatively less liquid. Liquidity of the banking 
sector refers to how easily banks can meet their short-term obligations. In order to 
measure the overall liquidity of the banking sector, the ratio of liquid assets (cash and 
investment in marketable securities, such as Treasury bills and bonds) to total assets 
(LTA) is used. 
L TA = Liquid assets/ Total assets (5.32) 
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LTA measures banks' ability to meet unanticipated funds that are claimed by 
depositors 168 . Since a high ratio of liquidity implies that the banks have a greater 
capacity to meet unexpected demand from creditors, LTA is expected to be in a negative 
relationship with exchange market pressure and the likelihood of currency crises. Figure 
5.14 shows the evaluation of LTA. It can be seen that the variable follows a consistently 
downward trend throughout the sample period, which can be attributed to the lack of 
prudent supervision and the absence of stringent legal and institutional frameworks in 
the banking sector. 
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Figure 5.14 Liquid assets / Total assets 
5.4.4 Capital Inflows 
The mechanisms through which a sudden stop or reyersal in capital flows may lead to a 
currency crisis has been explained through the Sudden Stop theory as discussed in 
Chapter 2. This theory suggests that a sudden stop in capital inflows or a sudden capital 
outflow can trigger crisis in an emerging economy by pushing the economy into 
insolvency, damaging financial sectors and inducing bankruptcies 169 . As this is known 
"' As Chang and Velasco (2001) explain, liquidity exposure leads to the possibility of bank runs. 
169 Capital reversals typically occur as international investors suddenly lose confidence in the financial 
markets of a country. This confidence loss can prompt sudden and large-scale portfolio adjustments, such 
as panic sales of securities. 
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'to the speculators, with the first sign of capital reversals they may attack the exchange 
rate to benefit from a forthcoming crisis. 
With the liberalization of the capital account in 1989, hot money in the form of foreign 
portfolio investments has flown into Turkey, increasing the vulnerability of the 
economy to capital reversals. Since the liberalization of the capital account, a 
considerable share of the capitalization of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) has been 
owned by foreigners 170 . Hence, the Turkish economy 
is highly sensitive to capital 
reversals. The most volatile component of capital flows and the one which therefore 
reflects changing expectations of foreign investors most clearly is portfolio investment 
by non-residents. Since the portfolio investments of non-residents reflect the 
expectations of international investors, it may reflect a self-fulfilling panic. Hence, this 
variable can be considered as a second-generation variable. In a sense, portfolio 
investments also capture the effect of global liquidity conditions as a fall in liquidity in 
global financial markets would immediately result in a fall in portfolio investments. 
In order to proxy short-term capital flows, portfolio investments of non-residents in 
Turkey (PIN) are used. When portfolio capital flows suddenly stop or even go into 
reverse, this can be taken as a sign of a loss of confidence and cause downward pressure 
on the exchange rate. Therefore, PIN is expected to be in a relationship with exchange 
market pressure and the likelihood of currency crises 171 . 
Figure 5.14 shows the evaluation of PIN. It can be seen that the variable generally 
follows a horizontal trend with a sharp increase in 1991 and falls in 1998,2000 (first 
halo and 2001. 
"0 For instance, in 2000, the share of foreigners was 37.9% (Berument et al 2007). 
17 1 Net capital inflows are also expected to stimulate bank credit growth, which, in turn, renders the 
banking system fragile. Hence, again capital inflows may impose downward pressure on the exchange 
rate. 
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Figure 5.14 Portfolio investments 
5.4.5 Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 
As the review of the literature in Chapter 2 has revealed, exchange rate overvaluation 
has widely been documented as a leading indicator of currency crises. This is because 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate leads to a loss of competitiveness for the 
domestic economy. In the context of speculative attacks, real exchange rate 
overvaluation leads to an increase in the probability of a speculative attack as it leads to 
an increase in the expectations of a "correction" in the exchange rates, i. e. it is perceived 
as a sign that the government will soon have to devalue. 
Furthermore, exchange rate overvaluation also increases the fragility of the banking 
sector, since a loss of competitiveness could lead to a recession, business failures, and a 
decline in the quality of loans 172 . This can also drive speculative attacks as the 
speculators know that the government is more likely to opt for a devaluation rather than 
defending the currency as increasing the interest rates in the presence of a weak banking 
sector may lead to bankruptcies. 
172 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
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Although there exist a variety of methods to measure exchange rate misalignment 173 , the 
literature on currency crises exclusively suggest measuring exchange rate overvaluation 
in terms of the deviations of the real exchange rate index from its long-run trend 
estimated by the Hodrick-Prescott filter 174 . 
The present thesis deviates from this literature and uses a more theory-based definition 
of real exchange rate overvaluation. Following Edwards (1989a), it defines real 
exchange rate misalignment as deviations of the real exchange rate (RER) from its long- 
E 
run equilibrium level (RER ). 
RER is defined as the nominal exchange rate (Turkish liras per unit of US dollars) 
adjusted by the ratio of the foreign price level (P*) to the domestic price level (P): 
RER e 
P* (5.33) 
p 
For P* and P, the wholesale price index (WPI) for the United States and Turkey are 
used rather than the CPI. This is because the WPI is a more representative index of the 
internationally-traded goods and services bundles, whereas the CPI generally includes a 
large number of non-traded goods or imported goods that may be subject to tariffs and 
additional taxes 175 . 
According to Equation 5.33, a decline in RER is interpreted as the real appreciation of 
the exchange rate. Accordingly, real exchange rate overvaluation (OVE) can be 
calculated as: 
OVE= InRERE-InRER (5.34) 
which suggests that the amount of a fall in RER below RER E denotes the overvaluation 
of the Turkish lira. The long-run equilibrium level of the real exchange rate is estimated 
173 The literature suggests four ways to estimate misalignment: (1) price-based criteria, such as purchasing 
power parity (PPP); (2) model-based criteria, based on the formal models of nominal exchange rates; (3) 
solvency and sustainability-based criteria, which make reference to trends in the current account and the 
external debts to GDP ratio; (4) trend-based criteria, which define misalignment as deviation from the 
long-run trend. 
174 See, for instance, Goldfajn and Valdes (1999), Dombusch el al (1995), Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999), Kaminsky et al (1998) and Karfakis and Moschos (1999). 
175 See Alper and Saglam (2000). 
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from the long-run equilibrium relationship between RER and its fundamental 
determinants using the Johansen cointegration technique. 
In essence, a wide range of macroeconomic variables can be considered as the 
fundamental determinants of the equilibrium real exchange rate. However, it is not 
176 
practical to consider all possible variables in the equilibrium model . In selecting the 
variables for the empirical model, 'this thesis follows Edwards (1989a, 1989b), who 
suggests the terms of trade (TOY), trade openness (OPE), international interest rates (i*) 
and capital inflows (PIN) as the set of fundamentals affecting the equilibrium real 
exchange rate in the case of a small, open economy 177 . Accordingly, the equilibrium 
real exchange rate model takes the following form: 
InRER, E =, Oo +, BllnTOTt -, 82lnOPEt -, 63 j, 
' 
-A 
PIJVt + Et (5.35) 
In Equation 5.35, the ratio of the export price index to import price index (TO7), is used 
to represent changes in the international economic environment. It is one of the main 
channels of global transmission of macroeconomic shocks. Changes in TOT imply 
higher domestic prices of importables and generate intertemporal substitution effects as 
well as income effects. This makes the net effect on the equilibrium real exchange rate 
ambiguous. If the income effect overwhelms the substitution effect, an improvement in 
the tenns of trade leads to equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation. Contrary to this, 
if the substitution effect dominates the income effect, an improvement in the terms of 
trade leads to real exchange rate depreciation 178 . 
OPE, defined as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP, is used to proxy trade 
restrictions. A decrease in OPE, arising from the imposition of a tariff, leads to an 
increase in the domestic price of importables, which in turn reduces the demand for 
176 In fact, there is a wide literature dedicated to this issue but no consensus exists on which variables 
should be considered as the fundamentals of the equilibrium real exchange rate. 0 177 National income (GDP) was also initially considered in the model but it was found to be insignificant 
It also affected the significance of the other variables in the model. So it was dropped. 
179 See Eita and Sichei (2006). 
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importables and results in a real appreciation. On the other hand, an increase in OPE 
would have the opposite effect. Hence OPE is expected to have a positive sign 179 . 
defined as the 3-month US T-bill rate, is used to capture the effects of international 
borrowing. Since Turkey is a net debtor in international financial markets, an increase in 
the world interest rate is expected to depreciate the equilibrium real exchange rate'80. 
Hence r* is expected to have a positive sign. 
PIN, as defined as in Section 5.4.4 as portfolio investments, is highly relevant in the 
case of an emerging market economy like Turkey. An increase in capital inflows results 
in higher current expenditure on all goods, including non-tradables. As a result, there 
will be an increase in the price of non-tradables 181 . This would result in the appreciation 
of the equilibrium real exchange rate. Hence PIN is expected to have a negative sign. 
Table 5.12 , Cointe2ration with no interceDts or trends in the VAR Null Altemative Statistic 5% C. V. 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
r=O r 2: 1 98.647 88.803 
r: 5 I r 2: 2 63.266 63.876 
r! 5 2 rý: 3 32.935 42.915 
r: 5 3 r -: E! 4 15.172 25.872 
r: 5 4 r ý: 5 5.181 12.517 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue ofthe Stochastic Matrix 
r=O r=1 31.002 30.439 
r: 5 I r=2 17.066 24.159 
r: 5 2 r=3 8.068 17.797 
r: 5 3 r=4 3.351 11.224 
r<4 r=5 0.201 4.129 
Notes: r is the number of cointegrating vectors under the null hypothesis. 5% critical values are given in 
parentheses. Cointegration is estimated with no intercept or trend in VAR selected using the Pantula 
Principle (Johansen, 1992). Tests have been carried out using Aficrofit 4.0. 
The long-run equilibrium level of the bilateral real exchange rate is obtained using 
cointegration test. Up to 4 lags are considered and the lag order is selected as 2 by both 
Akaike Information Criterion and Schwarz and Bayesian Criterion. Tile results of tile 
trace and maximum eigenvalue tests are reported in Table 5.12.182 As can be seen in tile 
table, both trace and maximal eigenvalue test statistics strongly rejects the null 
"9 Edwards (I 989a). 
'go See Alper and Saglarn (2000). 
181 See Edwards (I 989a). 
182 Results of the unit root tests of the variables are reported in Table 5.19. 
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hypothesis of no cointegration in favour of one cointegration relationships at the 5% 
level. Table 5.13 presents the coefficient estimates of the cointegration vector on RER. 
Table 5.13 Cointepratina coefficients 
PI P2 P3 P4 
-0.875 0.436 0.235 -0.764 
(0.037) (0.082) (0.101) (0.023) 
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses 
As the results suggest, all of the coefficients in this vector have the anticipated signs 
with sensible magnitudes. Accordingly, the associated cointegration equation is given 
by: 
In RER, E= (-0.875)InTOTt + (0.436)InOPE t+ (0.235) r, * + (-0.764)PINt (5.36) 
As can be seen, both the sign and the magnitude of the terms of trade full-it the a priori 
postulates of the model. Hence Equation 5.5 can be used to obtain the equilibrium 
values of the real exchange rate. Real exchange rate overvaluation, OVE, is estimated 
following Equation 5.35. 
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Figure 5.16 Real exchange rate overvaluation 
Figure 5.16 shows the evaluation of OVE. It can be seen that the variable generally 
follows a mean-reverting trend with a sharp increase in 1992,1994 (first halo and 2001. 
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5.5 Unit Root Tests 
Before moving on the econometric analysis, it is necessary to investigate the stationarity 
properties of the variables. A stationary series fluctuates around a constant long-run 
mean and, this implies that the series has a finite variance which does not depend on 
time. On the other hand, non-stationary series have no tendency to return to a long-run 
deterministic path and the variances of the series are time dependent. Non-stationary 
series suffer permanent effects from random shocks and thus the series follow a random 
walk. 
The problems caused by non-stationary variables in standard regression analysis have 
been well documented in the time-series literature. The standard classical estimation 
methods are based on the assumption that the mean and variances of the stochastic 
series are finite, constant and time invariant. Thus, it is assumed that time series are 
generated by the stationary stochastic process. If the first and second moments of a 
variable change over time, then all the statistics calculated using mean and variances 
will also be time dependent. Moreover, conventional hypothesis tests will be biased 
towards rejecting the null hypothesis of no relationship between economic variables. 
Given that economic time-series are typically described as non-stationary processes, the 
estimates of such variables will lead to spurious regression and their economic 
interpretation will not be meaningful' 83 . 
If the unit root tests find that a series contain one unit root, the appropriate route in this 
case is to transform the data by differencing the variables prior to their inclusion in the 
regression model, but this incurs a loss of important long-run information. Alternatively, 
if the variables are cointegrated, that is, if a long-run relationship exists among the set of 
variables that share similar non-stationarity properties, regression involving the levels of 
the variables can proceed without generating spurious results. In this case, a "balanced" 
regression leads to meaningful interpretations and evades the spurious regression 
problem. 
193 A spurious regression occurs when a pair of independent series, but with strong temporal properties, 
are found apparently to be related according to standard inference in an OLS regression (Granger el al, 
2001). 
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On the other hand, the method of estimation of the binary choice models are based on 
the assumption that the means and variances of these variables being tested are constant 
over time, i. e. stationary. Incorporating non-stationary or unit root variables in 
estimating the regression equations using these models give misleading inferences. 
Therefore, in what follows, tests for unit roots are performed. 
5.5.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit-root Tests 
Initially, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are used to 
assess the order of integration of the variables 184 . Uniform outcomes of 
both tests are 
necessary for the final conclusion about the stationarity properties of each series. All 
variables are tested with a linear trend and/or intercept or none. In these tests, the null 
hypothesis is that the series in levels are I(l) against the alternative hypothesis that they 
are 1(0). Each series is also expressed in first differences so that the test for a unit root in 
the first difference of the series is equivalent to the null that series in levels are 1(2) 
against the alternative hypothesis that they are I(I). 
The testing procedure involves calculating a test statistic and comparing it to critical 
values at different significance levels to determine whether the test statistic is 
significant. If the test statistic is greater than the critical value in absolute tenns, the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected. If, on the other hand,. the test statistic is not 
greater than the critical value, the unit root test suggests that the hypothesis of non- 
stationarity cannot be rejected, and the variables are said to be I(1). 
5.5.2 Unit-root Tests with Structural Breaks 
A well-known weakness of the ADF and PP unit root tests is their potential confusion of 
structural breaks in the series as evidence of non-stationarity. In other words, they may 
fail to reject the unit root hypothesis if the series have a structural break'85. In other 
184 PP test yields valid results even if the disturbances are serially correlated and heterogeneous while the 
ADF tests require that the error term be serially uncorrelated and homogeneous. C; 185 Perron (1989) argues that the power to reject unit root decreases when the stationary alternative is true 
and a structural break is ignored. 
133 
words, for the series that are found to be I(I), there may be a possibility that they are in 
fact stationary around the structural break(s), 1(0), but are erroneously classified as I(I). 
Perron (1989) shows that failure to allow for an existing break leads to a bias that 
reduces the ability to reject a false unit root null hypothesis. To overcome this, the 
author proposes allowing for a known or exogenous structural break in the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Following this development, many authors, including Zivot 
and Andrews (1992) and Perron (1997), proposed determining the break point 
'endogenously' from the data. However, Enders (2004) argues that Perron-Vogelsang 
186 (1992) unit root tests are more appropriate "if the date of the break is uncertain" 
As Glynn et al (2007) suggest, applying the unit root tests which allow for the possible 
presence of the structural break, has two advantages. First, it prevents obtaining a test 
result which is possibly biased towards non-rejection, as suspected by Perron (1989). 
Second, since this procedure can identify the date of the structural break, it facilitates 
the analysis of whether a structural break on a certain variable is associated with a 
particular event such as a change in government policy, a currency crisis, war and so 
forth. 
In this thesis, three unit root tests with structural breaks, namely the Zivot-Andrews 
(1992), Perron-Vogelsang (1992) and Clemente-Montanes-Reyes (1998) unit root tests 
are employed' 87 . The Zivot-Andrews and Perron-Vogelsang (1992) unit root tests allow 
for one structural break, whereas the Clemente-Montanes-Reyes (1998) unit root test 
allows for two structural breaks in the mean of the series'88. Clemente el al (1998) base 
their approach on Perron and Vogelsang (1992), allowing for the possibility of having 
two structural breaks in the mean of the series. 
In these tests, the null hypothesis is that the series has a unit root with structural break(s) 
against the alternative hypothesis that they are stationary with break(s). Tile null 
186 See Enders (2004: p. 207). 
'" Ben-David el al (2003) cautions that "just as failure to allow one break can cause non-rejection of the 
unit root null by the Augmented Dickey -Fuller test, failure to allow for two breaks, if they exist, can 
cause non-rejection of the unit root null by the tests which only incorporate one break" (Ben-David et al, 
2003: 304). 
"s Lumisdaine and Papell (1997) extended the Zivot and Andrews (1992) model to accommodate two 
structural breaks. However, this test was criticized for the absence of the breaks under the null hypothesis 
of unit root as this could result in a tendency for these tests to suggest evidence of stationarity with breaks 4DO (see Glynn et al, 2007). 
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hypothesis is rejected if the calculated t statistic is greater, in absolute values, than the 
critical value. The advantage of these tests is that they do not require an a priori 
knowledge of the structural break dates. 
Shrestha and Chowdhury (2005) argue that, in the case of a structural break, the testing 
power of the Perron-Vogelsang unit root test is superior to that of the Zivot-Andrews 
test. Therefore, this chapter presents the results of the Zivot-Andrews tests only for the 
purposes of comparison. 
The Perron-Vogelsang 189 and Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit root tests offer two 
models: (1) an additive outliers (AO) model, which captures a sudden change in the 
mean of a series; and (2) an innovational outliers (10) model, which allows for a 
gradual shift in the mean of the series. In this thesis, both models will be used. 
Nonetheless, the AO model seems to be more appropriate for the variables as they all 
seem to have sudden structural changes rather than gradual shifts. 
According to Baum (2004), if the estimates of the Perron-Vogelsang and Clemente- 
Montanes-Reyes unit root tests provide evidence of significant additive or innovational 
outliers in the time series, the results derived from ADF and PP tests are doubtful, as 
this is evidence that the model excluding structural breaks is misspecified. 
Therefore, in applying unit root tests in time series that exhibit structural breaks, only 
the results from the Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit root tests are considered if the two 
structural breaks indicated by the respective tests are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
On the other hand, if the results of the Perron-Vogel sang and Clemente-Montanes- 
Reyes unit root tests show no evidence of two significant breaks in the series, the results 
from the 'Perron-Vogelsang unit root tests are considered'90. If these tests show no 
evidence of a structural break, the ADF and PP tests can be considered. 
"9 Perron-Vogelsang tests are based on the minimal value of I statistics on the sum of the autoregressive 
coefflcients over all possible breakpoints in the appropriate autoregression (see, Perron and Vogelsang 
1992: pp. 303). 
190 See, Baum (2004). 
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5.5.3 Results of the Uýit-root Tests 
Tables from 5.14 to 5.18 report the results of the unit root tests. On the other hand, 
Table 5.19 presents the results of the unit root tests for the time series data used in the 
construction of the explanatory variables. In the case of EMP(E) and OVE, all tests 
suggest that the series are I(Q). On the other hand, in the case of FAL and L1C, all tests 
suggest that the series are I(]). Nonetheless, in the case of EMP(P), LCA, LTA, PIN, 
TBR, NIE, EXR, ERM and DCG, different test suggest different conclusions regarding 
the order of integration of the variables. 
Overall, the results suggest that the variables seem to be a mix of 1(l) and 1(0) series. 
The comparison of the findings of the ADF and PP unit root tests with the Zivot- 
Andrews, Perron-Vogelsang and Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit root tests show that it 
is difficult to capture the true order of integration of the variables in the presence of 
structural breaks in the series. The break dates suggested by the Perron-Vogelsang and 
Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit root tests generally coincide with the currency crisis of 
1994, the general elections in April 1999 and the two devastating earthquakes in August 
and October 1999, which have had an impact on fiscal balances. 
Table 5.14 ADF Unit Root Tests 
TT 
Levels 
Tý, T 
First-differences 
TT Tp T 
Decision 
EMP(E) -10.27* -10.24* -9.36* -9.21 -9.24* -9.27* 1(0) 
EMP(P) -7.65* -7.71 -7.73* -8.97* -8.98* -8.98* 1(0) 
FAL -2.35 -1.86 -1.48 -12.33* -12.37* -12.27* AO 
LCA -0.45 -0.73 -0.56 -7.69* -7.39* -7.41 * 10) 
L TA -4.97* -1.17 -1.31 -17.52* -17.58* -17.54* l(o) 
PIN -4.97* -4.03 * -3.84* -8.04* -8.07* -8.05* 1(0) 
LIC -0.74 -0.09 -0.92 -6.11 -5.49* -5.45* AO 
TBR -4.71 -4.15* -2.17** -14.15* -14.19* -14.24* 1(0) 
NIE -4.13* -3.29* -0.78 -15.04* -15.07* -15.11 * AO) 
EXR -4.08* -3.70* -0.59 -14.01* -14.04* -14.06* 1(0) 
ERM -4.64* -4.66* -4.67* -12.59* -12.47* -12.48* 1(0) 
0 VE -4.61 * -4.71 * -4.73 * -6.07* -6.00* -6.01 * 1(0) 
DCG -0.99 -2.08 -1.82 -2.46 -1.94 -1.94 1(2) 
Notes: ri. represents the most general model with a drift and trend- is the model with a drift and 
without trend; r is the most restricted model without a drift and trend. Numbers in brackets are the lag 
lengths and the bandwidths. In the tests, the lag length and the bandwidth are selected based on the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Newey-West Bartlett kernel. 7, " and *** denote rejection of 
the null hypothesis at the 1016,5% and 10% levels respectively. Tests have been performed using Eviews 
5. 
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Table 5.15 Philit)-Perron Unit Root Tests 
Levels First-differences Decision 
TT TI, T TT Tt, T 
EMP(E) -10.27* -10.25* -9.36* -60.03* -60.04* -60.05* 1(0) 
EMP(P) -7.63* -7.58* -7.52* -34.56* -34.57* -34.57* 1(0) 
FA L -2.37 -1.82 -1.47 -12.31* -12.32* -12.21* IM 
LCA -4.21 * -4.18* -0.23 -19.23* -17.23* -17.97* 1(0) 
L TA -12.19* -4.18* -1.16 -98.16* -89.17* 43.06* 1(0) 
PIN -8.26* -7.31 * -6.82* -33.96* -34.07* -34.06* 1(0) 
LIC -2.09 -2.06 -0.67 -15.67* -15.00* -15.00* 10) 
TBR -4.71 * -4.03* -1.73*** -17.78* -17.75* -17.45* 1(0) 
NIE -4.01 ** -3.00** -0.82 -16.35* -16.16* -16.35* 1(0) 
FXR -3.95** -3.58* -0.45 -16.16* -16.89* -16.16* 1(0) 
ERM -4.7 8*- 4.8 0* -4.82* -16.08* -15.93* -15.97* 1(0) 
0 VE -2.51 -2.58*** -2.61 * -5.48* -5.40* -5.40* 1(0) 
DCG -1.64 -1.51 -1.29 -8.58* -8.23* -8.20* 10) 
Notes: rT represents the most general model with a drift and trend, -r. is the model with a drift and 
without trend; r is the most restricted model without a drf and trend Numbers in brackets are the lag 
lengths and the bandwidths. In the tests, the lag length and the handwid1h are selected based on the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AlQ and the Newey-West Bartlett kernel. *, ** and *** denote rejection of 
the null hypothesis at the I? lo, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Tests have been performed using Eviews 
5. 
Table 5.16 Zivot-Andrews; Unit Root Tests with One Structural Break 
t-stat TB Decision 
EMP(E) -10.86* 1994: 05 1(0) 
EMP(P) -6.48* 1994: 06 1(0) 
FA L -4.01 1994: 04 IM 
L CA -1.54 1999: 07 IM 
L TA -5.47* 1992: 08 1(0) 
PIN -5.48* 1991: 12 1(0) 
LIC -1.25. 1999: 07 10) 
TBR -5.03 1996: 01 IM 
NIE -3.74 1994: 04 IM 
EXR -4.47 1996: 05 10) 
ERM -6.04* 1996: 11 1(0) 
OVE -5.26* 1994: 02 1(0) 
DCG -4.96* * 1994: 06 1(0) 
Notes: TB denotes the structural break dates suggested by the tests. - * denotes rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root at 5% level. Tests have been performed using Stata 9. 
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Table 5.17 Perron-Vop-elsan2 Unit Root Tests with One Structural Break 
Innovative Outliers Additive Outliers 
t-stat TB Decision t-stat TB Decision 
EMP(E) -3.86 1994: 12 -3.55 1994: 11 
EMP(P) -8.15* 1994: 03* 1(0) -1.33 1994: 02 
FA L -3.76 1996: 07* 10) -3.41 1997: 01 *I I(I) 
LCA -4.45 1994: 10 - -1.69 2000: 07* 10) 
L TA -1.18 1995: 01 -1.42 1994: 12* IM 
PIN -2.97 1991: 09* IM -5.05* 1991: 12* 1(0) 
LIC -0.51 1999: 10* IM -2.84 2000: 07* 10) 
TBR -5.02* 1995: 11 * 1(0) -3.93* 1995: 10* 1(0) 
NIE -3.04 1994: 02* IM -1.80 1999: 10* IM 
EXR -4.22 1998: 11 * 10) -3.10 1996: 02* IM 
ERM -4.51 * 1994: 03* 1(0) -4.64* 1994: 02 
0 VE -3.96 1994: 03 -5.46* 1994: 05* 1(0) 
DCG -3.59 1994: 01 * 10) -3.03 1994: 09* 10) 
Notes: TB denotes the structural break dates suggested by the tests. * denotes rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root at 5% level. * also indicates that the structural break suggested by the respective 
test is significant at 5% level. Tests have been performed using Stata 9. 
Table 5.18 Clemente-Montanes-Reves Unit Root Tests with Two Structural Breaks 
Innovativc Outliers Additive Outliers 
t-stat TBI TB2 Decision t-stat TBI TB2 Decision 
EMP(E) -3.43 1994: 02 1994: 12 - -3.37 1994: 01 1994: 11 
EMP(P) -9.22* 1993: 12* 1994: 03 * l(O) -1.54 1993: 12* 1994: 02* l(l) 
FA L -4.86 1994: 02* 1996: 07* 1(1) -4.89 1994: 10* 1997: 01 1(1) 
LCA -0.53 1990: 10 1994: 10 - -0.14 1990: 08* 1995: 01 10) 
L TA -3.53 1994: 05* 1997: 08* 1(1) -4.18 1994: 04* 1997: 11 1(1) 
PIN -3.45 1991: 09* 1998: 07 - -5.5 1* 1991: 12* 1998: 06* 1(0) 
LIC -1.15 1994: 10 1999: 10* - -2.75 1995: 01 * 1999: 09* 1(1) 
TBR -4.52 1995: 11 * 1996: 03* l(l) -3.51 1995: 11 * 1998: 10 - 
NIE -4.02 1994: 02* 1999: 11 * 1(1) -1.05 1994: 01* 1999: 10* 1(1) 
EXR -2.82 1996: 03* 1998: 11 - -2.85 1996: 02* 1998: 10* 1(1) 
ERM -5.23 1996: 09* 1997: 06* 1(1) -3.48 1994: 02 1997: 02 - 
0 VE -5.90* 1993: 12* 1994: 12* 1(0) -7.19* 1994: 05* 1995: 01 * 1(0) 
DCG -5.47 1991: 01* 1994: 01* 1(1) -2.00 1991: 09* 1994: 09* 1(1) 
Notes: TBI and TB2 denote the structural break dates suggested by the tests. * denotes rejection of the 
null h)pothesis of a unit root at 5Yo level. * also indicates that the structural break suggested by the 
respective test is significant at 5% level. Tests have been performed using Stata 9. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the variables used in the thesis and has estimated four 
alternative exchange market pressure indices based on the methodologies of Girton 
and Roper (1977), Eichengreen et al (1995), Pentecost et al (2001) and Weymark 
(1995). 
As a result of the analysis of these indices, the indices estimated following the 
approaches of Eichengreen et al (1995) and Pentecost et al (2001) have been 
selected to be used in the empirical investigations. 
The chapter has also investigated the time series properties of the variables using 
the traditional Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit-root tests. In 
addition to this, the Zivot-Andrews, Perron-Vogelsang and Clemente-Montanes- 
Reyes unit root tests, which take the possibility of structural breaks into 
consideration, have also been used and the stationarity properties of the variables 
have been established. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DETERMINANTS OF SPECULATIVE PRESSURE IN THE TURKISH 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the determinants of speculative pressure in the Turkish foreign 
exchange market in the period between 1989: 09 and 2001: 04. The motivation behind 
this analysis is the consideration that an increase in the speculative pressure in the 
exchange market indicates an increased likelihood of currency crises and vice versa. 
Therefore, conceptually, it can be argued that, if a variable is in a long-run relationship 
with the exchange market pressure, then it can be inferred that this variable is closely 
linked to the likelihood of currency crises. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the results of the unit root tests suggest that the presence of 
structural breaks introduces uncertainty as to the true order of integration of the 
variables. Therefore, this chapter uses the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
bounds testing procedure introduced by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), Pesaran and Shin 
(1999), and Pesaran et al (2001). The advantage of this methodology is that it yields 
valid results regardless of whether the underlying variables are I(I) or 1(0), or a 
combination of both. 
Conventionally, in the case where the unit root tests reveal that a series contain one unit 
root, the appropriate method is to transform the data by differencing the variables prior 
to their inclusion in the regression model to avoid tile risk of spurious regression. 
Nonetheless, this incurs a loss of important long-run information. Alternatively, if the 
variables are cointegrated, that is, if a long-run relationship exists among the set of 
variables that share similar non-stationarity properties, regression involving the levels of 
the variables can proceed without generating spurious results. In this case, a "balanced" 
regression leads to meaningful interpretations and evades the spurious regression 
problem. 
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Cointegration vectors are of considerable interest since they determine 1(0) relations that 
hold between variables which are individually non-stationary. Essentially, variables are 
cointegrated when a long-run linear relationship is obtained from a set of variables that 
share the same non-stationary properties'91. Hence, the intuition behind cointegration is 
that it allows capturing the equilibrium relationships dictated by the economic theory 
between nonstationary variables within a stationary model. A search is made for a linear 
combination of such variables such that the combination is stationary. If such a 
stationary combination exists, then the variables are said to be cointegrated, meaning 
even though they are individually not stationary, they are bound by an equilibrium 
relationship. In this case, the application of traditional econometric modelling to non- 
stationary time series data generates meaningful results. An advantage of the 
cointegration approach is that it provides a direct test of the economic theory and 
enables utilization of the estimated long-run parameters into the estimation of the short- 
run disequilibriurn relationships. 
Although Engle and Granger's (1987) original definition of cointegration refers to 
variables that are integrated of the same order, Enders (2004) argues that "it is possible 
to find equilibrium relationships among groups of variables that are integrated of 
different orders"192 . Asteriou and Hall (2007) also explains that in cases where a mix of 
1(0) and I(I) variables are present in the model, cointegrating relationships might exist. 
Similarly, Lutkopohl (2004) explains: 
"Occasionally it is convenient to consider systems with both I(l) and I(Q) 
variables. Thereby the concept of cointegration is extended by calling any 
linear combination that is I(Q) a coinlegration relation, although this 
terminology is not in the spirit of the original definition because it can 
happen that a linear combination of I(Q) variables is called a cointegration 
relation " 193 
Therefore, even in the presence of a set of variables which contains both I(l) and 1(0) 
variables, cointegration analysis is applicable and the presence of a long-run linear 
combination denotes the existence of cointegrated variables. Hence, it is possible to find 
191 Such relations are often referred to as "long-run equilibria", since it can be proved that they act as 
"attractors" towards which convergence occurs whenever there are departures therefrom (see Engle and 
Granger, 1987; Granger, 1986 and Banerjee et al, 1993).. 
192 See Enders (2004: p. 323). 
193 See Lutkopohl (2004: p. 89). 
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long-run equilibrium relationships among a set of 1(0) and I(l) variables if their linear 
combination reveals a cointegrating relationship. In the multivariate case, it is possible 
to have series with different orders of integration. In this case, a subset of the higher 
order series must cointegrate to the order of the lower order series. The long-run 
relationship among the variables could be achieved if the low frequency or the 
stochastic trend components of a set of variables offset each other to achieve a 
stationary linear combination of the variables. 
The choice of the ARDL bounds testing procedure as a tool for investigating the 
existence of a long-run relationship between EMP and the selected variables is based on 
the following considerations: 
First and the foremost, both EMP and the independent variables can be introduced in the 
model with lags. "Autoregressive" refers to lags in the dependent variable. Therefore, 
the past values of EMP are allowed to deten-nine the present value of EMP. This is a 
highly plausible feature in the present context as the speculators' perceptions of the past 
values of EMP may also drive speculative pressure 194 . On the other 
hand, "distributed 
lag" refers to the lags of the explanatory variables. Conceptually, the dependence of 
EMP on the independent variables may or may not be instantaneous depending on the 
response of the speculators to the changes in the economy. A change in the economic 
variables does not necessarily lead to an immediate change in the speculative pressure. 
The reaction to a change in each variable may be different depending on the investors' 
sentiment. Hence, in some cases, they may respond to the economic developments with 
a lag. Also, imperfect information may lead to lags in the speculator's decision making 
process. In addition, there is no reason to assume that all rcgressors should have the 
same lags. Hence, ARDL bounds testing approach is appropriate as it allows flexibility 
in terms of the structure of lags of the regressors in the ARDL model as opposed to the 
cointegration VAR models where different lags for different variables is not permitted 
(Pesaran el al, 2001). This is important in the present context as different variables are 
likely to have impact on the EMP with different lags. It goes without saying that the 
194 For instance, Falcetti and Tudela (2006) explain that "if a country experienced a crisis in the past, the 
probability of observing another crisis may likely depend on that previous crisis occurence" (Falcetti and 
Tudela, 2006: p. 446). The authors explain that "this can be either because, as a consequence of having 
experienced a currency crisis, constraints or conditions relevant to the occurrence of another crisis in the 
future may have been altered" (Falcetti and Tudela, 2006: p. 446). 
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correct choice of the order of the ARDL model is very important in the long-run 
analysis. In this respect, the ARDL approach has the advantage that it takes a suff"icient 
number of lags to capture the data generating process in a general-to-specific modelling 
framework'95. Furthermore, the lag orders can be selected based on four different 
selection criteria taking into consideration the results of the diagnostic tests for residual 
serial correlation, functional form misspecification, non-normality, and 
heteroscedasticity. 
Second, as shown by Pesaran et al (2001), the ARDL models yield consistent estimates 
of the long-run coefficients that are asymptotically normal irrespective of whether the 
underlying regressors are purely 1(0), 1(1) or mutually cointegrated, 96 . In other words, 
this procedure allows making inferences in the absence of any a priori information 
about the order of integration of the series under investigation. Consequently, the 
ARDL-technique is particularly suitable for the present analysis as there appears to be 
some degree of uncertainty over the stationarity properties of the variables. 
Third, as demonstrated by Pesaran and Shin (1999), the small sample properties of the 
bounds testing approach are superior to that of the traditional Johansen cointegration 
approach, which typically requires a large sample size for the results to be valid, ". 
Since the ARDL approach draws on the unrestricted error correction model, it is likely 
to have better statistical properties than the traditional cointegration techniques'98. In 
particular, Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that the ARDL approach has better properties 
in sample sizes up to 150 observations' 99. On the other hand, Narayan and Smyth (2005) 
provide exact critical values for up to 80 observations. Given the size of the sample 
used in this study (a total of 140 monthly observations), the bound approach appears 
more appealing than the Johansen cointegration technique 200 . 
195 See Laurcnccson and Chai (2003). 
196 See Pesaran el al (200 1 ). 
197 See Narayan and Smyth (2006). 
19' Unlike the Engle-Granger method, the unrestricted error-correction model does not push the short-run 
dynamics into the residual terms (see Narayan and Smyth, 2006: p. 338). 
"9 Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that the OLS estimators of the short-run parameters are consistent and 
the ARDL based estimators of the long-run coefficients are super-consistent in small sample sizes. Hence, 
valid inferences on the long-run parameters can be made using standard normal asymptotic theory. 
200 Johansen cointegration technique would have required the estimation of a system of many equations 
.. ree of 
freedom. Narayan and Smyth (2005,2006) note that because the and thus a considerable loss in deg 
ARDL approach draws on the unrestricted error correction model, it is likely to have better statistical 
properties than the Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) methods. The authors 
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Fourth, the ARDL approach is particularly applicable in the present context because of 
the disequilibriurn nature of the time series data stemming from the presence of possible 
structural breaks as shown in Chapter 4. With the ARDL approach, it can be 
conveniently tested whether the underlying structural breaks have affected the long-run 
stability of the estimated coefficients. As suggested by Pesaran (1997), the cumulative 
sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the CUSUM of square (CUSUMSQ) tests 
proposed by Brown et al (1975) can be applied to the residuals of the estimated error 
correction models to test param'eter constancy 201 . 
Fifth, the ARDL bounds testing technique generally provides unbiased estimates of the 
long-run model and valid test statistics even when some of the regressors are 
endogenous 202 . As long as the ARDL model is free of residual correlation, endogeneity 
is less of a problem in the estimated models. Pesaran and Shin (1999) demonstrated that 
the appropriate lags in the ARDL model are corrected for both serial correlation and 
endogeneity problems. Likewise, the ARDL technique can estimate the long-run and 
short-run relationships simultaneously, eliminating problems associated with omitted 
variables and autocorrelationS203. 
Nevertheless, in addition to the ARDL bounds testing approach, Trace and Maximal 
Eigenvalue tests within the framework of the Johansen cointegration approach will also 
be conducted in order to check whether the findings are contingent upon the 
econometric technique used. 
explain that, unlike the Engle Granger approach, the unrestricted error correction model does not push the 
short-run dynamics into the residual temns. 
201 The advantage of these tests is that, unlike the Chow test that requires break point(s) to be specified, 
they can be used without the requirement of a priori knowledge of the structural break point. The 
disadvantage, on the other hand, is that they are descriptive tests. 
202 See Harris (200i). 
203 See Narayan (2006). 
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6.2 Methodology 
This chapter considers a number of specifications based on various combinations of the 
eleven explanatory variables introduced in Chapter 5. In each model, the variable 
selection depends on the condition that there are no correlated variables in the same 
models to ensure the accuracy of the estimated parameters 204 . More specifically, the 
criteria for building the models is to avoid inclusion of the variables whose pairwise 
correlation coefficients is higher than 0.5 in the same model in order to avoid 
multicollinearty problem. In fact, there exists no consensus in the literature on what 
level of correlation constitutes multicollinearity. Using a rather conservative threshold, 
multicollinearity is defined at coefficients > 0.5 in the present analysis. Correlation 
matrix in Table 6.1 reports the correlation coefficients among independent variables. 
Table 6.1 Correlation Matrix 
InEXR InNIE lnTBR InDCG ERM InFAL InLIC InLCA InLTA 0 VE PIN 
InEXR 1.00 0.24 0.67 -0.47 0.04 -0.53 -0.22 -0.41 -0.41 -0.15 -0.04 
InNIE 1.00 -0.07 0.37 0.00 0.10 -0.31 -0.09 0.53 -0.16 0.31 
InTBR 1.00 -0.55 0.17 -0.28 -0.23 -0.42 -0.47 -0.12 -0.02 
InDCG 1.00 0.04 0.34 0.16 0.46 0.72 -0.08 0.37 
ERM 1.00 0.12 0.01 -0.02 -0.16 0.20 0.04 
InFAL 1.00 -0.07 0.12 0.53 0.26 0.18 
InLIC 1.00 0.86 -0.15 0.41 -0.18 
InLCA 1.00 0.21 0.32 -0.06 
InLTA 1.00 -0.06 0.36 
0 VE 1.00 -0.01 
PIN 1.00 
Note: the correlation coejrtcients greater than 0.5 are shown in bold 
Considering the number of observations used in the analysis (a total of 140 monthly 
observations), each model contains a maximum of seven regressors to preserve degrees 
of freedom. Although it is true that the inclusion of irrelevant variables can reduce the 
efficiency of the estimations, this is not as serious as the omitted variable bias. In other 
words, it is important to include all of the relevant variables in the estimated models as 
204 Multicollinearity leads to the following is: (1) small changes in the data may produce problem 
, es 
in the regression coefficients, (2) regression coeflicients have high standard errors, significant chang 
which affect the significance level of the corresponding independent variable, and (3) the regression 
coefficients may have the wrong sign and an unreasonable magnitude (see Kozak, 1997). This means that 0 
the expected relations among the dependent and independent variables can not be estimated with high 
certainty. For this reason, the models estimated in the present chapter do not include correlated variables 
in the same model. 
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the exclusion of an important explanatory variable would result in an omitted variable 
bias, in which case, the estimated parameters and the test statistics would be unreliable. 
Avoiding the inclusion of the correlated variables in the same models but retaining a 
maximum of seven regressors, the following models are estimated: 
Table 6.2 EXDlanatorv Variables Used in the Econometric Models 
Model Fiscal Monetary Banking Other 
(1) InEXR, ln NIE ERM InLIC PIN, 0 VE 
(2) InFXR, InNIE ERM InLCA PIN, OVE 
(3) InEXR ERM InLTA, InLCA PIN, 0 VE 
(4) lnNIE ERM, InDCG InLIC, InFAL PIN, 0 VE 
(5) InNIE ERM, InDCG InLCA, InFAL PIN, OVE 
(6) InNIE ERM InLIC, InFAL PIN, 0 VE 
(7) InNIE ERM InLCA, In FAL PIN, OVE 
(8) InTBR ERM InLIC, InFAL PIN, OVE 
(9) InTBR ERM InLCA, InFAL PIN, 0 VE 
(10) InTBR ERM InLTA, InFAL PIN, 0 VE 
(11) InNIE, In TBR ERM InFAL, InLIC PIN, OVE 
(12) InNIE, InTBR ERM InFAL, InLCA PIN, OVE 
(13) InNIE, lnTBR ERM InLIC, InLCA PIN, OVE 
(14) InEXR, InNIE ERM, InDCG InLIC PIN, OVE 
(15) InEXR, InNIE ERM, InDCG InLCA PIN, OVE 
As discussed in Chapter 4, all variables except PIN, FAL and LTA are a priori expected 
to have positive coefficients. In order to measure the robustness of the results to the 
choice of the exchange market pressure index, two indices EMP(E) and EMP(P) are 
used as the dependent variable. EMP(E) denotes the EMP index constructed a la 
Eichengreen el al (1995) and EMP(P) denotes the EMP index constructed a la 
Pentecost el al (2001). 
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6.2.1 ARDL Bounds Testing Approach to Cointegration 
The ARDL bounds testing approach involves estimating the conditional error correction 
version of the ARDL model for the variables under investigation. The Augmented 
ARDL (p, qj, qZ ...... qk) is given by the following equation205: 
k 
a(L, p)y, = a. +A (L, q)x,, + Xiv, + c, 
Vt=l ........... 
where 
a(L, p) =1 -ajL -a2L2 . ........ -a, 
LP 
A (L, qj) =, 8j. +A, L+ 
A2L2 . ....... + 
P,,,, Lql Vi = 1,2 k 
yj is an independent variable, a is the constant term, L is the lag operator such that 
Ly, = yj - 1, wt is sxI vector of deterministic variables such as intercept terni, time 
trends, or exogenous variables with fixed lags. The log-run equation with respect to 
intercept and time trend can be written as follows: 
k 
Y= a. +at +E a (1, P) (6.2) . _,, 
6, x, +)iv, +q, where: a= 
la 
i-I 
The long-term elasticities are estimated by: 
A Vi = 1,2,..., k (6.3) 
aI-a2-... - a,, 
Where P and 4, i=1,2, ..., k are the selected values of 
P and 4,9 i=1,2, ..., 
k. 
The long-run coefficients are estimated by: 
AAAAA 
Ir 
A(p, q, 9q29 ... qqk) 
AAA (6.4) 
ai-a2-... -ap 
203 See Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran et al (200 1). 
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Where denotes the OLS estimates of A in Equation 6.1 for the selected 
ARDL model. 
The ARDL approach involves two steps for estimating long-run relationship. The first 
step is to investigate the existence of long-run relationship among all variables in the 
equation under estimation. The ARDL method estimates (p + I)k number of regressions 
in order to obtain optimal lag length for each variable, where p is the maximum number 
of lags to be used and k is the number of variables in the equation. The second step is to 
estimate the long-run coefficients and the related error correction models (ECMS)206. 
6.2.1.1. Establishing a Long-run Equilibrium Relationship 
In the first step of the ARDL bounds testing procedure, the existence of one or more 
long-run relationships between EMP and the regressors is investigated by computing the 
F-statistic for testing the significance of the lagged levels of the variables in the error 
correction form of the underlying ARDL mode1207 . This is based on estimating an 
unrestricted error correction mode1208 (UECM) by treating EMP as a dependent variable 
as follows: 
p ql q2 q3 
-, +2 
AFIS, 
-, _, 
d, AAfON, 
-, +I: e, 
ABAN, 
-, + AEAIP, = ao + 
b, AEMP, ýC, + 1: 
1=1 1=0 0-0 0-0 
q4 qs 
-, +2: -, + 
jAION, 
-, 
APIN, E, + h, EMP, + i, FIS, 
.., 
g, AOV 
1-0 J-o 
k, BAN, 
-, + 
liPINI-I + miDEVI-I + c, (6.5) 
where FIS, MON and BAN denote, respectively, the fiscal sector variables (InEYR, 
1nNIE, InTBR), monetary policy variables (ERM, InDCG) and the banking sector 
206 See Pesaran et al (200 1 ). 
207 See Pesaran and Pesaran (1997: pp. 304-305). 
209 Since the error-correction term in the ARDL model does not have restricted error corrections, the 
ARDL is a an unrestriced error correction model (Pesaran ef al, 200 1). 
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variables (InLIC, InLCA, InLTA, InFAL) shown in Table 6.2. Two sets of fifteen 
separate models have been estimated as shown in Table 6.2. In one set, the dependent 
variable EMP is EMP(E) and in the other, it is EMP(P). 
In Equation 6.5, a,, is the drift component, A is the difference operator, p and q], q2, 
q3, q4, q5 are the optimum lags, and s is the usual error term with mean zero and finite 
covariance matrix. Following Pesaran et al (2001), an ARDL model is specified as 
ARDL (p, q 1, q2, q3, q4, qs). 
In the ARDL models, the first part of the equation represents the short-run dynamics 
whereas the second part represents the long-run dynamics. More specifically, in 
Equation 6.5, the first part of the equation with b, c, d, e, f and g represent the short-run 
dynamics of the models whereas the second part with h, i, j, kI and m represent the 
long-run dynamics. 
The existence of a long-run relationship among the variables is investigated using F- 
tests. The null hypothesis of no cointegration amongst the variables is specified as: 
HO: h=i=j=k=l=m=O (6.6) 
which states that. there exists no long-run relationship. On the other hand, the 
altemative hypothesis is: 
111: h i6 0, i: ý- 0, j qý 0, k40,14 0, m 7-10 (6.7) 
The estimated F-statistics have non-standard distributions irrespective of whether the 
underlying time series are I(l) or 1(0). The respective critical values depend upon the 
sample size and the number of regressors 209 . 
Pesaran et al (2001) estimate two sets of asymptotic critical value bounds for this test 
for the sample sizes between 500 and 1000 observations. On the other hand, Narayan 
(2005) reports the critical values for smaller sample sizes, namely between 30 and 80 
209 See Pesaran et al (200 1: pp. 295-296). 
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observations. Hence, given the sample size used in the present analysis, the estimated 
ARDL test statistics are compared to the respective critical value bounds reported by 
both Pesaran et al (2001) and Narayan (2005). 
The first set of asymptotic critical value bounds assumes that all variables are 1(0) while 
the second set assumes that all variables are I(l). Critical values for the I(l) series are 
referred to as upper bound critical values, while the critical values for 1(0) series are 
referred to as the lower bound critical values. If the test statistic is above an upper 
critical value, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship can be rejected regardless 
of the orders of integration of the underlying variables. The opposite is the case if the 
test statistic falls below a lower critical value. If the sample test statistic falls between 
these two bounds, the result is inconclusive 210 . 
Hence, the ARDL procedure allows making inferences in the absence of any knowledge 
about the order of integration of the series under investigation as long as the value of the 
test statistic falls outside the critical bounds. 
Table 6.3 reports the results of the ARDL bounds F-tests for cointegrating relationships. 
Using Pesaran et al's (2001) terminology, the test which normalizes on EMP(E) is, for 
instance, represented in the table by FEj'jp(E) (EMP(E)j EXR, ERM, LCA, PIN, OVE) 
where EXR, ERM, LCA, PIN and OVE are the long-run forcing variables for EMP(E). 
The models denoted by A have the dependent variable EMP(E) and those denoted by B 
have the dependent variable EMP(P). 
210 See Pesaran et al (200 1 ). 
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Table 6.3 ARDL Bounds F-tests for Cointearatina RelationshiDs 
Model Specification F-statistic 
(IA) FEmp(E) (EMP (E) I EXR, NIE, ERM, LIC, PIN, 0 VE) 6.013* 
(IB) FEmp(p)(EMP(P)l EXR, NIE, ERM, LIC, PIN, OVE) 5.054* 
(2A) FEmp(E) (EMP(E) I EXR, NIE, ERM, LCA, PIN, OVE) 5.968* 
(2B) FEmp(p)(EMP(P)l EXR, NIE, ERM, LCA PIN, OVE) 4.895* 
(3A) FEmpp (EMP (E) I EXR, ERM, L TA, L CA, PIN, 0 VE) 5.077* 
(3B) FEmp(p)(EMP(P)l EXR, ERM, LTA, LCA, PIN, OVE) 4.123** 
(4A) FEmp(E) (EMP(E) I NIE, ERM, DCG, LIC, FAL PI, ,0 VE) , N. 3.807* (4B) FEmp (P) (EMP (P) I NIE, ERM, D CG, L IC, FA L, PIN, 0 VE) 4.321 * 
(5A) FEmp(E) (EMP (E) NIE, ERM, D CG, L CA, FA L, PIN, 0 VE) 3.898** 
(5B) FEmp(p) (EMP (P) I NIE, ERM, D CG, L CA, FA L, PIN, 0 VE) 4.236* 
(6A) FEmp(E) (EMP(E) NIE, ERM, LIC, FA L, PIN, 0 VE) 5.351 * 
(6B) FEup(p)(EMP(P)l NIE, ERMLIC, FAL, PIN, OVE) 5.213* 
(7A) FEup(E) (EMP (E) NIE, ERM, L CA, FA L, PIN, 0 VE) 5.335* 
(7B) FEmp(p)(EMP(P)l NIE, ERMLCA, FAL, PIN, OVE) 5.167* 
(8A) FEmp(E) (EMP(E)l TBRERM, LIC, FAL, PIN, OVE) 5.096* 
(8B) FEmp(p)(EMP(P)l TBR, ERM, LIC, FALPIN, OVE) 5.684* 
(9A) FEmp(E)(EMP(E)j, TBR, ERM, LCA, FALPIN, OVE) 5.205 * 
(9B) FEmp(p)(EMP(P)l TBRERM, LCA, FAL, PIN, OVE) 5.550* 
(10A) FEmp(E) (EMP(E) I TBR, ERM, L TA, FA L, PIN, 0 VE) 4.834* 
(10B) FEmp(p)(EMP(P)l TBRERM, LTA, FALPIN, OVE) 6.260* 
(IIA) FEMP(E)(EMP(E)INIE, TBR, ERM, FALLIC, PIN, OVE) 4.524* 
(11B) FEMPO(EMPOINIE, TBR, ERM, FAL, LIC, PIN, OVE) 4.691* 
(12A) FEmP(E)(EMP(E)INIETBRERMFALLCA, PlNOVE) 4.813* 
(12B) FEmP(p)(EMP(P)l NIE, TBR, ERM, FAL, LCA, PIN, OVE) 4.631* 
(13A) FEup(E) (EMP(E) I NIE, TBR, ERM, LIC, LCA, PIN, 0 VE) 5.613* 
(13B) FEmp(p)(EMP(P)l NIE, TBR, ERM, LIC, LCA, PIN, OVE) 6.751* 
(14A) FEmp(E) (EMP(E) I EXR, NIE, ERM, DCG, LIC, PIN, 0 VE) 5.301* 
(14B) FEmp(p)(EMP(P) I EXR, NIE, ERM, DCG, LIC, PIN, OVE) 4.584* 
(15A) FEwP(E) (EMP (E) I EXR, NIE, ERM, D CG, L CA, PIN, 0 VE) 5.063* 
(15B) F-rmp(p)(EMP(P)l EXR, NIE, ERM, DCG, LCA, PIN, OVE) 4.362* 
ARDL Critical Value Bounds 
Pesaran et al (2001) Narayan (2005) 
1% Level 5% Level I% Level 5% Level 
k 1(0) 10) 1(0) IM 1(0) IM 1(0) IM 
6 3.15 4.43 2.45 3.61 3.46 4.94 2.63 3.86 
7 2.96 4.26 2.32 3.50 3.23 4.76 2.48 3.75 
Notes: k denotes number of regressors. * and * denote significance at I and 5 percent level, respectively 
Results of the ARDL bounds tests indicate the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among the underlying variables in all of the estimated models regardless of 
whether EMP(E) or EMP(P) is used as the dependent variable. In all cases, tile 
estimated ARDL test statistic is larger than the upper bound critical value. The results 
seem to be robust to the selection of the critical values suggested by Pesaran et al (2001) 
and Narayan (2005). 
153 
Next, in order to ascertain the robustness of the results and to test whether the results are 
contingent upon the econometric technique used, the traditional Johansen cointegration 
procedure introduced by Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius, (1990) is used. 
6.2.2 Johansen Cointegration Test 
Johansen cointegration approach is a system approach unlike a single equation approach 
like the ARDL procedure 211 . It involved the use of the maximum 
likelihood technique 
to the underlying unrestricted VAR model to estimate long-run relationships between 
I(I) series. Engle and Granger (1987) discuss that, even if a set of series is not 
stationary, there may be a linear combination of the variables that is stationary. Hence, 
in Johansen's method it is important to know the degree of integration of all variables 
involved. Hence, the system approach developed by Johansen (1991,1995) can also be 
applied to a mixture of 1(0) and I(l) series. 212 
In this approach, it is possible to have more than one cointegrating vector since this 
method is a system of VAR equations, whereas in ARDL only one cointegrating 
relationship is allowed. The optimum lag, which is the same for all variables, is 
determined according to the usual Akaike or Schwartz criteria. The general forrn of the 
vector error correction model is as follows: 
p 
yl = Lllk Yl-k +P+61 (6.8) 
k-I 
where yt is an (n x 1) column vector of n I(l) variables. 11, is a coefficient matrix, p 
represents an (I x n) vector of constants, p denotes the lag length, and C, is a 
disturbance tenn independently and identically distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance. As discussed earlier, yt is assumed to be I(I ). I fence, letting A, ), t = ), t - yt- 1, 
Equation 6.8 can be rewritten in first difference notation reformulated in error 
correction form as: 
211 Johansen's method is usually applicable when the sample size is very large (see Maddala and Kim, 
1998) 
212 However, 1(0) series have to be intrtoduced in the analysis as additional deterministic variables (see 
Pesaran et al, 200 1: p. 315). 
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P-1 
AYt 2: rk AYI-k + Fl YI-I +P+ Ct (6.9) 
k-I 
where rk ý- I- (F11 _- _1_Ik) and 171 =I- (rI,,... rIP) represent coefficient matrices and 
the rank (r) of matrix II determines the number of cointegration relations in the system. 
Since Ayt and Ayt-i variables are 1(0) and yt-1 variables are I(I), Equation 6.9 will be 
balanced if left-hand side and right-hand side have the same degree of integration. This 
will occur either if r--O, so that 171 =0, in which case the variables in yt are not 
cointegrated, or if the parameters of H are such that rIy, -, 
is also 1(0). In the first case 
(r--O and 11 =0), Equation 6.9 is just a traditional VAR model in first differences. The 
second case applies if the rank of H>0, which would indicate that there is r<n 
cointegration relations, meaning r possible stationary linear combinations of yt. The 
optimum lag, which is the same for all variables, is determined according to the usual 
Akaike or Schwartz criteria. 
The number of cointegrating vectors can be estimated through Trace and Maximum 
Eigenvalue tests. If the calculated statistics are greater than the corresponding Trace and 
Maximum Eigenvalue critical values at specific level of significance, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected. If the rank is equal to zero it indicates that the variables are 
not cointegrated. If the tests indicate that a cointegrating vector exists between the 
variables then this implies that the linear combination of variables is stationary 
Table 6.4 reports the results of Trace and Maximum eigenvalue tests. The findings of 
the ARDL bounds tests and the Johansen cointegration analysis are generally consistent. 
However, there are some discrepancies where the Johansen procedure fails to detect any 
cointegrating vectors in some cases while the ARDL bounds test suggest the presence of 
a long-run relationship. This inconsistency between the two approaches can be 
attributed to the fact that the Johansen cointegration approach depends on the 
stationarity properties of the data. For instance, it considers that EAfP(E), EAfP(P), PIN 
and OVE are exogenous 1(0) variables based on the results of the unit root tests in 
Chapter 4, which are not very clear. 
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Therefore, in the present analysis, the ARDL bounds testing approach is more 
appropriate than the traditional cointegration analysis as it yield consistent estimates of 
the long-run coefficients that are asymptotically normal irrespective of whether the 
underlying regressors are purely 1(0), 1(1) or mutually cointegrated. 
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6.3 Estimation of the Long-run Coefficients 
Cointegration of economic time series in the estimated models implies that the 
underlying variables have a long-run structural relationship that can be empirically 
evaluated. Having established the existence of a long-run relationship based on F-tests, 
the second step of the analysis is to estimate the long-run and the associated short-run 
coefficients. The long-run relationship is regarded as a steady-state equilibrium, 
whereas the short-run relationship is evaluated by the magnitude of the deviation from 
the equilibrium. The order of the lags in the ARDL model are selected using the 
appropriate selection criteria such as Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwartz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC), Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) and R'ensuring that there is 
no evidence of residual serial correlation, functional form misspecification, non- 
normality and heteroscedasticity. 
Also, in the present analysis, if more than one selection criterion suggests a 
specification that passes all diagnostic tests, the most parsimonious models with the 
shortest lags is chosen based on the theoretical expectation that speculative attacks have 
short lag structures. The long-run coefficients of the models are estimated using the 
following model: 
p ql q2 q3 q4 
EMP =, 80 +Z PIN, -, 
AEMP, 
-, +Zfl2FIS, _, +E, 
83AfON, 
_, +Zfl4BAN, _, +Zps 1.1 1=0 1-0 0-0 1-0 
q6 
1 ß60VE, 
1-0 
(6.10) 
where FIS, MON and BAN are defined as before. Again, two sets of fifteen separate 
models have been estimated using EAfP(E) and EAfP(P) as the dependent variables. 
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6.4 Estimation of Short-run Coefficients 
The existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship implies that an equilibrium error- 
correction model (ECM) exists. In order to estimate the short-run dynamic parameters, 
the following ECM associated with the long-run estimates is estimated: 
p q] q2 q3 
AEMP, = go +LA AEMP, -, + EARS,, +I: A AAION, -, + 
1: 
#84A. BAN, -, 1-1 1-0 . 1-0 #-0 
q4 q5 
Iß5APIN, 
-i + 
Iß6A0VE, 
-, + irECT, -, 1-0 3-0 
where FIS, MON and BAN are defined as before. Again, two sets of fifteen separate 
models have been estimated as before, using EMP(E) and EAIP(P) as the dependent 
variables. In Equation 6.11,81,82,83, & fl. 5, and fl6 represent the short-run dynamic 
coefficients of the model's convergence to equilibrium and 7r is the coefficient of the 
one period lagged error correction term, ECTt. 1, which captures the speed of adjustment. 
If the equilibrium is disrupted, the magnitude of 7r determines how quickly the 
equilibrium is restored. In other words, it ties the short-run behaviour of the dependent 
variable to its long-run behaviour and tells how much of the adjustment to equilibrium 
takes place in each period, or how much of the equilibrium error is corrected. The error 
correction term should be significant and should have a negative coefficient to ensure 
that long-run equilibrium can be attained. A highly significant error correction term is 
further proof of the existence of a stable long-run relationship 213 . 
213 See Narayan (2005). 
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6.5 Empirical Results 
Table 6.5 reports the selected ARDL specifications, their selection criteria and their 
diagnostic tests for residual serial correlation, functional form misspecification, non- 
normality and heteroscedasticity. Models are selected using the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) 
and R'depending on whether the estimated models pass all of the diagnostic tests. In 
the case where more than one selection criterion suggests a specification that passes all 
diagnostic tests, the most parsimonious models with the shortest lags is chosen. The 
specifications are estimated using up to a maximum of 4 lags for each variable in the 
models as the selection of shorter lags has resulted in serial correlation problem and 
choosing a long lag length means losing degrees of freedom which leads to misspecified 
models considering the number of variables and observations used in the analysis. The 
only exceptions are the models 14A, 14B, 15A and 15B where up to 6 lags had to be 
considered to avoid serial correlation problem 214 . 
As can be seen in the table, the diagnostic tests of the selected models suggest that all 
models suffer from the non-normality problem. In this case, the short-run and long-run 
coefficients of the estimated models are not valid. The presence of non-normality 
problem can be attributed to the presence of outliers over the sample period, which 
results from non-recurring, exogenous shocks rather than the normal evolution of the 
economic data. These outliers can individually or collectively be responsible for the 
residual non-normality problem. Indeed, this is not surprising given most of the series, 
especially the exchange market pressure indices are characterized by frequent 
fluctuations as pointed out in Chapter 4. 
214 In the case of residual correlation, the least squares estimator will still be unbiased, but no longer best 
linear unbiased estimator. Moreover, in the case of positive serial correlation, the estimates of the 
standard errors will be biased downward, which means that the confidence intervals are too small and the 
findings are unrelaiable. 
161 
Table 6.5 Diap-nostic Tests of Estimated Models 
Model ARDL Selection X2f IA 
2 
XRESET 
2 
XNORU 
2 
XHFTER 
Specification Criterion 
(IA) ARDL(3,3,2,4,4,4,2) R2 15.361 1.647 58.352* 0.133 
(113) ARDL(3,1,1,3,4,1,2) AIC 21.642 1.344 45.542* 0.986 
(2A) ARDL(3,0,4,0,4,4,2) AIC 18.633 1.231 143.234* 0.024 
(2B) ARDL(2,1,4,1,3,4,2) R2 20.425 0.523 51.621 0.276 
(3A) ARDL(3,0,4,1,0,4,2) HQC 17.972 0.746 21.732* 1.704 
(3B) ARDL(2,2,4,2,1,3,2) AIC 19.582 0.753 53.342* 0.342 
(4A) ARDL(3,0,4,3,4,4,4,2) SBC 18.653 0.689 58.522* 0.034 
(4B) ARDL(2,0,4,3,2,2,4,2) AIC 17.983 0.642 56.243* 0.242 
(5A) ARDL(3,0,4,3,4,4,4,2) R2 18.723 0.134 106.231 * 0.263 
(5B) ARDL(2,0,4,3,4,1,0,1) R2 20.453 0.942 44.854* 1.343 
(6A) ARDL(3,3,4,4,3,4,2) R2 15.039 0.016 43.901 * 0.961 
(6B) ARDL(2,2,2,4,3,2, I) HQC 21.935 0.458 63.818* 0.200 
(7A) ARDL(3,0,4,4,3,4,2) AIC 17.780 0.380 96.700* 0.154 
(7B) ARDL(3,0,4,3,3,2, I) AIC 25.169 1.088 51.748* 0.848 
(8A) ARDL(3,1,4,4,1,1,1) HQC 12.813 0.269 13.150* 1.875 
(8B) ARDL(3,1,4,3,1,1,2) AIC 22.923 1.747 43.667* 0.589 
(9A) ARDL(3,2,4,4,3,1,2) R2 16.553 0.025 23.180* 2.041 
(9B) ARDL(4,2,2,4,3,1,1) R2 23.364 0.680 54.820* 0.031 
(10A) ARDL(3,1,4,0,0,1,1) SBC 17.131 0.267 11.711 * 0.941 
(10B) ARDL(4,1,3,0,0,1,1) HQC 24.249 0.979 66.519* 0.055 
(IIA) ARDL(3,0,1,4,1,4,1,1) HQC 12.802 0.296 12.614* 2.132 
(11B) ARDL(4,0,1,3,1,3,1,1) HQC 28.240 0.835 66.395* 1.344 
(12A) ARDL(3,0,1,4,3,4,1,1) AIC 11.589 0.135 21.675* 2.076 
(12B) ARDL(4,0,1,4,3,2,1,1) SBC 21.621 1.225 70.785* 0.680 
(13A) ARDL(3,0,1,4,3,4,1,2) 2 17.061 0.215 17.668* 2.004 
(13B) ARDL(2,0,1,3,0,3,1,2) R2 25.882 0.458 42.424* 0.304 
(14A) ARDL(6,0,1,4,3,0,1,4) R2 17.629 1.441 56.801* 0.154 
(I 4B) ARDL(3,0,1,4,3,4,1,3) AIC 15.772 0.352 43.523* 0.873 
(I 5A) ARDL(4,0,1,4,3,4,1,5) HQC 16.873 0.754 52.321 * 0.652 
(I 5B) ARDL(5,0,1,3,0,3,1,3) IIQC 17.523 0.837 48.212* 0.653 
2,222 
-7-I. -R are, respectively, Lagrange multiplier statisticsfor tests of Notes: XIM XRESETI and XHI., . 
residual serial correlation, Ramsey's RESET test using the square of thefilled valuesforfunctionalforin, 
normality based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals, and heteroscedasticity based on the 
regression of squared residuals on squaredfitted values. * denotes significance at 5% level. Tests have 
been carried out using Aficrofil 4.0. 
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6.5.1 Introducing Pulse Dummy Variables 
In econometric modelling, the presence of extreme residuals, i. e. outliers, may lead to a 
rejection of the normality assumption 215 . One way to improve the chances of error 
normality is to use pulse dummy variables to capture those one-off abnormal 
observations. Based on this consideration, models are re-estimated by augmenting the 
cointegrating equations with pulse dummy variables. 
Accordingly, separate dummy variables are introduced for each of the outliers. 
Following the existing econometrics literature, the operational definition of an outlier is 
considered as any data point for which the residuals are in excess of 2 standard 
deviations from the fitted model. The dummy variables are set equal to zero for all 
observations except the month in which the observation goes beyond the threshold of 
two standard errors. In these months, the dummy variable takes on the value of 1. 
Figure 6.1 plots the residuals of the estimated models and 2 standard errors. The 
horizontal lines in the figures represent the 2 standard error bands. The identified 
outliers seem to correspond to the currency crises of 1994 and 2000-2001. Hence, pulse 
dummy variables may be justifiably used to remove observations corresponding to these 
one-off events that are highly unlikely to be repeated. 
Table 6.6 reports the results of the models which are re-estimated using the pulse 
dummy variables to account for the presence of the outliers. As can be seen, the use of 
the intervention dummy variables ensured normality of the probability distribution of 
the residuals, which pen-nitted hypothesis testing on the results of the model. 
Furthermore, the results also confirm that the re-estimated models do not suffer from 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasti city, or model misspecification problems. The ARDL 
models that pass all of the diagnostic tests and are as parsimonious as possible are 
selected. Maximum number of lags is considered 4 in all models except models 14A, 
1413,15A and 15B where up to 6 lags had to be considered to avoid the serial 
correlation problem. 
215 Outliers would appear in the tails of the distribution and would therefore lead to kurtosis being very 
large. 
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Fhzure 6.1 Plots of the Models' Residuals 
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Model 6B 
1992M2 1994M3 1996104 1998M5 200OM3 
Model SA 
1991MIl 1993MI2 1996M1 1998M2 200CM3 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
4 
'5 19S 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
.1 
-2 
.3 
4 
-5 1981 
Model 7A 
Model 8A 
Model SA 
3 
2 
1 
0 
.1 
2 
, 31 
-4 
-5 1990MI 1992M2 1994M3 1996M4 1998M5 200ON13 
3 
2 
1 
0 
.1 
-2 
-3 
-4 199 
Model IOA 
Model IIA 
2- 
0 
1990mi 1992M2 1994M3 1996M4 1998M5 200OM3 
3 
M(Wel 12A 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
4 
198i 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 198! 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
4 
198 
Model 78 
Model 813 
M(Wel 9B 
Model IOB 
4 
3 
2 
I 
0 
-3 
-4 
1989MIO 1991MIl 1993M12 
4 
3 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
.1 
-2 
-3 
-4 198! 
165 
Model IIB 
Model 12B 
2 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 199 
Model 13A M(Wel 13B 
4-- 
3-- 
2- 
1- 
0 
.1 
-2 
-3 
-4 1989MIO 199liAll 199 12 1 
McAel 14A 
24 
13 
2 
01 
0 -1 
-1 -2 2 
-3 -3 
.4 .4 1990ml 1992M2 1994M3 1996M4 1998ms 200OM3 198 
2 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 199 
McWel ISA 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 198! 
166 
Model 14B 
Model 15B 
20DOM3 
Table 6.6 Results of the Diap-nostic Tests of the models with Dummy Variables 
Model Specification Selection 
Criterion 
2 XLU 2 XRESET 2 XIVOM 
2 XHFTER 
(IA) ARDL(3,1,0,4,4,1,1) AIC 23.814 0.796 4.458 0.557 
(IB) ARDL(4,1,0,2,4,0,1) AIC 26.620 1.653 9.702 1.213 
(2A) ARDL(3,0,4,0,4,4, I) Alc 13.689 2.514 1.236 0.030 
(2B) ARDL(2,1,4,0,4,2, I) R2 25.123 0.643 2.716 0.339 
(3A) ARDL(3,0,4,0,4,1,1) HQC 9.106 0.918 1.413 2.052 
(3B) ARDL(2,0,4,1,3,1,1) AIC 24.086 0.926 3.365 0.421 
(4A) ARDL(3,0,4,3,4,4,1,1) AIC 18.943 1.708 0.175 2.272 
(4B) ARDL(3,0,4,3,2,2,1,1) AIC 22.119 0.790 2.381 0.298 
(5A) ARDL(3,0,4,3,4,3,1,1) R2 15.719 0.974 0.671 2.551 
(5B) ARDL(1,0,4,3,2,3,1,1) X2 25.157 1.159 13.215 1.652 
(6A) ARDL(3,2,4,4,3,2, I) R2 23.904 0.673 2.303 0.288 
(6B) ARDL(2,2,2,4,3,2, I) HQC 26.980 0.563 1.968 0.246 
(7A) ARDL(3,2,4,4,3,4, I) R2 15.519 0.007 1.399 2.649 
(7B) ARDL(2,2,2,4,3,2, I) AIC 30.958 1.338 8.344 1.043 
(8A) ARDL(3,1,4,0,1,1,1) R2 34.606 1.034 8.354 1.044 
(813) ARDL(4,1,3,0,1,2, I) AIC 28.195 2.149 5.796 0.724 
(9A) ARDL(3,3,4,4,3,1,1) R2 9.808 0.399 2.815 0.507 
(9B) ARDL(3,4,3,1,2,1,1) R2 28.738 0.836 0.305 0.038 
(10A) ARDL(3,0,3,0,0,1,0) AIC 8.743 1.097 1.995 1.940 
(1 OB) ARDL(4,0,3,0,0,2, O) HQC 29.826 1.204 0.541 0.068 
(1 IA) ARDL(3,0,0,4,0,0,1,1) AIC 16.877 0.279 2.139 1.944 
(I IB) ARDL(3,1,0,4,0,0,2, I) HQC 34.735 1.027 13.225 1.653 
(ItA) ARDL(3,0,0,4,0,4,1,1) SBC 8.348 2.623 1.115 0.057 
(I 2B) ARDL(4,0,0,3,0,4,1,1) AIC 26.594 1.507 6.691 0.836 
(I 3A) ARDL(3,0,1,4,0,4,4, I) R2 9.537 0.968 3.160 0.132 
(1313) ARDL(3,0,1,3,0,4,3, I) R2 31.835 0.563 2.991 0.374 
(14A) ARDL(6,2,1,1,0,4,4, I) R2 21.684 1.772 1.515 0.189 
(14B) ARDL(6,4,1,2,0,1,2,1) AIC 19.400 0.433 8.590 1.074 
(I 5A) ARDL(6,6,1,0,1,1,2, I) HQC 20.754 0.927 6.416 0.802 
(I 5B) ARDL(5,6,1,0,2,1,3,1) HQC 21.553 1.030 6.426 0.803 
2222 Notes: XLu , XRESFT I XNOI? U I and ; rH,.; 7TI? are, respectively, 
Lagrange mulliplier statisticsfor tests of 
residual serial correlation, Ramsey's RESET test using the square of thefitted valuesforfiinciionalform, 
normality based on a test of skewness and kurlosis of residuals, and heteroscedasticity based on the 
regression of squared residuals on squaredfated values. * denotes significance at 5% level. Tests have 
been carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
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6.5.2 Long-run Coefficients of the Estimated Models 
Having confirmed that the estimated models pass the diagnostic tests for functional 
form misspecification, non-normality, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, this 
section presents their long-run coefficients. 
In all models, the pulse dummies are highly significant with large coefficients 
confirming the importance of the outliers in the estimated models. 
Regarding the independent variables, PIN, LTA and FAL are significant in all models 
with a negative sign as expected regardless of whether the dependent variable is EMP(E) 
or EMP(P). Likewise, FXR, ERM, LIC, LCA, LTA, NIE and OVE are significant in all 
models with a positive sign as expected regardless of whether the dependent variable is 
EMP(E) or EMP(P). On the other hand, DCG is not significant in any of the models. 
TBR is significant in some models but has a negative coefficient 216 . The interpretation 
of these findings will be provided at the end of the present chapter 
Table 6.7 Models IA and IB Lonv--run Coefficients 
Variable 
Model IA 
ARDL(3,1,0,4,4,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model IB 
ARDL(4,1,0,2,4,0,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
InNIE 0.365** 0.112 0.240*** 0.028 
ERM 0.034*** 0.031 0.341 ** 0.035 
InEXR 0.738** 0.171 0.163* 0.026 
InLIC 0.024** 0.005 0.226* * 0.031 
PIN -0.057* 0.011 -0.152* 0.034 
OVE 0.016 0.013 0.194 0.098 
Constant 0.271 0.155 0.637 0.331 
DI 2.305* 0.251 -0.590* 0.202 
D2 -3.842* 0.293 1.117* 0.294 
D3 -3.753* 0.408 -1.976* 0.367 
D4 2.654* 0.766 1.561 * 0.262 
D5 -3.538* 0.327 -2.622* 0.252 
D6 -3.436* 0.233 
Notes: and denote significance at lVo, 5? lo, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Alicrofit 4.0. 
216 The possibility of dropping DCG and TBR was also considered but this resulted in the loss of 
significance of the remaining variables and the signs of their coefficients. Hence they are retained in the 
models. 
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Table 6.8 Models 2A and 2B Long-run Coefficients 
Model 2A Model 2B 
ARDL(3,0,4,0,4,4, I) ARDL(2,1,4,0,4,2, I) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coeflicient Std. Err. 
InNIE 0.132 0.062 0.201 0.012 
ERM 0.536* 0.104 0.422* 0.118 
InF. XR 0.421 ** 0.118 1.384*** 0.212 
InLCA 0.504* 0.113 0.195** 0.017 
PIN -0.03 1** 0.011 -2.429* 0.326 
0 VE 0.006 0.012 2.121 1.233 
Constant 1.140 1.066 0.317 0.254 
DI 2.819* 0.337 -1.573* 0.323 
D2 -2.3 93 * 0.293 2.512* 0.232 
D3 -6.386* 1.329 -1.356* 0.451 
D4 1.595* 0.332 2.623* 0.281 
D5 -2.436* 0.345 -1.512* 0.351 
D6 -4.547* 0.176 
Notes: and *** denote significance at 1? 16, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
Table 6.9 Models 3A and 3B Lonp--run Coefficients 
Variable 
Model 3A 
ARDL(3,0,4,0,4,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 3B 
ARDL(2,0,4,1,3,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
InLTA -0.487 0.356 -1.868 1.353 
ERM 0.035*** 0.203 0.263** 0.018 
InEXR 0.198* 0.045 1.279** 0.256 
InLCA 0.157** 0.024 2.863* 0.205 
PIN -0.092** 0.021 -0.428** 0.113 
OVE 0.228* 0.033 3.179* 0.102 
Constant 1.917 1.209 0.065 0.032 
DI 2.575* 0.678 -1.251 0.211 
D2 4.014* 1.431 2.611 0.421 
D3 -3.711 0.416 -1.868* 0.205 
D4 1.263* 0.308 
D5 3.279* 0.356 
D6 -2.346* 0.205 
Notes: t ** and *** denote significance at /Yo, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
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Table 6.10 Models 4A and 4B Lonp--run Coefficients 
Model 4A Model 4B 
ARDL(3,0,4,3,4,4,1,1) ARDL(3,0,4,3,2,2,1,1) 
Variabl Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
e 
InNIE 0.054** 0.016 0.179* 0.029 
ERM 0.236*** 0.023 o n, %-i ** nmi 
InDCG -0.086 0.051 
-. w-. 
-0.091 
w. -. . 
0.045 
InLIC 0.560** 0.149 0.312*** 0.026 
InFAL -0.414* * 0.032 -0.344*** 0.022 
PIN -0.084* 0.021 -0.123** 0.021 
0 VE 0.075** 0.024 0.121** 0.012 
Constan 0.995 0.261 
t 0.118 0.059 
D1 2.531 0.312 -2.085* 0.202 
D2 -2.512* 0.404 2.099* 0.109 
D3 -2.123* 0.302 -1.082* 0.201 
D4 -3.243 0.209 2.085* 0.212 
D5 1.089* 0.249 
D6 w2.21 1* 0.206 
Notes: and *** denote significance at I? lo, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
Table 6.11 Models 5A and 5B Lona-run Coeflicients 
Variable 
Model 5A 
ARDL(3,0,4,3,4,3,1,1) 
Coeff icient Std. Err. 
Model 5B 
ARDL(1,0,4,3,2,3,1,1) 
Coefficicnt Std. Err. 
InNIE 0.834** 0.112 0.512** 0.138 
ERM 0.076* 0.013 1.551 * 0.214 
InDCG 0.083 0.054 0.824 0.383 
InLCA 0.468*** 0.019 0.623** 0.174 
InFAL -0.235** 0.041 -0.523*** 0.206 
PIN -0.088** 0.031 -1.342** 0.220 
OVE 0.079** 0.023 0.623** 0.039 
Constant 0.257 0.106 1.531 0.128 
DI 2.805* 0.423 2.141 * 0.017 
D2 2.3 81 * 0.014 -1.525* 0.338 
D3 -3.475* 0.323 1.532* 0.414 
D4 -2.410* 0.212 1.532* 0.203 
D5 -2.234* 0.304 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at Mo. 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
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Table 6.12 Models 6A and 6B Long-run Coefficients 
Variable 
Model 6A 
ARDL(3,2,4,4,3,2, I) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 6B 
ARDL(2,2,2,4,3,2, I) 
Coefficient Std. Err, 
InNIE 0.212 0.665 1.093 0.573 
ERM 0.085*** 0.023 0.453* 0.157 
InLIC 0.366** 0.034 1.942* 0.171 
InFAL -0.287** 0.031 -0.734*** 0.258 
PIN -0.037** 0.021 -1.342** 0.246 
0 VE 0.107 0.023 0.742 0.634 
Constant 1.535 1.249 1.234 0.734 
DI 2.349* 0.303 1.532* 0.204 
D2 -2.294* 0.204 -1.232* 0.414 
D3 3.685* 0.305 1.432* 0.703 
D4 -5.819* 0.217 -1.623* 0.232 
D5 2.453* 0.202 
D6 -2.412* 0.232 
Notes: ý ** and *** denote significance at I? lo, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
Table 6.13 Models 7A and 7B Lon2-run Coefficients 
Variable 
Model 7A 
ARDL(3,2,4,4,3,4, I) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 7B 
ARDL(2,2,2,4,3,2, I) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
InNIE 0.889 0.619 0.292 0.218 
ERM 0.234* 0.031 0.164* 0.204 
InLCA 0.730** 0.123 1.052* 0.316 
InFAL -0.157*** 0.026 -0.812** 0.253 
PIN -0.233** 0.021 -1.388* 0.345 
0 VE 0.015 0.013 0.332 0.251 
Constant 0.662 0.550 1.208 0.306 
DI 2.907* 0.312 -1.571* 0.531 
D2 -2.313* 0.221 1.241 * 0.012 
D3 2.947* 0.412 -2.723 * 0.351 
D4 -1.909* 0.235 1.782* 0.321 
D5 -2.213* 0.752 
Notes: t ** and *** denote significance at Mo, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Aficrofit 4.0. 
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Table 6.14 Models 8A and 8B Lon2-run Coefficients 
Variable 
Model 8A 
ARDL(3,1,4,0,1,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 8B 
ARDL(4,1,3,0,1,2, I) 
Coefficient Std. Eff. 
InTBR -0.272 0.206 -0.068 0.031 
ERM 0.233** 0.041 0.322*** 0.052 
InLIC 0.194* 0.037 0.685* 0.127 
InFAL -0.682* 0.103 -0.682* 0.121 
PIN -0.432** 0.101 -0.625*** 0.211 
0 VE 0.017 0.015 0.472 0.221 
Constant 0.053 0.012 0.562 0.262 
DI 2.3 61 0.380 1.423* 0.311 
D2 -3.3 51 0.421 -2.123* 0.231 
D3 -0.641 0.123 0.923* 0.211 
D4 2.646* 0.399 1.432* 0.312 
D5 -2.657* 0.142 -2.412* 0.515 
D6 -4.289* 0.125 
Notes: and denote significance at I? lo, 5? 16, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Microfil 4.0. 
Table 6.15 Models 9A and 9B Lonp--run Coefficients 
Variable 
Model 9A 
ARDL(3,3,4,4,3,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 9B 
ARDL(3,4,3,1,3,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
InTBR -0.343 0.246 -1.034 0.643 
ERM 0.196*** 0.303 0.034** 0.012 
InLCA 0.716** 0.153 0.453** 0.075 
InFAL -0.036** 0.085 -0.754*** 0.134 
PIN -0.231 *** 0.031 -0.782** 0.175 
0 VE 0.412* 0.114 0.533** 0.143 
Constant 0.644 0.158 0.742 0.454 
DI 2.721 * 0.304 1.643* 0.342 
D2 -3.34* 0.245 -1.652* 0.345 
D3 2.653* 0.742 0.923* 0.132 
D4 -3.772* 0.622 1.352* 0.231 
D5 -2.747* 0.263 
Notes: t ** and *** denote significance at Mo, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Alicrofit 4.0. 
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Table 6.16 Models I OA and I OB Lon2-run Coefficients 
Variable 
Model I OA 
ARDL(3,0,3,0,0,1,0) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model I OB 
ARDL(4,0,3,0,0,2, O) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
InTBR -0.466* 0.108 -0.154* 0.026 
ERM 0.969* 0.123 0.134* 0.037 
InLTA -0.882* 0.124 -0.162* 0.012 
InFAL -0.062*** 0.027 -0.040* * 0.031 
PIN -0.151** 0.031 -0.205* 0.034 
OVE 0.321 * 0.022 0.191** 0.074 
Constant -0.061 0.045 0.257 0.117 
DI -1.932* 0.397 1.569* 0.222 
D2 4.693* 0.562 -2.432* 0.331 
D3 -5.729* 0.841 1.354* 0.274 
D4 2.012* 0.304 
D5 -1.431* 0.232 
Notes: t ** and *** denote significance at lVo, 5? 16, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
Table 6.17 Models 11 A and IIB Lone-run Coefficients 
Model IIA Model IIB 
ARDL(3,0,0,4,0,0,1,1) ARDL(3,1,0,4,0,0,2, I) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
InNIE 0.779** 0.139 1.205* 0.252 
InTBR -0.356** 0.063 -0.942* 0.171 
ERM 0.073*** 0.023 0.093** 0.012 
InLIC 0.937** 0.245 0.913* 0.152 
lnFAL -0.444*** 0.148 _n Olin* A A71 
PIN -0.421 0.031 -0.044** 0.021 
0 VE 0.149** 0.013 0.229* 0.035 
Constant 0.361 0.189 0.187 0.164 
DI -2.054* 0.728 2.130* 0.464 
D2 -3.846* 0.288 -1.305* 0.354 
D3 2.942* 0.541 
D4 3.093* 0.344 
D5 -1.913* 0.452 
Notes: and *** denote significance at lVo, 5? 16, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Alicroflit 4.0. 
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Table 6.18 Models 12A and 12B Long-run Coefficients 
Model 12A Model 12B 
ARDL(3,0,0,4,0,4,1,1) ARDL(4,0,0,3,0,4,1,1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
InNIE 0.207* 0.002 0.652** 0.157 
InTBR -0.467** 0.103 -0.471 0.146 
ERM 0.084*** -0.021 0.547** 0.114 
InFAL -0.267** 0.084 -0.456** 0.129 
InLCA 1.196* 0.241 0.470*** 0.145 
PIN -0.064* 0.021 -0.211 0.031 
0 VE 0.108* 0.034 0.515** 0.107 
Constant 1.778 1.047 0.594 0.189 
DI 2.816* 0.391 1.652* 0.357 
D2 -6.674* 0.869 -2.431 0.635 
'U. 5 -J. U. 942 3.594* 0.689 
D4 2.652* 0.657 
D5 -2.23 1*0.723 
Notes: and *** denote significance at lVo, 5? lo, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
Table 6.19 Models 13A and 13B Long-run Coefficients 
Model 13A Model 13B 
ARDL(3,0,1,4,0,4,4,1) ARDL(3,0,1,3,0,4,3, I) 
Variable Coeff icient Std. Eff. Coeff icient Std. Err. 
InNIE 0.044 0.675 0.082 0.065 
InTBR -0.244 0.192 -0.747 0.016 
ERM 0.226*** 0.001 0.224* 0.012 
InLIC 0.656** 0.048 0.842*** 0.082 
InLCA 1.711 *** 0.104 0.248* 0.004 
PIN -0.506** 0.001 -0.824*** 0.007 
0 VE 0.012 0.014 0.822 0.242 
Constant 1.131 1.003 0.086 0.064 
DI -2.661 0.087 -2.747* 0.016 
D2 -6.597* 0.045 2.224* 0.012 
D3 -2.543* 0.042 
D4 1.324* 0.005 
D5 3.453* 0.042 
D6 -2.445* 0.064 
Notes: t ** and *** denote significance at Mo, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have heen 
carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
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Table 6.20 Models 14A and 14B Lonp--run Coefficients 
Variable 
Model 14A 
ARDL(6,2,1,1,0,4,4, I) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 14B 
ARDL(6,4,1,2,0,1,2, I) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
InNIE 0.845 0.469 0.542 0.225 
InEXR 0.753* 0.108 0.442 0.329 
ERM 0.956* 0.103 0.483* 0.102 
InLlC 0.538* 0.109 0.387* 0.102 
InDCG -0.875 0.435 -0.448 0.221 
PIN -0.706* 0.206 -0.832* 0.106 
0 VE 0.352 0.094 0.249* 0.205 
Constant 0.837 0.335 0.634 0.225 
DI -1.579* 0.207 -2.765* 0.106 
D2 -2.689* 0.803 1.477* 0.205 
D3 -2.659* 
D4 3.569* 
Dý 2.752* 
D6 -2.654* 
Notes: and *** denote significance at IYq, 5Y., and 10% levels, 
carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
Table 6.21 Models 15A and 15B Lone-run Coefficients 
0.047 
0.846 
0.273 
0.321 
respectively. Tests have been 
Model 15A Model 15B 
ARDL(6,6,1,0,1,1,2, I) ARDL(5,6,1,0,2,1,3, I) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
InNIE 0.035 0.105 0.854 0.784 
InEXR 0.527** 0.113 0.918* 0.106 
ERM 0.503* 0.121 0.584** 0.109 
InLCA 0.906* 0.125 0.677*** 0.101 
InDCG -0.402 0.231 -0.847 0.784 
PlN -0.215* 0.042 -0.918* 0.206 
OVE 0.707 0.211 0.588 0.476 
Constant 0.557 0.221 0.776 0.430 
DI -2.765* 0.312 -1.856* 0.308 
D2 -2.984* 0.206 2.335* 0.405 
D3 -2.184* 0.339 
D4 3.373* 0.431 
D5 2.844* 0.284 
D6 -2.518* 0.605 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at Mo, J? lo, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests have been 
carried out using Aficrofit 4.0. 
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6.5.3 Short-run Coefficients of the Estimated Models 
Turning to the short-run coefficients, regardless of whether EMP(E) or EAIP(P) is used 
as the dependent variable, the results are generally consistent with the long-run 
parameters and the signs of the coefficients do not seem to change. The error correction 
term ECTt-1, which measures the speed of adjustment to restore equilibrium in the 
dynamic model, has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level coefficients in all cases. This supports cointegration results obtained by using F- 
statistic that the long-run equilibrium is attainable. The magnitude of the error 
correction term does not vary too much between the different models and generally 
imply a quite high speed of a djustment to equilibrium after a shock. In all models, a 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium level in the current month is corrected by over 
75% in the next month. 
In all models, null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the errors is not rejected as the 
calculated Durbin Watson statistic is higher than the upper critical values at the 1% 
level. On the other hand, the fitness of the selected models are reasonably well based on 
the goodness-of-fit indicator, R2 
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Table 6.22 Models IA and IB Error Correction Representation 
Model IA Model IA 
ARDL(3,1,0,4,4,1,1) ARDL(4,1,0,2,4,0,1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
AEMPt-I 0.216* 0.033 0.146* 0.082 
AEMPt-2 0.294* 0.049 0.190* 0.042 
AEMP t-3 0.512* 0.105 
A InNIE t -0.349 0.612 0.050 0.381 
A InEXR t 0.315 0.235 0.244 0.035 
AERMt -0.027* 0.006 -0.572* 0.103 
AERMt-I 0.036* 0.004 0.43 1 0.005 
AERMt-2 0.054* 0.005 
AERMO -0.023* 0.008 
A1nLICt 0.072 0.706 0.241 0.505 
, JInLICt-j -1.632* 0.237 -0.789* 
0.107 
AInLICt-2 -0.259 0.675 0.711 * 0.128 
A InL1C 0 -2.222* 0.202 -1.385* 0.307 
APINt -0.327* 0.033 1.209* 0.303 
ADEVt 0.574* 0.104 -0.581 0.105 
Constant 0.259 0.209 0.342 0.219 
DI 2.207* 0.205 -1.524* 0.401 
D2 -3.677* 0.307 2.512* 0.226 
D3 -6.464* 0.239 -2.352* 0.202 
D4 3.477* 0.404 1.251 * 0.281 
D5 -2.326* 0.444 -3.152* 0.401 
D6 -3.553* 0.305 
ECTt. j -0.957* 0.021 -0.812* 0.201 
RI 0.797 0.736 
R2 0.756 0.626 
F-statistic 24.525* 22.163* 
DW-statistic 2.052 2.012 
Log-likelihood -161.938 -124.532 
** and denote significance at lVo, 5Yo, and 1 Notes: * 0% levels, respectively. EMP denotes , 
EMP(E) in Model IA andEMP(P) in Model IB. Tests havebeen carriedout usingAficrofit 4.0. 
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Table 6.23 Models 2A and 2B Error Correction Representation 
Variable 
Model 2A 
ARDL(3,0,4,0,4,4, I) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 2B 
ARDL(2,1,4,0,4,2, I) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
AEMPt-I 0.205* 0.087 0.198* 0.054 
AEMP t-2 0.346* 0.075 
A 1nEXR t 0.402 0.361 0.067 0.515 
AERMt -0.401 0.031 0.431 * 0.016 
AERMt-I 0.409* 0.102 0.211 * 0.024 
AERMt-2 0.522* 0.134 -0.341 * 0.011 
AERMt-3 -0.003* 0.001 0.325* 0.032 
A 1nNIE t 0.426* 0.107 -0.432* 0.048 
AInLCA t 0.287 0.743 -1.066 0.772 
AInLCA t-I -2.309* 0.406 0.150* 0.033 
AInLCA t-2 -0.221 0.734 -1.870 0.659 
AInLCA t-3 -3.085* 0.328 1.633* 0.209 
APINt -0.704* 0.201 -0.244* 0.026 
APINt. i -1.832* 0.432 1.813 0.001 
APINt-2 -0.338* 0.022 
APINt-3 -0.304* 0.032 
ADEVt 0.117* 0.024 -0.006 0.004 
Constant 1.093 1.007 -0.002 0.001 
DI 2.701 * 0.197 -2.049* 0.325 
D2 -2.293* 0.290 2.035* 0.226 
D3 -6.117* 0.299 -2.039* 0.253 
D4 1.528* 0.399 2.742* 0.395 
D5 -2.468* 0.277 -3.198* 0.284 
D6 -2.554* 0.143 
ECTw -0.958* 0.021 -0.926* 0.015 
R2 0.812 0.712 
R2 0.767 0.683 
F-statistic 21.407* 17.256* 
DW-statistic 2.242 2.021 
Log-likelihood -156.907 -135.147 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5Yo, and 10% levels, respectively. EMP denotes 
EMP(E) in Model ]A andEMP(P) in Model IB. Tests have been carriedout rising Microfit 4.0. 
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Table 6.24 Models 3A and 3B Error Correction Renresentation 
Variable 
Model 3A 
ARDL(3,0,4,0,4,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 3B 
ARDL(2,0,4,1,3,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
AEMPt-I 0.202* 0.038 0.265** 0.032 
AEMPt-2 0.245* 0.034 
AInFXRt -0.085 0.737 0.090* 0.021 
AERMt -0.322* 0.036 -0.503** 0.107 
AERMt., 0.712* 0.104 0.601** 0.103 
AERMt-2 0.411 * 0.106 0.301 0.033 
AERMt-3 -0.407* 0.011 -0.601 * 0.106 
AInLTA t -0.423 0.298 -0.435* 0.113 
AInLCA t -0.124 0.711 -1.426** 0.332 
AInLCA t-I -2.248* 0.268 0.201 ** 0.103 
A InLCA V2 -0.286 0.672 -2.502*** 0.212 
AInLCA t-3 -2.416* 0.309 
APINt -0.405* 0.103 -0.327* 0.092 
ADEVt 0.153* 0.102 2.426 1.299 
Constant 1.668 1.290 0.464 0.211 
DI 2.241 * . 0.414 -2.001 0.041 
D2 3.492* 0.224 2.001 0.411 
D3 -6.193 0.411 -2.003 0.201 
D4 3.265* 0.412 
D5 2.343* 0.334 
D6 -2.553* 0.308 
ECTt-i -0.875* 0.106 -0.815* 0.212 
w 0.827 0.844 
ýi 2 0.789 0.762 
F-statistic 26.482* 23.153* 
DW-statistic 2.120 2.031 
Log-likelihood -151.378 -135.723 
Notes: t ** and denote significance at IVo, 5? lo, and 10% levels, respectively. EMP denotes 
EMP(E) in Model lA andEMP(P) in Model IB. Tests have been carriedout usingMicrofit 4.0. 
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Table 6.25 Models 4A and 4B Error Correction Representation 
Variable 
Model 4A 
ARDL(3,0,4,3,4,4,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 4A 
ARDL(3,0,4,3,2,2,1 
-, 
I) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
AEMPt-I 0.243* 0.044 0.567* 0.114 
AEMPt-2 0.329* 0.038 0.277* 0.108 
A InNIE t -0.056 0.053 -0.027 0.014 
AERMt -0.602* 0.106 -0.767* 0.124 
AERMt. 1 0.721 0.106 0.753* 0.136 
AERMt-2 0.701 0.123 0.734* 0.107 
AERMW -0.709* 0.125 -0.530* 0.105 
AInDCGt -0.129 0.091 -0.615 0.118 
JInDCGt-l 0.05 1* 0.011 0.514* 0.107 
A InDCG t-2 0.272* 0.035 0.529* 0.105 
AInLICt -0.758 0.691 -0.552 0.457 
AInLICt_j -1.391* 0.391 -0.284* 0.206 
, JInLICt-2 0.534 0.468 
A MLIC W -2.279* 0.403 
,J InFA Lt -1.239 
0.974 -0.383 0.184 
AInFAL t-I -0.285 0.199 -0.174 0.082 
JInFAL t-2 -2.866* 0.132 
A InFAL 0 -1.386 0.994 
APINt -0.406* 0.044 -0.139* 0.027 
ADEVt 0.065* 0.021 0.128* 0.022 
Constant 0.860 0.322 0.017 0.011 
DI 2.401 * 0.301 -2.006* 0.113 
D2 -2.278* 0.222 1.156* 0.033 
D3 -2.204* 0.362 -2.159* 0.122 
D4 -3.287* 0.234 1.002* 0.302 
D5 2.567* 0.324 
D6 -2.473* 0.322 
ECTw -0.95 1 0.124 -0.877* 0.138 
W 0.845 0.834 
R2 0.797 0.725 
F-statistic 21.652* 23.623 
DW-statistic 2.286 2.024 
Log-likelihood -143.655 -132.324 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at Plo, 5yo, and 10% levels, respectively. EAIP denotes 
EMP(E) in Model IA andEMP(P) in Model IB. Tests have been carriedout usingAficrofit 4.0. 
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Table 6.26 Models 5A and 5B Error Correction Remesentation 
Model 5A Model 5A 
ARDL(3,0,4,3,4,3,1,1) ARDL(1,0,4,3,2,3,1,1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
JEMPt., 0.209* 0.032 0.311 0.051 
JEMPt-2 0.292* 0.031 
A InNIE t -0.121 0.082 0.050 0.041 
,J InNIE t. 1 -0.023 0.011 
JERMt -0.431 * 0.103 0.776* 0.104 
AERMt-I -0.541 * 0.101 0.763* 0.106 
AERMt-2 -0.501 * 0.112 0.625* 0.109 
JERMO 
-0.408* 0.102 0.809* 0.201 
, dlnDCGt -0.038 0.014 0.253 0.205 
, dlnDCGt-l -0.165* 0.023 0.748* 0.201 
AInDCGt-2 0.226* 0.031 0.842* 0.196 
JInLCA t -0.885 0.742 0.175 0.142 
JInLCA t-I -2.222* 0.222 0.703* 0.164 
A InLCA t-2 -0.779 0.666 
JInLCA t-3 -2.945* 0.328 
AInFAL t -1.645* 0.271 -0.525 0.245 
XnFAL t-i -0.919 0.823 -0.005 0.004 
J InFAL t-2 -2.130* 0.142 -0.820* 0.078 
APINt -0.005* 0.001 0.711 * 0.109 
, dDEVt 0.065* 0.013 0.830* 0.024 Constant 1.142 0.771 0.150 0.141 
DI 2.453 0.251 1.151* 0.047 
D2 2.452* 0.241 -2.023* 0.302 
D3 -3.155* 0.113 1.05 1* 0.021 
D4 -2.545* 0.231 2.123* 0.220 
D5 -2.654* 0.054 
ECTt-i -0.908* 0.103 -0.912* 0.207 
W 0.842 0.734 
jj 2 0.796 0.673 
F-statistic 23.268* 21.623* 
DW-statistic 2.243 2.061 
Log-likelihood -145.227 -134.623 
Notes: *, ** and denote significance at 1%, 5,16, and 10% levels, respectively. EMP denotes 
EMP(E) in Model IA andEMP(P) in Model IB . Tests have been carriedow usingHicrofit 4.0. 
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Table 6.27 Models 6A and 6B Error Correction Revresentation 
Model 6A Model 6B 
ARDL(3,2,4,4,3,2, I) ARDL(2,2,2,4,3, TI) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
JEMPt-I 0.243*** 0.049 1.446* 0.303 
A EMP t-2 0.306 0.069 
A InNIE t -1.204 1.137 -0.736 0.368 
AlnNIEt-I -1.725 1.118 -1.099 0.054 
AERMt -0.642* 0.103 -0.835* 0.208 
AERMw 0.743* 0.204 1.995* 0.207 
AERMt-2 0.701 * 0.203 
AERMO 0.609** 0.203 
AInLICt 0.191 0.102 0.688 0.344 
AMLICt., -1.603* 0.313 -1.798* 0.309 
AInLICt-2 0.169 0.108 0.666 0.333 
AInLICt-3 -2.817* 0.402 -1.135* 0.202 
AInFAL t -2.281 * 0.305 -0.716* 0.203 
AInFAL t-I -0.245 0.041 -1.368 0.177 
AInFAL t-2 -2.078* 0.223 -0.532* 0.201 
APINt -0.605* 0.004 -1.018* 0.308 
APINt-I 0.421 *** 0.205 0.823* 0.201 
ADEVt 0.271 * 0.042 1.446* 0.303 
Constant 1.464 0.812 0.051 0.021 
DI 2.241 * 0.307 2.736* 0.208 
D2 -2.188* 0.187 -4.099* 0.450 
D3 3.513* 0.258 3.035* 0.218 
D4 -5.548* 0.408 -2.995* 0.317 
D5 2.657* 0.356 
D6 -1.345* 0.254 
ECTt-i -0.953* 0.028 0.976 0.108 
R" 0.826 0.864 
T2 0.779 0.786 
F-statistic 21.915 23.565 
DW-statistic 2.276 2.042 
Log- -151.571 -136.548 
Rclihood 
Notes: *, ** and denote significance at Mo, 5? 16, and 10% levels, respectively. EAIP denotes 
EMP(E) in Model IA and EXIP(P) in Model IB. Tests have been carried out using A ficrofit 4.0. 
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Table 6.28 Models 7A and 7B Error Correction Representation 
Variable 
Model 7A 
ARDL(3,2,4,4,3,4, I) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 7B 
ARDL(2,2,2,4,3,2, I) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
AEMPt-I 0.234* 0.038 0.872* 0.206 
AEMP t-2 0.321 * 0.047 
A InNIE t -1.892 1.109 0.444 0.222 
JlnNIEt-j -1.927* 0.308 1.060* 0.303 
JERMt -0.602* 0.101 0.521 * 0.201 
JERMt-, -0.709* 0.105 1.600* 0.206 
JERMt-2 -0.801 * 0.203 
AERMO 
-0.608* 0.101 
AInLCA t 0.221 0.118 1.414* 0.307 
AInLCA t-I -1.913* 0.304 0.481 * 0.104 
AlnLCA t-2 0.311 0.339 1.402 1.201 
A InLCA 0 -1.429* 0.238 0.414* 0.207 
AlnFAL t -2.101* 0.406 -1.432* 0.206 
AlnFAL t-I -1.325 1.022 -0.222 0.106 
A InFAL t-2 -1.906* 0.303 -1.030* 0.214 
APINt -0.605* 0.101 0.611 * 0.105 
APINt-I 0.606 0.401 1.300 0.844 
APINt-2 -0.705 0.453 
JPINt-3 -0.402 0.401 
ADEVt 0.083 0.023 1.207 0.499 
Constant 1.587 0.920 0.240 0.115 
DI 2.681 * 0.209 -2.222* 0.226 
D2 -2.209* 0.304 1.029* 0.214 
D3 2.814* 0.323 -1.011* 0.435 
D4 -1.544* 0.327 1.271 * 0.404 
D5 -1.275* 0.041 
ECT-i -0.955* 0.205 0.922* 0.206 
R2 0.838 0.753 
ý2 0.791 0.664 
F-statistic 21.659 25.657 
DW-statistic 2.248 2.032 
Log-likelihood -146.437 -124.654 
Notes: t ** and denote significance at lVo, 5Yo, and 10% levels, respectively. EMP denotes 
EMP(E) in Model ]A andEAIP(P) in Model IB. Tests have been carried out using Hicrofit 4.0. 
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Table 6.29 Model 8A and 8B Error Correction Representation 
Model 8A Model 8B 
ARDL(3,1,4,0,1,1,1) ARDL(4,1,3,0,1,2, I) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
JEMPt-I 0.134 0.093 1.235* 0.228 
J EMP t-2 0.571 0.205 0.821* 0.058 
JEMPt-3 0.816* 0.108 
A In TBR t -0.844* 0.203 -1.006* 0.103 
JERMt 0.506* 0.111 0.963* 0.109 
AERMt-I 0.709* 0.203 1.164* 0.107 
, JERMt-2 -0.801 
* 0.204 -0.656* 0.105 
AERMO 0.622* 0.201 
J InLIC t -0.850 0.444 -0.53 1 0.103 
, 41nFAL t -1.787 1.658 -0.689 0.241 
, JPINt -0.805* 
0.201 -1.121* 0.058 
JPINt-i -0.216* 0.008 
JDEVt 0.868** 0.205 0.006 0.003 
Constant 0.429 0.131 0.148 0.079 
DI 2.135* 0.326 1.341 * 0.132 
D2 -3.198* 0.437 -2.232* 0.331 
D3 -1.578* 0.317 2.142* 0.234 
D4 3.645* 0.322 1.341 * 0.113 
D5 -2.644* 0.228 -1.4231ý 0.225 
D6 -2.217* 0.122 
ECTw -0.904* 0.210 -0.904* 0.213 
R2 0.745 0.723 
R2 0.701 0.624 
F-statistic 22.414* 24.453* 
DW-statistic 2.132 2.021 
Log-likelihood -177.623 -163.461 
Notes: *, ** and denote significance at Iyo, 5yo, and 10% levels, respectively. EMP denotes 
EMP(E) in Model ]A andEMP(P) in Model IB. Tests have been carriedout using A ticrofit4.0. 
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Table 6.30 Model 9A and 9B Error Correction Representation 
Variable 
Model 9A 
ARDL(3,3,4,4,3,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model 9B 
ARDL(3,4,3,1,2,1,1) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
AEMPt-I 0.127 0.089 0.872* 0.206 
A EMP t-2 0.229* 0.022 0.722* 0.101 
AEMPO 
AInTBR t -0.727* 0.113 -1.060* 0.230 
AInTBR t-I -0.367 0.252 -0.021 0.011 
A InTBR t_2 -0.286 0.239 -0.604 0.548 
A 1nTBR 0 0.633 0.332 
AERMt -0.43 1 0.102 -1.588* 0.394 
AERMt-i 0.501 0.104 -0.574* 0.107 
AERMt-2 0.701 0.211 -0.414* 0.106 
AERMO -0.806* 0.203 
AInLCA t 0.732 0.636 1.402 0.201 
AInLCA t-I -2.605* 0.174 
AInLCA t-2 -0.039 0.023 
AInLCA W -3.326* 0.436 
AInFAL t -1.966* 0.368 -0.902* 0.201 
AInFAL t-I -0.616** 0.211 -1.444 0.222 
A 1nFAL t-2 -2.607* 0.525 
APINt -0.601 * 0.204 -0.021 0.011 
ADEVt 0.385* 0.053 0.604* 0.103 
Constant 1.423 0.921 0.588 0.394 
DI 2.349* 0.305 -1.531* 0.032 
D2 -1.324* 0.402 2.432* 0.114 
D3 2.553* 0.524 -1.734* 0.414 
D4 -3.116* 0.225 1.434* 0.001 
D5 1.23 1* 0.141 
ECTw -0.864* 0.201 -0.892* 0.242 
R2 0.821 0.811 
R2 0.776 0.751 
F-statistic 23.533* 20.123* 
DW-statistic 2.106 2.031 
Log-likelihood -153.723 -124.323 
Notes: t ** and *** denote significance at 1%. 5Yo, and 10% levels, respectively. EAfP denotes 
EMP(E) in Model ]A andEMP(P) in Model IB. Tests have been carriedout usingAficrofit 4.0. 
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Table 6.31 Model I OA and I OB Error Correction Representation 
Variable 
Model IOA 
ARDL(3,0,3,0,0,1,0) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
Model IOB 
ARDL(4,0,3,0,0,2, O) 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
JEMP w 0.209* 0.042 0.519* 0.109 
AEMP t-2 0.185* 0.055 0.800* 0.205 
A EMP t-3 1.129 1.064 
AInTBR t -0.409* 0.105 0.152* 0.026 
AERMt -0.602* 0.104 0.054* 0.017 
JERMt-I 0.901 * 0.106 0.527* 0.023 
JERMt-2 0.701 * 0.211 1.497* 0.309 
AInLTA t -0.774* 0.297 -0.462* 0.101 
AInFAL t -0.654 0.376 -1.055 0.528 
J PIN t -0.904* 0.201 0.824* 0.212 
JPINt-I 1.023* 0.211 
JDEVt -0.718* 0.111 0.053 0.026 
Constant 0.043 0.028 0.099 0.059 
DI -1.696* 0.348 1.342* 0.303 
D2 2.121 * 0.246 -1.434* 0.121 
D3 -2.032* 0.125 2.432* 0.301 
D4 1.342* 0.223 
D5 -2.432* 0.202 
ECTt_j -0.872* 0.208 -0.921 0.052 
0.779 0.765 
R2 0.747 0.732 
F-statistic 27.814* 23.314* 
DW-statistic 2.082 2.153 
Log-likelihood -167.762 -157.532 
Notes: t ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5Yo, and 10% levels, respectively. EMP denotes 
EMP(E) in Model ]A and EMP(P) in Model IB. Tests have been carried out using Microfit 4.0. 
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Table 6.32 Model IIA and IIB Effor Coffection ReDresentation 
Model IIA Model IIB 
ARDL(3,0,0,4,0,0,1,1) ARDL (3,1,0,4,0,0,2,1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coeff icient Std. Err. 
J EMP t- 1 0.710* 0.005 0.705* 0.003 
A EMP t-2 0.572* 0.009 0.479* 0.003 
A InNIE t -0.750 0.602 -0.028 0.012 
J 1n TBR t -0.343* 0.007 -0.791 * 0.005 
AERMt -0.401 * 0.004 -0.776* 0.008 
AERMt-i 0.307* 0.011 0.757* 0.004 
JERMt-2 0.106* 0.006 0.546* 0.007 
JERMt-3 -0.897* 0.007 -0.634* 0.002 
J InLIC t -0.902* 0.002 -0.529* 0.006 
, dInFAL t -0.427 0.340 -0.545 0.443 
APINt -0.505* 0.001 -0.801 * 0.004 
APINt-i -0.902* 0.001 
JDEVt 0.158* 0.003 0.717* 0.015 
Constant 0.273 0.141 0.689 0.558 
DI -1.977* 0.009 2.034* 0.001 
D2 -3.703 0.091 -1.454* 0.004 
D3 2.049* 0.036 
D4 1.053* 0.065 
D5 -2.752* 0.045 
ECTt-i -0.962* 0.001 -0.946* 0.042 
w 0.776 0.754 
R2 0.739 0.634 
F-statistic 25.165* 23.654* 
DW-statistic 2.115 2.023 
Log-likelihood -168.739 -143.763 
Notes: t ** and denote significance at Ma, 5? 1q, and 10% levels, respectively. EA! P denotes 
EMP(E) inModel IA andEAIP(P) inAfodellll. Tests have been carried out using A ficrofil 4.0. 
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Table 6.33 Model 12A and 12B Error Correction Representation 
Model 12A Model 12B 
ARDL(3,0,0,4,0,4,1,1) ARDL(4,0,0,3,0,4,1,1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coeff icient Std. Err. 
AEMP t-I 0.568* 0.104 0.634* 0.108 
AEMPt-2 0.269* 0.059 0.694* 0.106 
AEMP t-3 0.094 0.076 
A InNIE t -0.187 0.175 0.157 0.127 
, dInTBR t -0.420 0.164 0.569 0.461 
AERMt -0.702* 0.106 0.502* 0.101 
AERMt-I 0.609* 0.104 0.605* 0.104 
AERMt-2 0.70 1* 0.121 0.479* 0.104 
AERMt-3 -0.409* 0.105 
AInFAL t -0.241 0.227 -0.791 0.640 
AMLCAt 0.057 0.055 0.776 0.628 
AInLCAt-i -2.281 * 0.506 0.757* 0.203 
AInLCA t-2 0.125 0.093 0.546 0.443 
A 1nLCA t-3 -2.63 1* 0.343 0.634* 0.104 
APINt -0.605* 0.201 0.529* 0.109 
ADEVt -0.792* 0.224 0.545* 0.101 
Constant 1.601 0.051 0.021 0.012 
DI 2.534* 0.329 2.017* 0.304 
D2 -3.006* 0.102 -1.689* 0.008 
D3 -5.255* 0.035 3.123* 0.112 
D4 2.023* 0.001 
D5 -2.23 1* 0.104 
ECTt-i -0.903* 0.056 0.852* 0.101 
R2 0.795 0.821 
R2 0.755 0.782 
F-statistic 24.356* 25.352* 
DW-statistic 2.066 2.021 
Log-likelihood -162.792 -141.512 
Notes: *, ** and denote significance at 1116,5yo, and 10% levels, respectively. EMP denotes 
EMP(E) inAlodel ]A andEMP(P) in Model IB. Testshavebeen carriedout usingMicrq/7114.0. 
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Table 6.34 Model 13A and 13B Error Correction Representation 
Model 13A Model 13B 
ARDL(3,0,1,4,0,4,4, I) ARDL(3,0,1,3,0,4,3, I) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
AEMP t-I 0.175* 0.028 0.254* 0.051 
AEMP t-2 0.317* 0.054 0.455* ,* 
0.101 
A InNIE t 0.639 0.598 1.104 0.601 
A In TBR t -0.593* 0.104 -1.413* 0.251 
AERMt -0.801* 0.107 -0.554* 0.124 
AERMw 0.809*** 0.378 1.023 0.594 
AERMt-2 -0.877* 0.106 -0.621 0.105 
AERMO -0.701 ** 0.027 
AInLICt 0.581 0.457 -1.234*** 0.194 
AInLCA t -1.788 1.047 -0.055 0.011 
AInLCA w -2.358** 0.006 1.016** 0.109 
AInLCA t-2 0.087 0.046 -1.044* 0.104 
AInLCA t-3 -2.882* 0.004 0.654* 0.102 
APINt -0.605* 0.011 0.755* 0.011 
APINw -0.608 0.201 -1.104 0.602 
A PIN t-2 -0.704 0.004 -1.413*** 0.204 
APINO -0.602** 0.117 
ADEVt 0.507* 0.005 1.023 0.094 
Constant 1,301 1.293 0.021 0.004 
D1 -2.356** 0.303 -3.054* 0.154 
D2 -3.839* 0.505 2.054* 0.004 
D3 -2.055* 0.005 
D4 1.016* 0.024 
D5 3.054* 0.094 
D6 -3.536* 0.179 
ECTt-i -0.885* 0.101 0.754* 0.102 
R2 0.809 0.821 
R2 0.765 0.702 
F-statistic 21.991 23.54* 
DW-statistic 2.108 2.241 
Log-likelihood -157.98 -163.65 
** and denote significance at 1%, 5Yo, and 10% levels, respectively. EMP denotes Notes: * , EjVfP(E) in Model IA andEMP(P) in Model IB. Tests have been carriedout using Microfit 4.0. 
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Table 6.35 Model 14A and 14B Error Correction Representation 
Model 14A Model 14B 
ARDL(6,2,1,1,0,4,4, I) ARDL(6,4,1,2,0,1,2, I) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
JEMPt-I 0.856 0.363 1.113 0.472 
JEMPt-2 0.709 0.303 1.442** 0.404 
JEMP t-3 0.292** 0.108 0.677*** 0.207 
JEMP V4 0.511 0.103 0.513* 0.101 
AEMP t-5 0.443 * 0.013 0.734 0.414 
AInEXR t 0.603* 0.103 0.704** 0.003 
J InEXR 0.902* 0.114 0.241 0.144 
A InEXR t-2 0.453* 0.104 
AInEXR t-3 0.143 * 0.002 
A InNIE t 1.405*** 0.508 1.827* 0.036 
AERMt 0.609* 0.107 0.993** 0.339 
AERMt. i 1.518* 0.006 
AInDCG t 0.649* 0.106 0.844* 0.084 
AInLICt 1.089** 0.009 1.518** 0.506 
AML]Ct-i 1.063* 0.011 
AInLICt-2 1.056** 0.006 
AMLICO 0.842 0.599 
APINt -0.613* 0.002 0.517* 0.102 
APINt-I -0.703 ** 0.013 0.704* 0.104 
APINt-2 -0.833* 0.023 
APINO -0.311*** 0.002 
ADEVt 0.210* 0.004 0.273* 0.043 
Constant 0.150 0.113 0.195 0.047 
DI -2.492* 0.009 -2.841 0.098 
D2 -2.2 10* 0.012 2.174* 0.033 
D3 -1.113* 0.072 
D4 1.442* 0.024 
D5 2.377* 0.097 
D6 -3.432* 0.064 
ECTt-i -0.876* 0.103 -0.913* 0.104 
R2 0.822 0.837 
R2 0.756 0.783 
F-statistic 21.252* 26.011 
DW-statistic 2.022 2.012 
Log-likelihood -134.623 -155.822 
Notes: t ** and denote significance at lVo, 5010, and 10% levels, respectively. EAIP denotes 
EA/P(E) in Model ]A andEMP(P) in Model IB. Tests have been carried out using Alicrofit 4.0. 
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Table 6.36 Model 15A and 15B Error Correction Representation 
Model 15A Model 15B 
ARDL(6,6,1,0,1,1,2, I) ARDL(5,6,1,0,2,1,3, I) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
AEMPt-I 0.884** 0.009 1.141 * 0.108 
JEMP t-2 0.841*** 0.007 0.774** 0.018 
JEMPt-3 0.938 0.904 0.725* 0.103 
AEMP t_4 0.822** 0.014 0.525*** 0.257 
JEMP t_5 0.867*** 0.107 
J 1nEXR t 0.647* 0.208 0.678*** 0.217 
A InF_XR t-I 0.767* 0.108 0.578** 0.219 
AInEXR t_2 0.693* 0.104 0.515* 0.113 
JInEXR t_3 0.745* 0.205 0.529** 0.147 
AInF. XR t_4 0.429** 0.106 0.624* 0.082 
A InF_XR t_5 0.805* 0.004 0.234** 0.031 
A 1nNIE t 0.547 0.238 0.668 0.371 
JERMt 0.324* 0.102 0.641 ** 0.126 
JInDCGt -0.029 0.021 0.433 0.278 
AInDCG t-I 0.654 0.348 
AInLICt 0.537*** 0.303 0.878 0.548 
APINt -0.330 0.249 0.375* 0.003 
,J PIN t. 1 -0.888 0.122 0.237** 0.104 
APINt-2 0.467* 0.105 
ADEVt 0.133 0.054 0.774 0.738 
Constant 0.441 0.267 0.725 0.573 
D1 -2.638* 0.504 -1.025* 0.007 
D2 -1.022* 0.206 2.008* 0.022 
D3 -1.548* 0.024 
D4 2.434* 0,066 
D5 3.515* 0.080 
D6 -2.647* 0.034 
ECTw -0.913* 0.014 -0.829* 0.107 
RI 0.865 0.877 
T2 0.753 0.796 
F-statistic 22.557* 23.767* 
DW-statistic 2.024 2.011 
Log-likelihood -156.654 -187.755 
Notes: t ** and *** denote significance at M, 5Yo. and 10% levels, respectively. EAIP denotes 
EMP(E) in Model IA andEMP(P) in Alodel IB. Tests have been carriedout using Alicrofit 4.0. 
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6.6 Parameter Stability Tests 
The existence of cointegration does not necessary imply that the estimated coefficients 
are stable. If the coefficients are unstable the results will be unreliable. In order to test 
for long-run parameter stability,. Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) suggest applying the 
cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of recursive 
residuals of square (CUSUMSQ) tests proposed by Brown et al (1975) to the residuals 
of the estimated ECMs to test for parameter constancy. The advantage of these tests is 
that, unlike the alternative Chow test that requires break point(s) to be specified, they 
can be used without the requirement of a priori knowledge of the exact date of the 
structural break(S)217. In both CUSUM and CUSUMSQ, the related null hypothesis is 
that all coefficients are stable. 
The CUSUM test uses the cumulative sum of recursive residuals based on the first 
observations and is updated recursively and plotted against break point. The test is more 
suitable for detecting systematic changes in the regression coeflicients. The CUSUMSQ 
makes use of the squared recursive residuals and follows the same procedure. However, it is 
more useful in situations where the departure from the constancy of the regression 
coefficients is haphazard and sudden 218 . If the plot of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stays 
within the 5 percent critical bounds the null hypothesis that all coefficients are stable cannot 
be rejected. If however, either of the parallel lines are crossed then the null hypothesis of 
parameter stability is rejected at the 5 percent significance level. 
Figure 6.2 plots the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests. The plots of the CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ statistics are generally confined within the 5 percent critical value bounds, 
indicating the absence of any instability of the coefficients, thus providing evidence that 
the parameters of the model do not suffer from any structural instability over the period 
of the study. 
217 Choosing the dates exogenously introduces arbitrariness in the analysis. Even if sudden changes were 
observed in the data, the exact breakpoint affecting the parameters of the model may not obvious. I lansen 0 
and Johansen (1992) also suggest a parameter constancy test but they require the variables to be I(l). 
Also, they do not incorporate the short-run dynamics of a model into testing unlike CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ tests. 
219 See Pesaran and Pesaran ( 1997: p. 117). 
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Figure 6.2 Plots of the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) Tests 
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Figure 6.3 Plots of the Cumulative Sum of the Squares (CUSUMSQ) Tests 
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6.7 Interpretation of the Empirical Results 
The findings obtained in this chapter suggest that budget expenditures to budget 
revenues ratio (EXR) is significant with a positive sign in all models. Also, non-interest 
budget expenditures to budget revenues ratio (NIE) is significant in most models with a 
positive sign. Hence, it can be inferred that exchange market pressure in Turkey 
depends on the ability of the authorities to maintain fiscal balance. On the other hand, 
another fiscal balance variable, total borrowing to budget revenues ratio (TBR), is 
significant in some models but is negative. This is a finding that seems to contradict 
with the first-generation models of speculative attacks. It is possible to explain this by 
the fact that domestic borrowing in Turkey is done through issuing government debt 
instruments such as T-bills and governments bonds usually with very high interest 
rates 2 19. As a result, these high interest rates attract not only domestic investors but also 
the foreign investors. As high interest rates of government debt instruments attract 
foreign capital, it leads to an increased demand for Turkish lira and leads to an 
appreciation of the Turkish lira. Therefore, the potentially negative effects of 
government borrowing on the fiscal balance, which is expected to lead to an increase in 
exchange market pressure, are offset by the inflow of capitals. Hence, government 
borrowing does not drive speculative pressure in the case of Turkey. 
The significance of fiscal variables is not surprising. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the 
case of Turkey, political instability resulted in fiscal instability and the successive 
governments pursued fiscally damaging populist economic policies in the post- 
liberalization period. As the first-generation models of speculative attacks suggest, the 
risks associated with the fiscal imbalances in the presence of political uncertainties 
seem to have had an impact on the expectations of the international investors. Results 
suggest that, realizing that fiscal imbalances in the presence of weak governments and 
the lack of political consensus among the partners of the coalition would render the 
economy defenseless against the speculative attacks, international speculators increased 
their pressure on the exchange rate in hopes of profiting from an impending 
depreciation. 
2 19 As OzIale and Yeldan (2004) explain, government debt instruments were used to finance public sector 
borrowing requirements. Cý 
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This finding provides empirical evidence to support the analysis of the 1994 crisis by 
Celasun (1998), who argues "while the importance offundamental deterioration of 
fiscal balances in preparing groundfor the crisis is clear, it is impossible to rule out the 
role ofpolicy errors in explaining the timing and extent ofthe turbuience"220 . 
Indeed, the related literature points out that the successive governments did not manage 
to meet certain monetary and fiscal targets consistent with the capital account 
liberalization of August 198922 1. As Alesina and Tabellini (1990) suggest the alternating 
governments, disagreeing over the composition of public spending, have given rise to 
budget deficits. In addition, because of fragmented political system and the weak 
coalition govenu-nents, successive Turkish governments failed to initiate the much 
needed fiscal discipline during this period 222 . This was closely observed 
by the 
international speculators as the results of the present analysis suggests. 
Bildirici and Cosar (2005) explain that political polarization and coalition governments 
in Turkey caused lags in fiscal reforms. 223 Especially after the 1991 elections, various 
coalition governments ruled the country until November 2002. Especially, as a result of 
populist policies enacted by the successive governments, agricultural subsidies via 
state-owned banks and transfers to social security institutions were provided to broaden 
electoral support 224 . Also, due to the significant size of the unregistered economy and 
the inefficiency of the tax system, public sector deficits expanded during the sample 
period. As the findings of the present analysis have shown, these have paved the way to 
the first-generation type speculative attacks in the exchange market. 
As Celasun (1998) and Ekinci (2000) argue, the underlying reason behind the fiscal 
instability in the sample period was the surge in public expenditures stemming from the 
wage bill of the government, generous agricultural support policies, worsening 
performance of the state owned economic enterprises, the increased cost of military 
operations in the south-eastern region of the country, persistent problems in the taxation 
220 See Celasun (1998: p. 22). 
221 See, for instance, Onis (2000) and Bildirici and Cosar (2005). 
222 See, for instance, Onis (2000) and Ozkan (2005). 
223 The authors argue that the number of the political parties that joined the elections was the important 
indicator of the political instability in Turkey after 1980. They report that while the number of parties was 
three in 1983, it was 21 in 1999 elections. 
224 See Ozkan (2005). 
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system and increased interest payments on existing debt especially after 1992 225 . In the 
presence of such fiscal imbalances, international investors who had rational 
expectations, anticipated that a crisis might be imminent and they shifted their wealth 
out of domestic currency and into foreign currency thus putting pressure on the 
exchange market. 
On the other hand, realizing that the Turkish government would be too weak to defend 
the Turkish lira, forward-looking speculators attacked the Turkish lira, buying the 
Central Bank's stock of foreign-exchange reserves in order to profit from the 
depreciation. In this respect, the sample period seems to carry the elements of the first 
generation models of speculative attacks which highlight the role of structural fiscal 
imbalances in generating a rational speculative attack on a country's official foreign 
reserves. 
Similarly, the results suggest that an increase in monetary expansion in excess of 
demand for money (ERA4) also results in increased EMP. This lends support to 
Cukierman et al (1992) who argue that, due to the shift of governments, coalitions, and 
political instability, monetary authorities tend to rely more on seigniorage. This is because, 
due to populist policies, governments prefer seigniorage as an alternative to taxation as a 
means of financing budget deficits 226 . The fact that excessive monetary growth was 
in a 
relationship'between EMP can be explained through the first generation models which 
emphasize the role of monetary policies. Conceptually, in the presence of fiscal deficits, 
the Turkish government had three options to finance the deficits: (1) it could use its 
foreign exchange reserves, (2) it could borrow (either from the IMF or by issuing 
government debt instruments, or (3) it could print money to raise seigniorage revenue. 
Since the reserves were needed to defend the currency in the case of a speculative 
attack, the government was reluctant to use the first option. On the other hand, since the 
government was already indebted to the IMF and was already engaging in ponzi 
financing, the second option was also not practical. Hence, the government chose the 
third option, seigniorage. However, since printing money is inconsistent with keeping 
the exchange rate stable as the first-generation models suggest, the speculators believed 
225 See Celasun (1998). 
226 Similarly, Chowdhury (1999), argue that populist economic policies end up with large government 
budget deficits. 
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that the regime would eventually collapse. Hence, they exerted selling pressure on the 
exchange rate in order to buy the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank at the 
prevailing low value of the exchange rate and to sell them at a higher rate after a 
devaluation. Therefore, the finding that the monetary expansion had a positive effect on 
the EMP is in line with the postulates of the first-generation models of speculative 
attacks. 
However, another monetary expansion variable, domestic credit to GDP ratio (DCG) is 
not significan t and appear with a negative sign in some models. This can be explained 
through the fact that domestic credit was extended in Turkey primarily through cash 
advances from the Treasury until the end of 1994, hence DCG may not accurately 
capture the impact of domestic credit expansion. Also, as explained in Chapter 4, 
domestic credit was minimized due to policy changes in the monetary policy in the 
aftermath of the currency crisis of 1994. 
Results also suggest that a reversal in capital inflows (PIN) leads to an increase in 
exchange market pressure as the sudden stop theory of Calvo (1998) suggests. It can be 
argued that a major consequence of the integration of the Turkish economy into the 
global financial system through financial liberalization has been the exposure of the 
economy to speculative short term capital movements. The negative relationship 
between EMP and capital inflows can be explained through the fact that the reversal of 
capital flows means that investors sell Turkish assets, which puts a selling pressure on 
the Turkish lira. This results in an increase in the exchange market pressure 227 . 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the spikes on the graphs of speculative pressure coincide 
with the global liquidity problems such as the Gulf war of 1991 and the Russian debt 
crisis of 1998. Hence, it is intuitional that EMP was in a negative relationship with 
portfolio investments. The suggests that a slowdown in capital inflows and the 
output/credit collapse associated with this were mitigated by the Turkish Central Bank 
through exhausting international reserves or increasing the interest rates. As the sudden 
stop theory suggests, reserve-loss policies of the Turkish Central Bank while fighting 
speculative pressure, might have induced a further flight from domestic assets. This is 
227 This lends support to Balkan and Yeldan (1998) and Yenturk (1999) who argue that Turkish financial 
system is under a severe pressure of the international speculators. 
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because, as soon as the investors perceive the trouble, they lower their demand for 
assets denominated in Turkish liras and resort to investing in other countries. The rush 
out of the Turkish lira denominated assets, in return, exacerbate the fall in capital 
inflows and lead to further pressure in the exchange market. 
These results are not surprising as a large percentage of the capitalization of the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange (ISE) is owned by foreign investors, who can withdraw their funds any 
time. Just as a surge in capital inflows causes an overvaluation of the domestic currency 
and a subsequent fall in the exchange market pressure, capital outflows result in a 
depreciation of the domestic currency as investors sell assets denominated in domestic 
currenCY228. 
Indeed, as the findings suggest, capital outflows put a further pressure on the exchange 
market. This suggests that speculative pressures also largely reflect changes in 
expectations. A fall of the investors' confidence in the ability of the central bank to 
maintain the exchange rate any longer either due to political instability or fiscal 
imbalances, prompts the investors to liquidate their claims and convert the sums into 
foreign currency. This causes a selling pressure in the exchange market as the central 
bank may attempt to fight these trends by raising interest rates and/or selling reserves. 
In fact, if this becomes apparent to the public, there will be a further loss of confidence, 
and the pressure may increase. 
Given the relationship between capital outflows and the exchange market pressure, it is 
worthwhile to ask what kinds of policies might make emerging markets less vulnerable 
to sudden stops in capital flows. The policy implication that emerges from this chapter 
is quite straightforward: Practitioners and policy makers should closely monitor the 
capital movements for any sign of reversals, whereas governments should not rely on 
hot money in their long-term plans, particularly for financing deficits as any 
unanticipated reversal in capital flows would cause an increase in the exchange market 
pressure, the excess of which would result in a currency crisis. The results also lend 
228 This is consistent with the results of several earlier studies on the causes of currency crises in Turkey 
by Akyuz and Boratav (2003), Boratav and Yeldan (2002), Kibritcioglu et al (1998), Gazioglu (2003), 
Ekinci and Erturk (2004) and Ghoshal (2006), Onis and Aysan (2000), Cizrc-Sakallio-lu and Yeldan 0 (2000), Boratav et al (1996), and Ekinci (2002), who suggested that capital movements contributed to 0 
rising external and domestic instability in Turkey in 1990s, among other factors, led to the currency crises 
in 1994 and 2000-2001. 
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support to the views of Caprio and Summers (1993) and Stiglitz (1994), who argue that 
some degree of regulation is preferable to premature liberalization in developing 
countries. In this respect, capital controls might be imposed to limit capital flow 
fluctuations and achieve economic stability. For instance, capital controls may be used 
to discourage capital outflows in the event of a crisis as Malaysia did in September 1998. 
The devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997 had sparked significant capital outflows 
from Southeast Asia. In response, Malaysia imposed capital controls in September 1998. 
In February 1999, a system of taxes on outflows replaced the prohibition on repatriation 
of capital. This policy reaction succeeded in discouraging short-term capital flows while 
permitting longer-term transactions 229 . Another example is Chile where capital controls 
have been successful in changing the maturity profile of capital inflows and, therefore, 
reducing the potential risk of capital reversals (Barro, 1998). 
Likewise, controls can be designed to lower capital inflows, as Chile did for most of the 
1990s by taxing foreign capital inflows, with short-term flows being taxed much more 
heavily than long-term flows 230. This way, governments can limit volatile capital that 
may leave on short notice. In addition, especially in times of economic turbulence, 
capital controls may be of some use in buying time to recover. 
The results of this chapter also suggest that the overvaluation of the Turkish lira (OVE) 
was in a long-run relationship with EMp231. It is possible to explain this in light of the 
second-generation models of speculative attacks which emphasize the role of multiple 
policy objectives of the government. As Stein and Streb (1999) and van der Ploeg 
(1989) argue, the operations to correct the exchange rate misalignments are usually 
delayed before elections due to the significant political costs that an incumbent might 
have to incur by using this policy tool, especially before elections. This fits tile case of 
Turkey as there were parliamentary elections in 1991,1995 and 1999. 
The overvaluation of the Turkish lira leads to a loss in competitiveness where imports 
increase and exports decrease. Hence, overvaluation prompts tile investors that a 
correction of the exchange rate, i. e. a devaluation, is imminent. Particularly in the 
229 See Blustein (1998). 
230 See Neely (1999). 
231 indeed this finding is in line with Atasoy and Saxena (2006) who provide empirical evidence that the 
Turkish Lira was overvalued before the 1994 and 2000-2001 crises in Turkey. 
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presence of fiscal imbalances, speculators expect this to result in a full-blown financial 
crisis. As soon as the Central Bank is perceived to be too weak to defend the Turkish 
lira, speculators raise their demand for foreign currencies selling Turkish lira to buy 
foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank in order to profit from the situation. This 
led to a further pressure on the exchange market. In order to fight the speculative 
232 pressure, the Central Bank is forced to increase the interest rate 
Overall, based on the findings of this chapter it can be argued'that, excessive monetary 
expansion coupled with fiscal imbalances in presence of political instability leads to 
capital outflows as the international investors expect an imminent correction due to the 
overvaluation of the Turkish lira. This results in an increase in speculative pressure as 
speculators pushes to benefit from a devaluation that they deem is imminent. The 
findings also suggest that, while speculative attacks are usually sudden in nature, they 
are a product of rational speculation with perfect foresight as the forward-looking 
investors were aware of the fiscal imbalances and the weaknesses in the banking sector. 
This constituted an incentive to form a rational speculative attack due the potential gains 
from a devaluation. 
Turning to the significance of the banking sector variables, foreign assets to foreign 
liabilities ratio (FAL) is significant and it appears with a negative sign as expected. This 
suggests that as the amount of foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities decrease, the 
speculative pressure on the exchange rate intensifies. This suggests that the 
predominance of foreign currency liabilities in the banks' balance sheets in Turkey 
induces a selling pressure in the exchange market. This lends support to the third- 
generation models of currency crises. Namely, currency mismatches that deteriorate the 
positions of the banks, lead to a self-fulfilling selling pressure in the exchange market. 
Findings also suggest that liability dollarization in Turkey plays a central role in causing 
the fear of floating phenomenon put forward by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), where the 
central bank is reluctant to allow for large nominal exchange rate fluctuation due to 
presence of liability dollarization in the banking sector. Because of this, the Turkish 
Central Bank either increases the interest rates or expends international reserves through 
232 This finding is supportive of the analysis of the Turkish monetary policy by Balkan and Yeldan (2002) M. 
who explain that the opening up of the Turkish economy to the speculative foreign transactions, the 
central bank is bound to a passive role and the domestic economy is trapped into the vicious cycle of high 
real interest rates and an overvalued Turkish lira. 
205 
open market operations, which is captured by the exchange market pressure index 
consisting of the changes in interest rates, international reserves and exchange rate 233 . 
Liabilities to capital equity ratio (LIC) and loans to capital equity ratio (LCA) are 
significant in all models with a positive sign as expected. Also, liquid assets to total 
assets ratio (LTA) is significant with a negative sign as expected. These results further 
suggest that an increase in banking sector weaknesses is associated with the speculative 
pressure in the exchange market. Hence, there is evidence of a long-run relationship 
with exchange market pressure and the banking sector indicators, which suggest that 
third-generation models are also relevant in explaining speculative pressure in the case 
of Turkey. 
The results shed light on the impact of the aggregate currency mismatches in banks' 
balance sheets on the exchange market pressure. Results suggest that banking sector 
balance sheet information is useful in identifying and correcting weaknesses before they 
contribute to speculative attacks. Consequently, three policy implications concerning 
the banking sector are worth emphasizing. First, the regulators should actively promote 
balance sheet protection and impose tighter credit limits on foreign currency- 
denominated loans to limit exposures stemming from currency mismatches. Second, the 
regulators should limit the implicit promise of government bail-outs of losses stemming 
from currency mismatches to discouraging heavy recourse to foreign currency- 
denominated loans. Third, the central bank should regularly monitor currency 
mismatches to take informed decisions on time. 
233 The results also lend some support to the existing empirical studies such as Alesina and Wagner 0 (2004), Ganapolsky (2003), Hausman el al (2001) and Honig (2005), who report empirical evidence that 
foreign currency-denominated liabilities contribute to the fear of floating in emerging market economics. 
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6.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the long-run relationship between exchange market 
pressure and a number of variables proxying fiscal imbalances, monetary expansion, 
banking sector weaknesses, currency overvaluation and capital inflows. Fifteen 
alternative models have been used to test the robustness of results to the choice of 
explanatory variAles. Also, in order to test the sensitivity of the results to the different 
exchange market pressure indices, two alternative EMP indices have been used. 
Furthermore, the existence of the cointegrating relationships in the estimated ARDL 
models are confirmed with the trace and maximal eigenvalue tests within the Johansen 
cointegration framework. 
Results suggest that fiscal balance variables such as the budget expenditures to budget 
revenues ratio and non-interest budget expenditures to budget revenues ratio is 
significant in most models with the expected signs. Similarly, the results suggest that an 
increase in monetary expansion in excess of demand for money also results in increased 
EMP. Results also suggest that a reversal in capital inflows, leads to an increase in 
exchange market pressure as the sudden stop theory of Calvo (1998) suggests. The 
findings further suggest that the overvaluation of the Turkish lira was in a long-run 
relationship with EMP. Regarding the banking sector variables, foreign assets to foreign 
liabilities ratio, liabilities to capital equity ratio and loans to capital equity ratio and 
liquid assets to total assets ratio are significant with the expected signs. 
In light of these findings, it can be concluded that excessive monetary expansion and 
currency overvaluation coupled with fiscal imbalances, banking sector weaknesses and 
capital outflows lead to an increase in speculative pressure as speculators pushes to 
benefit from a devaluation that they deem is imminent. 
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CHAPTER 7 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENCY CRISES IN TURKEY 
7.1 Introduction 
Although Chapter 6 has shed some light on the causes of the speculative pressure in the 
foreign exchange market Turkey, the results are not entirely sufficient to infer 
conclusions about the causes of currency crises. This is because, as discussed earlier, 
not all episodes of speculative pressure result in a currency crisis. Hence, conceptually, 
the determinants of currency crises may differ from those of exchange market pressure. 
In this respect, currency crises warrant a separate empirical analysis. Based on this 
consideration, the present chapter aims at investigating the determinants of currency 
crises in Turkey from 1989: 09 to 2001: 04. 
As explained earlier, in most cases, a speculative attack is fended off by the Central 
Bank and no abrupt devaluation of the currency is observed. In this case, the excess 
pressure in the foreign exchange market is manifested through two non-mutually 
exclusive channels, namely, through exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves of the 
central bank or a sudden increase in interest rates. Therefore, even if a speculative attack 
is fended off successfully by the Central Bank, such exchange rate defences may still 
incur severe costs for the agents in the exchange market, disrupt economic activity, or 
result in the collapse of a government's entire macroeconomic strategy. For this reason, 
the existing literature defines a currency crisis as an occasion of extreme speculative 
pressure in the foreign exchange market, which is not necessarily followed by an abrupt 
devaluation of the exchange rate. In the case of Turkey, depletion of foreign exchange 
reserves or increases in the short-term interest rates provide information not given 
explicitly by the exchange rate particularly in the central bank's costly efforts to defend 
the Turkish Lira many times in the sample period. Another advantage of this crisis 
definition is that it captures attacks on not only fixed exchange rate regimes, but also on 
any other regimes 234 . This feature makes the index applicable in the case of the Turkish 
234 See Anastasatos and Davidson (2006). 
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economy, where fixed, crawling and managed-floating exchange rates were used during 
the period under investigation. 
Therefore, the present chapter uses only the episodes of extreme speculative pressure as 
the dependent variable, rather than a continuous exchange market pressure index, and 
investigates the possible causes of currency crises in Turkey. The present analysis is 
based on two approaches. In the first approach, binomial logit models are used, where 
the dependent variable takes the value of I if a currency crisis takes place, and 0 if 
otherwise. In the second approach, the failure of the binary crisis index in distinguishing 
between crises of small magnitude and larger magnitude is taken as the point of 
departure and a categorical crisis index is introduced. This index treats each episode in 
accordance with its magnitude and is used in ordered logit models to provide a more 
accurate analysis of the dynamics underlying the currency crises. 
7.2 Methodology 
Since the purpose of the present chapter is to analyse the determinants of currency 
crises in Turkey, the dependent variable in the estimated models is a binary variable that 
classifies the observations as the crisis months and the tranquil periods. Although this 
classification seems to be a straightforward task, in practice, it is complicated due to the 
fact that the empirical analysis necessitates the use of an operational definition to 
identify the episodes of currency crises. Therefore, the first step in the econometric 
analysis is the identification of the currency crisis episodes in the sample period. 
7.2.1 Operational Definition of Currency Crises 
Essentially, pinning down the episodes of currency crises depends on an operational 
definition of crises. A priori, there exists no clear-cut definition of what should 
constitute a currency crisis in the literature. As explained in Chapter 3, the existing 
literature uses the EMP indices to determine the episodes of currency crises. As 
discussed earlier, a positive value of the EMP index indicates an increased pressure in 
the exchange market that can stem from any combination of a devaluation, an expansion 
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of the domestic and foreign interest rate spread, or a loss of foreign exchange reserves 
of the Central Bank. Accordingly, the literature empirically defines currency crises as 
the instances of extreme speculative pressure in which the index of speculative pressure 
goes above a specific threshold level. As discussed earlier, the advantage of this 
definition is two fold. First, both successful and unsuccessful attacks on the currency are 
taken into consideration. Second, such an index can be used to analyze speculative 
attacks under any exchange rate regime. 
Ultimately, the efforts of capturing currency crises empirically involves the critical 
issue as to above what threshold the EMP index should be labelled a currency crisis. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, there exist a number of operational definitions of currency 
crises. Regardless of the definition adopted, inevitably, there remains an element of 
arbitrariness in setting a specific threshold for the currency crises. 
7.2.1.1 A Binary Crisis Definition 
The present analysis identifies the months in which the index of speculative pressure is 
at least 1.5 standard deviations above the sample mean as the episodes of currency 
35 
crises following Eichengreen et al (1995,1996) and Herrera and Garcia (1999ý . 
Accordingly, a binary currency crisis index (CI, '8) is introduced as a dummy variable to 
take the value of I if a crisis occurs and 0, if otherwise. The criteria for building CI, 'O 
can be summarized as follows: 
cill, 
I if 
0 if EMP, < 
where a,. -A4,,, and are the sample standard deviation and the sample mean of the 
underlying EMP index, respectively. The observations of tile index of speculative 
235 In some studies in the literature, an exclusion window is used to eliminate identification of crises 
which may still be part of the initial crisis (see for ecample, Moreno 1995 and Frankel and Rose 1996). 
However the present analysis does not use an exclusion window in order to preserve the number of Is in 
the crisis index so that an econometric analysis is possible. Also, the purpose of this chapter is not only to 
explain the outbreak of currency crises but also to explain the determinants of persistent extreme 
speculative pressure. Hence all instances of speculative pressure beyond the threshold are retained. 
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pressure which is at least 1.5 standard deviations above the sample mean are marked as 
the instances of currency crises. 
In order to test the sensitivity of the empirical results on the choice of the approach used 
to estimate the exchange market pressure index, two separate indices built following 
Eichengreen et al and Pentecost et al are considered as in Chapter 6. 
7.2.1.2 A Categorical Crisis Definition 
The binary classification of the crisis index does not distinguish between crises of lower 
or mediocre magnitude and of much larger magnitude. It simply assumes that all crisis 
episodes are homogenous and treats them equally. However, in reality, the 
macroeconomic variables may affect not only the likelihood of having a currency crisis 
but also its magnitude, if it does occur. Hence, treating each episode in accordance with 
its magnitude could provide a more accurate analysis of the dynamics underlying the 
currency crises rather than classifying observations strictly as 0 or 1. Based on this 
consideration, the identified episodes of currency crises are also classified according to 
their magnitude and are used to build a categorical currency crisis index. The 
categorical currency crisis index is, then, used as the dependent variable in ordered logit 
models. As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature uses thresholds ranging from mean 
plus 1.5 to 3.0 standard deviations 236 . The present approach uses these thresholds to 
rank the episodes of currency crises from I to 4 based on their magnitudes. More 
specifically, the categorical crisis index (CI, ") takes a value between 0 and 4 based on 
the following criteria: 
0 if EAIP, < 
I if < EAIP, < 
CI" =2 if (2*Ocri. Afl,, +< EMP, < (2.5a,... Ali., + 
3 if (2.5cri. -Afl,, +< EMP, < (3.0a,:,,,,. + 
4 if (3. Oal. -Ml,, + p13,, j, < EMP, (7.2) 
236 For instance, Eichengreen el al (1995) use a threshold of mean plus 1.5 standard deviations, 
Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) use a threshold of mean plus 2.0 standard deviations, Edison (2003) 
uses a threshold of mean plus 2.5 standard deviations, and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997b) use a threshold 
of mean plus 3.0 standard deviations. 
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Accordingly, the indices and the thresholds estimated in Chapter 5 are used in the 
present chapter. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 in Chapter 5 plot the indices estimated using the 
Eichengreen et al's (1995) and Pentecost et al's (2001) approaches, respectively. The 
horizontal lines in the figures represent the threshold values estimated for each index. 
For the index estimated using the Eichengreen et al's (1995) approach, the estimated 
threshold values are 1.85,2.47,3.08 and 3.70. On the other hand, for the index 
estimated using the Pentecost et al's (2001) approach, the threshold values are 2.50, 
3.19,3.97 and 4.56. 
Table 7.1 shows the dates of the currency crises captured by each index, as well as the 
respective values that each categorical crisis index takes based on Equation 7.2. 
Table 7.1 Enisodes of Excessive SDeculative Pressure 
Date CI(E)t cffiý)t 
January 1991 2 0 
March 1991 0 1 
December 1993 1 0 
February 1994 0 3 
March 1994 4 2 
April 1994 0 4 
May 1995 1 0 
December 1995 1 0 
August 1998 1 0 
November 2000 2 0 
December 2000 0 2 
February 2001 1 2 
March 2001 3 4 
April 2001 0 1 
Note: CI(E), and CI(P), denote, respectively, the crisis index constructed based on the EAIP inde-ir 
suggested by Eichengreen et al (1995) and Pentecost et al (2001). 
As can be seen in the table, the index estimated using tile Eichengreen el al's (1995) 
approach captures not only the currency crises of 1994 and 2000-2001 but also several 
other episodes of excessive speculative pressure. For instance, the spikes observed in 
1991 and 1998 can be attributed to the increase in the interest rates by the Turkish 
Central Bank while defending the Turkish Lira in the global panic caused by the Gulf 
war and the Russian debt crisis of 1998, respectively. On the other hand, the index built 
following Pentecost et al (2001) captures primarily the currency crises of 1994 and 
2001. The index also captures the increased speculative pressure in caused by the Gulf 
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war in 1991. Overall, the currency crisis index built using EMP(E) captures nine, and 
the index built using EMP(P) captures eight instances of currency crises. 
Having established the currency crisis indices to be used as the dependent variable in 
the regressions, the next section introduces the empirical approaches that will be 
followed. 
7.2.2 Binary Logit Regression 
When the dependent variable in a regression model is a binary, variable, the error term 
in such a model is also binary and follows a binomial distribution. Hence, it is not 
possible to assume that the error term in these models follows a normal distribution. In 
this case, the error term is heteroskedastic 237 . Consequently, the ordinary 
least squares 
(OLS) method can no longer produce the best linear unbiased estimator. As a result, the 
OLS estimates of the sum of squares are misleading and this can lead to wrong standard 
errors. The existing literature overcomes this complication by employing logit and 
probit models. 
Logit models typically perform better than probit models when the dependent variable 
is not evenly distributed between the two outcomes 238 . Since the crisis events that are 
modelled in the present analysis are in the tail of the distribution, i. e. there are many 
more non-crisis observations than crisis observations, the present analysis uses logit 
models to investigate the determinants of currency crises in Turkey. 
Overall, logit analysis has two major advantages that make it suitable for the purposes 
of this chapter. First, it does not assume multivariate normality and equal covariance 
matrices for the independent or predictor variables as discriminant analysis does. 
Second, it makes a non-linear transformation of the time series data, which diminishes 
the possible influence of outliers 239 . 
237 See Gujarati (2006: pp. 503-503). 
239 See Maddala, (2002: pp. 325-326). 
239 See Chi and Tang (2006: p. 20). 
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In the logit models, an econometric regression is run on various variables to explain the 
dichotomous currency crisis indicator. Hence, the predicted outcome, i. e. the probability 
of crises, is constrained between zero and one. The model is based on the principle that 
the probability of a dichotomous outcome is related to a set of potential predictor 
variables in the form: 
109 [PIO -A ý'- A+ PIXI +, 82X2 +---+ PoXi (7.3) 
where p is the probability of the occurrence of a currency crisis, pl(I - p) is the odds 
ratio and log [pl(l - p)] is the log odds ratio, which is the logarithm of the ratio of two 
probabilities of the occurrence of currency criscs. flo is the intercept term, and fli Q=I 
n) represents the coefficients associated with the corresponding explanatory 
variables xi (i =I..., n). A is interpreted as the rate of change in the log odds as xi 
changes. Logit regression assumes that if the fitted probability of logit (p) is greater than 
0.5, the dependent variable should have value I rather than 0. 
The coefficients of the corresponding parameters are estimated using the Maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) technique, which finds the coefficients that makes the log 
of the likelihood function as large as possible. 
7.2.3 Ordered Logit Regression 15 
In the case of a categorical dependent variable, the appropriate technique to use is the 
ordered logit regression 240. Ordered logit models estimate k-I intercept terms, where k 
denotes the number of categories of the dependent variable. These intercepts can be 
interpreted as indexing the distance between sequential points on the ordinal scale of the 
dependent variable. Just like the logit regression, ordered logit uses maximum 
likelihood methods, and finds the best set of regression coefficients to predict values of 
the logit-transformed probability that the dependent variable falls into one category 
rather than another. 
240 in practice, if the dependent variable consists of a large number of categories, OLS regression could be 
used. Nonetheless, in the present case, since the dependent variable consists of only 4 different categories, 
OLS cannot be used. 
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Unlike logit regression, which assumes that if the fitted probability of logit (P) is greater 
than 0.5, the dependent variable should have value 1, the ordered logit does not have 
such an assumption. Instead, it fits a set of cut-off points. If there are r levels of the 
dependent variable, it finds r- I cut-off values, k, and k,.,, such that if p is below kj, the 
dependent variable is predicted to take value 0, if p is between k, and k2, the dependent 
variable is predicted to take value 1, and so on. The ordered logit model can be 
represented as follows: 
P(Y, > j) 
exp(aj + XP) 
_, jn-1 (7.4) + [exp(a, + Xj, 8)] 
where n is the number of categories of the ordinal dependent variable. When n=2, the 
model is equivalent to the logistic regression model. On the other hand, when n>2, the 
model becomes equivalent to a series of binary logistic regressions, where categories of 
the dependent variable are combined. More specifically, when n=4, then for j=1, 
category I is contrasted with categories 2,3 and 4; forj =2 the contrast is between 
categories I and 2 versus 3 and 4; and forj = 3, the contrast is between categories 1,2 
241 and 3 versus category 4. 
In the model,, 8 are the same for all values ofj in Equation 7.4. Separate regressions are 
run for each of the categories and it is assumed that the slopes across levels of the 
outcome variable are parallel. For this reason, ordered logit model is also referred to as 
the proporlional odds model since the model makes the proportional odds assumption 
that the odds ratio for being in a chosen category or higher compared to being in a lower 
category is the same regardless of which category is chosen 242 . 
241 See Williams (2006). 
242 The existing literature refers to this assumption as "the proportional odds assumption", "the parallel 
regressions assumption" or "the parallel lines assumption" (see Williams, 2006). 
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7.3 Empirical Analysis 
Based on the identified crisis episodes, the determinants of currency crises in Turkey 
will be investigated empirically using binary and ordered logit regressions using 
monthly time-series data for the period between 1989: 09 and 2001: 04. The explanatory 
variables introduced in Chapter 5 will be used in the analysis. 
In the case of logit models, variables have to be stationary because a spurious 
regressionmay result if a nonstationary time series, is regressed on one or more 
nonstationary time series. In this case, the econometric estimations yield results with no 
economic meaning. As discussed in Chapter 5, PIN and OVE are stationary whereas the 
rest of the series are I(1). Therefore, I(1) series are first-differcnced to generate 
stationarity and the resulting stationary series are used in the estimations. First- 
differenced series are denoted with D such that D(ERM) denotes ERM in its first- 
differenced form. 
7.3.1 Testing for Multicollinearity 
One of the assumptions of MLE within the context of logit regressions is that the 
explanatory variables are not linearly related, i. e. correlated. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
in the case of multicollinearity among the variables, the expected relations among the 
dependent and independent variables can not be estimated with high certainty 243 . For 
this reason, the models fon-ned in this research do not include the pairs of variables 
which has a correlation coefficient of 0.5, or higher, in the same model244. 
After first-differencing the I(l) variables to ensure stationarity, it is observed that the 
multicollinearity among the variables in levels observed in Chapter 6 has widely 
disappeared. As can be seen in Table 7.2, the only collinear pairs of variables are NIE- 
EXR and LCA-LIC. Hence, the variables in these pairs are not used in the same 
regression models in the rest of the analysis. 
243 Including highly correlated macro variables in a model could result in significant bias to the level of 
the parameters and may yield spurious results with inflated standard errors (See Chapter 6). 
244 See Chapter 6 for a discussion on multicollincarity. 
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7.3.2 Modelling Currency Crises 
An important issue regarding the logit models is to decide whether to use the 
explanatory variables as contemporaneous with the crisis index or to use them in lagged 
form. This is because, since the currency crisis index is constructed from ex-post data 
on exchange rate, interest rate and foreign reserves, using contemporaneous explanatory 
variables may render it difficult to identify whether the deterioration macroeconomic 
variables have caused the crisis, or the crisis have caused the deterioration of the 
macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, immediately after a currency crisis, some 
macroeconomic variables may be affected. In this case, the results estimated by using 
contemporaneous explanatory variables can be difficult to interpre t245. 
Hence, using lagged variables would help to differentiate genuine leads from the effects 
of the currency crisis itself. Anastasatos and Davidson (2004) argue that "this can also 
address the possibility of non-synchronous acquisition or processing of the relevant 
information ftom market agents ýq 246. Similarly, Kruger et al (2000) suggest that "it 
takes some time for deteriorations in economic fundamentals to trigger a currency 
crisis" 247 . Therefore, conceptually, it seems more appropriate to use the explanatory 
variables after lagging one-month in order to differentiate genuine leads from the effects 
of the currency crisis itself, rather than considering them as contemporaneous with the 
crisis index. This way, the effects of explanatory variables on currency crises are 
isolated and it is ascertained that the crises are not driven by the behaviour of 
independent variables during or after a crisis. Kruger et al (2000) explain that "this also 
provides a simple test of the ability of the explanatory variables to predict fitture 
248 crises" 
In order to measure the robustness of the results to the choice of the exchange market 
pressure index underlying the currency crisis index, two indices, CI(E) and CI(P), are 
used as the dependent variable. CI(E) denotes the crisis index constructed based on the 
245 Also, assuming that the market participants use the most recent publicly available information to form 
their expectations, the crisis index is expected to have a lagged response to the explanatory variables (see 
Anastasatos and Davidson, 2004). 
246 See Anastasatos and Davidson (2004: pp. 19-20). 
247 See Kruger el al (2000: p. 270). 
248 See Kruger el al (2000: p. 270). See also Frankel and Rose (1996) who report empirical evidence that 
lagging the regressors strengthens the empirical results in binary choice models. 
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EMP index suggested by Eichengreen et al (1995) and CI(P) denotes the crisis index 
constructed based on the EMP index suggested by Pentecost el al (2001). The estimated 
models are specified as follows: 
CIt =, go + PiDanEXR) t-I + fl2DgnTBR) t-I + fl3D6nDCG) t-I + fl4D(ERAf) t-I 
, 
85DOnFAL) t-I + fl6DqnLIQ t-I + fl7DOnLTA) t. 1 + P80VEt-I +, 89PINt-I + lit 
(7.5) 
CIt = flo +fl, DqnF-XR) t-I +, 82DOnTBR) t-I + fl3D(7nDCG) t., + fl4D(ERAf) t. 1 
P5DflnFAL) t-I + fl6DqnLCA) t-I + fl7DflnLTA) t-I + P80VEt. 1 + flgPlNt-i + pt 
(7.6) 
CIt =, 8o + PiDanNIE)t-l +, 82DOnTBR) t-I + fl3DOnDCG) t-I + fl4D(E)Uf) t. 1 
, 85DOnFAL)t. 1 +fl6DgnLIC)t-I +fl7D(7nLTA)t. 1 +, 8&OVEt-I+PgPINt. i+pt 
(7.7) 
CIt =, 8o +, 8, DanNIE)t-l +fl2DanTBR) 1-1 +, 63DOnDCG) t. 1 + fl4D(ERAf) t-I 
, 85DOnFAL) t-I + fl6DgnLCA) t-I + fl7DgnLTA) t-I + P80VEt. 1 + flgPlNt-I + pt 
(7.8) 
In each of the above models, the dependent variable crisis index CA denotes CME) and 
CI(P). In the case of binary logit models, the dependent variable is a binary variable as 
defined in Equation 7.1. On the other hand, in the case of ordered logit models, the 
dependent variable is a categorical variable as defined in Equation 7.2 and takes on the 
values reported in Table 7.1. 
In the models,, 8o is the constant term, fli, 132,... Pt are the estimated coefficicnts and pt is 
the usual error term. D denotes that the variable is used in its first-differenced form. The 
models investigate the possibility of different functional forms between tile 
dichotomous crisis index and the one-month lagged values of the individual explanatory 
variables. Positive values of each coefficient imply that increasing the variable will 
increase the probability of the crises whereas the negative values imply the opposite. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, all variables except PIN, FAL and LTA are a priori expected to 
have positive coefficients. 
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7.4 Empirical Results 
This section presents the results of the binary and ordered logit models. Before moving 
on to running the binary logit regressions, it is first necessary to ensure that the 
estimated models are specified correctly. 
This is because, the underlying assumption of a binary logit regression is that no 
relevant variables are omitted from the model and no irrelevant variables are included in 
the model. Otherwise, there exists a specification error, which may affect the estimated 
parameters. If relevant variables are omitted from the model, the common variance they 
share with included variables may be wrongly attributed to those variables, and the error 
term may be inflated. On the other hand, if irrelevant variables are included in the 
model, the common variance they share with included variables may be wrongly 
attributed to them. 
7.4.1 Link Test for Model Specification Error 
In order to detect a specification error, link tests are employed to the estimated 
models 249 . The idea behind link test is that if the model is correctly specified, there 
should not be any additional predictors that are statistically significant. Link test creates 
two new variables, the variable of prediction, which is referred to as hat, and the 
variable of squared prediction, which is referred to as hatsq. The model is then refitted 
using these two variables as predictors. If the model is correctly specified, hat should be 
significant since it is the predicted value from the model, whereas hatsq should not be 
significant. This is because, if the model is specified correctly, the squared predictions 
should not have much explanatory power. Therefore, if halsq is significant, then the null 
hypothesis of a correctly-specified model is rejected. The results of the link tests are 
reported in Table 7.3. 
As can be seen in the table, hat is significant at the 5% level in all models, whereas 
hatsq is not significant in any of the estimated models. Therefore, the results suggest no 
249 The linktest command in Stata 9.0 is used to run a model specification link test for single-equation 
models. 
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evidence against model misspecification in any of the estimated models. Hence, in what 
follows next, the parameter estimates of the logit models are analyzed. 
Table 7.3 Link Test for Model Snecification Error 
Equation 7.5 Equation 7.6 Equation 7.7 Equation 7.8 
Regressor Hat Hatsq Hat Hatsq Hat Hatsq Hat Hatsq 
CI(E)t 0.627* -1.119 
CI(P)t 1.568* 0.456 
0.256* 1.044 
ý: -1.233* 0.245 
0.342* -0.132 
1.221 * 0.365 
0.467* -0.943 
0.477* -1.235 
Notes* denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. Tests have been carried out using Stata9.0. 
7.4.2. Results of the Binary Logit Models 
The results of the binary logit models are reported in Tables 7.4 to Table 7.7. Unlike in 
the case of OLS models, since the logit and probit models are non-lincar, the 
coefficients reported cannot be interpreted as the marginal effects. Instead, the marginal 
effect of a change in xi on the probability of a currency crisis is estimated by taking the 
derivatives of the coefficients. Tables 7.4 to Table 7.7 report the estimated marginal 
effects beside the coefficient estimates and the respective standard crrors. 
Table 7.4 Binary Logit Estimates of Equation 7.5 
Dependent variable: CI(E)t Dependent variable: gjLP), 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. ME Coefficient Std. Err. ME 
D(InEXR)t-l 1.652 1.307 0.249 2.476 2.321 0.053 
D(7nTBR)t-l -2.885 2.223 -0.075 -1.821 1.329 -0.039 
D(InDCG)I. l 0.446 0.454 0.011 0.928 0.817 0.019 
D(ERM)t-i 1.003 1.002 0.009 1.031 1.001 0.008 
D(InFAL)t-I -1.029* 0.279 -0.026 -2.026** 1.089 -0.129 
D(InLIC)t-l 2.331 * 0.169 0.060, 2.087* 0.393 0.088 
D(7nLTA)t-l -4.878** 1.971 -0.126 -1.671** 0.799 -0.014 
0 VEt. 1 1.083* 0.063 0.002 1.004 1.002 0.008 
PINt- 1 -1.001*** 0.501 -0.001 -1.004* 0.004 -0.001 
Constant -0.401 0.590 -0.777 0.743 
Pseudo R2 0.794 0.705 
LL -27.107 -21.238 
LR X2 22.53* 18.62** 
IIL X24.00 3.54 
Notes: AIE, LL, LR and HL denote marginal effects, log-likelihood likelihood ratio and Ilosmer- 
Lemeshow, respectively. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the Mo, 5% and 10% lewls, 
respectively, Regressions and the associated tests have been carried out using Stata 9.0. 
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Table 7.5 Binarv Lop-it Estimates of Eciuation 7.6 
Dependent Variable: CI(E)j Dependent variable: CI(P)t 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Variable 
DanEXR)t-l 1.682 1.642 0.258 2.279 5.301 0.053 
D(7nTBR)t-l -2.813 2.210 -0.075 -1.914 1.345 -0.044 
D(7nDCG)t-l 0.429 0.461 0.011 0.887 0.819 0.032 
D(ERApt-I 1.001 1.001 0.009 1.001 1.001 0.008 
D(7nFAL)t-l -1.156** 0.586 -0.031 -2.347*** 0.806 -0.147 
D(7nLCA)t-l 2.048* 0.276 0.054 3.028** 0.611 0.069 
D(7nLTA)t-l -5.005** 2.158 -0.133 -3.75 1* 0.074 -0.017 
0 VEt. 1 1.084* 0.063 0.002 1.009 1.004 0.002 
PINt-I -1.001*** 0.502 -0.001 -0.205** 0.091 -0.001 
Constant -0.391 0.588 -0.661 0.706 
Pseudo R-' 0.792 0.789 
LL -27.272 -21.699 
LR X2 22.20* 17.69* 
HL X23.60 3.03 
Notes: ME, LL, LR and HL denote marginal effects, log-likelihood, likelihood ratio and Hosmer- 
Lemeshow, respectively. t ** and *** denote statistical significance at the I? lo, 5% and 10% levels. 
respectively, Regressions and the associated tests have been carried out using Stata 9.0. 
Table 7.6 Binary Loifit Estimates of Eauation 7.7 
Dependent variable: CI(E)t Dependent variable: CI(P)t 
Variable Coefficient Std. Eff. Variable Coefficient Std. Eff. Variable 
D(7nNIE)t-l 1.771 1.367 0.270 1.920 1.438 0.132 
D(7nTBR)t-l -2.212 2.621 -0.072 -2.662 2.607 -0.045 
D(7nDCG)t-l 0.483 0.427 0.008 0.966 0.845 0.016 
D(EWt-I 0.089 0.093 0.007 1.001 1.001 0.007 
D(7nFAL)t-l -1.613* 0.123 -0.027 -2.741 0.049 -0.096 
D(7nLIC)t-l 1.984* 0.237 0.034 4.241 * 2.086 0.071 
D(7nLTAJt-i -5.449** 2.256 -0.093 -1.763** 0.550 -0.013 
OVEt-I 1.092*** 0.367 0.002 1.011 1.003 0.001 
PINt-I -1.006** 0.504 -0.001 -1.002*** 0.301 -0.003 
Constant -0.752 0.723 -0.006 0.839 
Pseudo R' 0.806 0.728 
LL -26.611 -20.524 
LR X2 23.52* 20.04** 
IIL X24.11 3.21 
Notes: ME, LL, LR and HL denote marginal effects, log-likelihood, likelihood ratio and llosmer- 
Lemeshow, respectively. *, ** and *** denote statistical signijtcance at the /Yo, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, Regressions and the associated tests have been carried out using Stata 9.0. 
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Table 7.7 Binarv Lo2it Estimates of Eciuation 7.8 
Dependent variable: CI(g )t Dependent variable: CI(P)t 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Variable 
D(7nNIE)t-l 1.942 0.901 0.278 1.557 1.440 0.138 
DanTBR)t-l -2.171 1.631 0.073 -2.753. 2.651 0.051 
D(7nDCG)t-l 0.469 0.431 0.008 0.925 0.846 0.017 
D(EWt-I 1.003 1.004 0.007 1.004 01002 0.008 
D(7nFAL)t-l -1.845* 0.012 -0.032 -2.069** 0.615 -0.111 
DflnLCA)t-l 1.768*** 0.327 0.031 3.115** 1.622 0.057 
D(7nLTA)t-l -5.567** 2.251 -0.097 -1.836*** 0.712 -0.015 
OVEt-I 1.095*** 0.467 0.002 1.017 1.002 0.003 
PINt-I -1.001* 0.034 -0.001 -2.007* 0.004 -0.001 
Constant -0.753 0.727 -0.873 0.795 
Pseudo R-' 0.761 0.731 
LL -26.711 -21.047 
LR ;r2 23.32* 19.00** 
HL ;r2 5.34 4.75 
Notes: ME, LL, LR and HL denote marginal effects, log-likelihood likelihood ratio and Hosmer- 
Lemeshow, respectively. t ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1016.5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, Regressions and the associated tests have been carried out using Stata 9.0. 
The interpretation of the logit coefficient values is complicated by the fact that 
estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect of the probability of 
crises. The coefficients are the values for the logistic regression equation for predicting 
the dependent variable from the independent variable and are in log-odds units. They 
tell the amount of increase in the predicted log odds of dependent variable being equal 
to I that would be predicted by a one unit increase in the predictor, holding all other 
predictors constant. Accordingly, the standard interpretation of the ordered logit 
coefficient is that for a one unit increase in the predictor, the response variable level is 
expected to change by its resliective regression coefficient in the ordered log-odds scale 
while the other variables in the model are held constant. For instance, in Model I Tile 
coefficient for DqnEXR)t_j is 1.652 when the dependent variable is CI(E)t, which means 
that an increase of 1.652 is expected in the log odds of currency crisis with every one- 
unit increase in DqnEXR)t-,, holding all other independent variables constant. 
However, these coefficients exclude the effect of the existing alternatives and thus give 
only a partial assessment of the overall effect of the independent variable on the 
likelihood of currency crises. Therefore, the marginal effects of the significant 
explanatory variables are estimated separately by taking the derivatives of the parameter 
estimates. The marginal effects are useful in analyzing the full effect on the probability 
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of choosing one outcome over'all the existing alternatives. More speciflcally, they 
indicate how much the probability of a currency crisis will increase when there is a one 
unit rise in one of the independent variables. 
Regarding the signs of the variables, it can be seen that PINt. 1, DonFAL)t., and 
DgnLTA)t-l appear in all models with negative coefficients in line with the theoretical 
postulations. On the other hand, the rest of the variables appear with a positive sign as 
expected, except D6nTBR)t. j, which is negative. The significant variables in the models 
where the dependent variable is CI(E), are DflnFAL)t. 1, DflnLIC)t. 1, DanLTA)t. 1, OVEt. 1 
and PINt-1. On the other hand, in the models where the dependent variable is CI(P)t, the 
same variables are significant variables. Nonetheless, the models estimated with CI(E)t 
as the dependent variable seem to have yielded stronger results. 
The quality of model specification in logit regressions is assessed based on the criteria 
of the maximized value of the log-likelihood function, likelihood ratio X2 and pseudo- 
W criteria. Log-likelihood of the fitted model indicates if the relationships between the 
predictors and the dependent variable in the model are significant. It is also used in the 
likelihood ratio X2 test of whether all predictors' regression coefficients in the model are 
. simultaneously equal to zero. On the other hand, the pseudo-R2 is a measure of the 
goodness-of-fit of a model. Another commonly used test of model fit is the Ilosmer- 
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. The idea behind this test is that the more closely the 
predicted frequency matches the observed frequency, the better is the model fit. A 
significant Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic would indicate that the model does not fit 
the data well. 
The results reported in Tables 7.4 to Table 7.7 indicate that, in all cases, the estimated 
models are statistically significant and the model fit is quite well. Tile Likelihood 
Ratio Z' is very high and is clearly statistically significant. Also, the pseudo-R 2 reported 
for the models are around 0.7, suggesting that the most of the variation of the dependent 
variable is explained by the model explanatory variables. Based on pseudo-R. 2, the fit of 
these models estimated with CI(E)t as the dependent variable seem to be better than 
those estimated with CI(P)t as the dependent variable. Therefore, the findings seem to 
be slightly sensitive to the exchange market pressure index underlying the dependent 
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variable. On the other hand, the maximized value of the log-likelihood functions reveals 
that the models generally fit the data equally well. 
Having obtained satisfactory results using the binary logit models, in what follows next, 
ordered logit models are estimated. Nonetheless, it is first necessary to investigate if the 
proportional odds assumption underlying the ordered logit models holds. 
7.4.3 Brant Test for the Proportional Odds Assumption 
Since an ordered logit regression estimates one equation over all levels of the dependent 
variable, it is overly restrictive and the parallel lines assumption may not always holdý50. 
In order to investigate whether the coefficients are the same for each group of the 
dependent variable, the Brant test is used 251 . The Brant test compares slope coefficients 
of the binary logits implied by the ordered regression model and uses the Wald tests to 
test the hypothesis that the coefficients in each independent variable are constant across 
categories of the dependent variable. If the resulting test statistic is significant, the 
parallel lines assumption does not hold. In this case, the ordered logit models cannot be 
used and a more flexible model, such as generalized ordered logit model, should be 
used. The results of the Brant test for the proportional odds assumption are reported in 
Table 7.8. 
i ame /. zs oram i esi ior ine rro )onionai uaas Assumption 
Equation 7.5 Equation 7.6 Equation 7.7 Equation 7.8 
Regressor X2 p> X2 x2 p> X2 x2p>x2 X2 p> X2 
Cl(E)t 4.45 0.999 
CI(P)t 5.61 1.000 
3.44 1.000 
3.31 1.000 
4.91 0.999 
-5.90 1.000 
-1.02 1.000 
-5.66 1.000 
As can be seen in Table 7.8, there is no evidence of the violation of the parallel lines 
assumption in any of the estimated models as the reported p-values are not statistically 
significant. This suggests that it is indeed possible to assume that the cocfficients across 
categories of the outcome variable are parallel. Accordingly, in what follows, the results 
of the ordered logit regressions are presented. 
250 In this case, one or more fls may differ across values ofj in Equation 7.4. 
251 See (Brant, 1990). 
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7.4.4 Results of the Ordered Logit Models 
The -results of the ordered logit models are reported in Table 7.9 to Table 7.12. The 
regressions have been carried out using the Stata 9.0. Instead of aj for all values ofj in 
Equation 7.5, Stata 9.0 introduces cut-points, which are the negatives of aj. The cut-off 
points reported in the tables are the estimated thresholds on the latent variable used to 
differentiate low magnitude crises from middle and high magnitude crises when values 
of the predictor variables are evaluated at zero. 
Table 7.9 Ordered Lop-it Estimates of Eauation 7.5 
Dependent variable: CI(E)t Dependent variable: CI(P)t 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
D(7nFXR)t-l 0.075 0.068 3.305 3.283 
D(7nTBR) .1 -2.702 2.216 -2.463 
2.367 
D(7nDCG)t-l 0.508 0.421 0.458 0.442 
D(ERA, f)t-l 1.021 1.001 1.003 1.001 
D(7nFAL)t-l -1.674** 0.925 -2.200** 0.825 
D(7nLIQt. j 2.002*** 0.172 5.062** 2.601 
D(7nLTA)t-l -4.738** 2.157 -2.348** 1.623 
OVEt-I 1.073* 0.058 1.008 1.006 
PINt-I -1.001* 0.224 -0.403 ** 0.204 
Cut-off 1 0.313 0.835 
Cut-off 2 1.629 1.234 
Cut-off 3 2.147 2.234 
Cut-off 4 3.109 3.342 
Pseudo R' 0.776 0.755 
LL -36.070 -30.627 
LR X2 23.52* 20.97** 
Notes: LL and LR denote log-likelihood and likelihood ratio, respectively. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the I Yo, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, Regressions and the associated tests have heen 
carried out using Stata 9.0. 
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Table 7.10 Ordered Lop-it Estimates of Eciuation 7.6 
Dependent variable: CI(E)t Dependent variable: CI(P)t 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
D(7nEXR)t-l 0.741 0.671 2.657 5.239 
D(7nTBR)t. 1 -2.584 2.195 -2.529 2.362 
D(7nDCG)t-l 0.479 0.428 0.543 0.434 
D(ERAI)t-l 1.003 1.001 1.004 1.001 
D(7nFAL)t-l - 1.741 0.128 -2.747** 0.743 
D(7nLCA)t. 1 1.853** 0.952 3.924* 0.485 
D(7nLTA)t. 1 -4.819** 2.143 -1.469*** 0.805 
0 VEt_ 1 1.075*** 0.958 1.014 1.011 
PINt-I -1.005*** 0.804 -1.008** 
0.308 
Cut-off 1 0.301 0.643 
Cut-off 2 1.616 1.133 
Cut-off 3 2.389 2.242 
Cut-off 4 3.093 3.872 
Pseudo R" 0.767 0.738 
LL -38.932 -31.315 
LR v2 21.62** 19.60** 
Notes: LL and LR denote log-likelihood and likelihood ratio, respectively. t** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the I? lo, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, Regressions and the associated tests have been 
carried out using Stata 9.0. 
Table 7.11 Ordered Loait Estimates of Eauation 7.7 
Dependent variable: CI(E), Dependent variable: CI(P)t 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficicnt Std. Err. 
D(7nNIE)t-l 0.832 0.764 1.839 1.432 
D(7nTBR)t-l -1.974 1.581 -1.468 1.245 
D(7nDCG)t-l 0.546 0.404 0.639 0.449 
D(ERAPt-i 1.004 1.002 1.004 1.002 
D(7nFAL)t-l -2.056** 0.894 -2.941 ** 0.991 
D(7nLIQt_j -1.621* 0.232 5.136** 2.613 
D(7nLTA)t-l -5.243** 2.216 -2.414** 0.657 
OVEt. 1 1.087* 0.063 1.022 1.005 
PINt-I -1.001*** 0.504 -0.802** 0.301 
Cut-off 1 0.692 0.052 
Cut-off 2 1.992 1.523 
Cut-off 3 2.342 2.628 
Cut-of y ff4 3.425 3.289 
Pseudo R-1 0.776 0.770 
LL -38.023 -29.995 
LR X2 23.44* 22.24* 
Notes: LL and LR denote log-likelihood and likelihood ratio, respectively. *, 0* and *** denote statistical 
significance at the Blo, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, Regressions and the associated tests have been 
carried out using Stata 9.0. 
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Table 7.12 Ordered Loizit Estimates of Eauation 7.8 
Dependent variable: CI(E)t Dependent variable: CI(P)t 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
D(7nNIE)t-l 1.199 1.066 1.365 1.034 
DanTBR)t-l -1.921 1.587 -1.493 1.036 
DflnDCG)t-l 0.535 0.408 0.557 0.439 
D(ERApt-I 1.003 1.002 1.004 1.002 
D(7nFAL)t-l -2.262** 0.971 -2.601 ** 0.870 
D(7nLCA)t-l 1.391 * 0.295 3.938* 0.510 
D(7nLTA)t-l -5.337** 2.211 -2.531** 
1.624 
OVEt-I 1.089*** 0.363 1.026 1.016 
PINt- 1 -1.001** 0.504 -2.001 0.201 
Cut-off 1 0.692 0.894 
Cut-off 2 1.001 1.332 
Cut-off 3 2.776 2.422 
Cut-off 4 3.484 3.039 
Pseudo R- 0.754 0.752 
LL -38.101 -30.748 
LR X2 23.28* 20.73** 
Notes: LL and LR denote log-likelihood and likelihood ratio, respectively. t** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the lVo, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, Regressions and the associated tests have been 
carried out using Stata 9.0. 
In the case of ordered logit models, a positive coefficient is interpreted as an increased 
probability that the outcome will be observed in a higher category, i. e. a currency crisis 
of greater magnitude. On the other hand, a negative coefficient suggests a higher 
likelihood that the outcome will be observed in a lower category. The estimated 
coefficients are the ordered log-odds estimates for a one unit increase in the independent 
variable on the expected outcome given the other variables are held constant in the 
model. For instance, in Model 1, the coefficient of DanEYR)t., is 1.074 when CI(E)t is 
used as the dependent variable, which means that a one unit increase in DflnEXR)t. 1 
would result in the ordered log-odds of having a currency crisis of higher magnitude by 
1.074, while the other variables in the model are held constant. As can be seen in the 
tables, PINt-1, DanFAL)t-l and DflnLTA)I. l appear in all models with negative 
coefficients in line with the theoretical postulations. On the other hand, the rest of the 
variables appear with a positive sign as expected, except D(IIITBR)t. 1, which is negative. 
As in the results of the logit models, the significant variables in the models where the 
dependent variable is CI(E) are D(7nFAL)t-,, DflnLIC)t. 1, DgnLTA)1.1,0VEt_j and PINt. j. 
On the other hand, in the models where the dependent variable is CI(P), the same 
variables are significant variables. Nonetheless, as in the case of binary logit models, 
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the models estimated with CI(E) as the dependent variable seem to have yielded 
stronger results. 
In the case of ordered logit models, the model fit is assessed based on the likelihood 
ratio ; r2 test statistic, which indicates if all the coefficients with the exception of the 
cut-off points are zero in the model, and the pseudo-Rý. In all cases, the estimated 
models are statistically significant and fit the data significantly. The likelihood 
ratio X2 is generally very high and is clearly statistically significant. On the other hand, 
the pseudo-W reported for the models are around 0.6, implying that the most of the 
variation of the dependent variable is indeed explained by the predictor variables in the 
model. Based on the pseudo-R2, the fit of these models estimated with CI(E) as the 
dependent variable seem to be better than those estimated with CI(P) as the dependent 
variable. This can be attributed to the fact that CI(P) contains more crisis observation 
than CI(P). Therefore, the findings seem to be slightly sensitive to the exchange market 
pressure index underlying the currency crisis index. 
7.5 Interpretation of the Empirical Results 
The findings obtained in this chapter have shed light on the factors that increase the 
likelihood of currency crises in the case of Turkey. The most striking finding of the 
chapter is that the variables related to the first-generation models of currency crises are 
generally not statistically significant even though they seem to carry the expected signs. 
As discussed earlier, this genre of currency crisis models explain currency crises 
through speculative attacks that take place due to inconsistencies between an exchange 
rate peg and domestic monetary policy. Indeed, Chapter 6 has documented that fiscal 
variables are generally in a long-run equilibrium relationship with the speculative 
pressure in the exchange market. However, the results obtained in this chapter suggest 
that fiscal variables are not linked to the likelihood of having a currency crisis. This 
finding lends support to the discussion that not all episodes of increased speculative 
pressure results in a full-blown currency crisis. The results further suggest that, currency 
crises and speculative pressure are not necessarily driven by common factors. 
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The findings obtained in the present chapter suggest that neither budget expenditures to 
budget revenues ratio (EXR) nor non-interest budget expenditures to budget revenues 
ratio (NIE) is statistically significant in the estimated logit and the ordered logit models, 
even though they appear with positive signs as expected. These findings are quite 
surprising because during the period under investigation, the public accounts in Turkey 
continuously deteriorated and the economy never achieved a period of sustained fiscal 
austerity, with persistent primary deficits forcing the governments for continued 
monetization 252 . These findings can perhaps be attributed to the policy changes 
implemented by the government especially in the post-1994 period. During this period, 
the unsustainable nature of domestic debt forced the policyrnakers to keep the primary 
balance in surplus. Accordingly, the government adopted a disinflation program, which 
put limits on the primary balance of the public sector. This resulted in a consistently 
increasing level of primary surplus following the crisis in 1994. 
The fact that the fiscal variables are not empirically related to the, likelihood of currency 
crises can be can also be attributed to the impact of the fiscal discipline imposed on the 
public finances by the IMF-led stabilization program which was launched in 1999. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this had resulted in an apparent fall in the public sector 
borrowing requirement after 1999. Indeed, there was a very significant increase in the 
primary surplus in 2000, just a few months before the crisis of February 2001. Hence, 
the possible statistical impact of fiscal imbalances on the likelihood of crises might have 
been offset by the improvement of the fiscal imbalances after 1999. This was not the 
case in Chapter 6 because a continuous dependent variable was used. In a sense, this 
suggests that the continuous exchange market pressure index contains more information 
about the increased speculative pressure in the Turkish exchange market and, hence, the 
increased likelihood of currency crises. The index seems to have captured the dynamic 
relationships between the fiscal variables and the magnitude of speculative pressure in 
the Turkish exchange market unlike the binary and categorical currency crisis indices 
which failed to yield any significant link with the fiscal variables. This can perhaps be 
attributed to the differences between the logit models and the cointegration models in 
that the binary and ordered logit models the capture only the impact effects of the 
252 As discussed earlier, the primary deficits in the pre-1994 period was caused by a number of factor such 
as the surge in public expenditures, persistent problems in the taxation system and increased interest 
payments. 
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underlying explanatory variables, whereas the cointegration models used in Chapter 6 
are able to capture the longer-run effects. 
In a similar vein, the results suggest that another fiscal balance variable, total borrowing 
to budget revenues ratio (TBR) is also not significant and has a negative sign, which is 
not in line with the theoretical expectations. The fact that TBR is not significant is also 
an unexpected finding because the Turkish government was heavily engaging in ponzi 
financing to service their debt, where new debts equalled 50 percent of the existing 
stock of debt over the decade 253 . Moreover, real interest rates on domestic 
borrowing 
were increasing constantly which constituted a source of further deterioration in public 
balances. The negative sign of this variable can be explained by the fact that domestic 
borrowing in Turkey has been carried out through issuing government debt instruments 
such as T-Bills and governments bonds usually with very high interest rates. As a result, 
these high interest rates, attract not only domestic investors but also the foreign ones. As 
high interest rates on government debt instruments attract foreign capital, it leads to an 
increased demand for Turkish lira and, the resultant appreciation of the Turkish lira. 
Therefore, the potentially negative effects of government borrowing on the fiscal 
balance which is expected to increase the likelihood of currency crises are offset by the 
inflow of capital. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the first-generation models of currency crises hypothesise a 
government that runs a persistent fiscal deficit, which is financed through domestic 
credit expansion and monetization in the presence of lax fiscal policies. Having failed to 
obtain significant evidence for the link between fiscal variables and the likelihood of 
currency crises, the next question is, therefore, whether the monetary variables arc 
significant or not. The results suggest that the monetary expansion in excess of demand 
for money, i. e. excess real MI balances (ERAI) is not significant either, although it 
appears with a positive sign as expected. This finding is not consistent with the findings 
of Chapter 6 where a long-run relationship was documented between this variable and 
the speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market. This finding also contrasts with 
the first-generation models, which postulate that monetary expansion is inconsistent 
with keeping the exchange rate fixed and that the regime must eventually collapse. This 
finding can perhaps be attributed to the stabilization program launched in 1994 that 
253 See Boratav et al (2002) and Voyvoda and Yeldan (2002). 
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halted the excess liquidity creation through extension of the central bank advances to 
the treasury in the post-1994 period. Indeed, as Ozatay and Sak (2002) and Ozkan 
(2005) argue, the tight money control as specified by the stabilization program of 1994 
was strictly adhered to. Hence, the budget deficits were not financed by monetization in 
the major part of the sample period. For this reason, monetary expansion has had no 
significant impact on the likelihood of currency crises. In fact, possibly for the same 
reason, another monetary expansion variable, domestic credit to GDP ratio (DCG) is not 
significant either, although it has a positive sign as expected. The insignificance of this 
variable can be explained through the unique case of Turkey, where the domestic credit 
was extended by the Central Bank to the Treasury in the form of cash advances along 
with the direct provision of domestic credit. Hence, DCG does not capture the amount 
of domestic credit expansion to full extent. 
Overall, the empirical results discussed so far have failed to fit in the first-generation 
theory of currency crises. The most important interpretation that emerges from this 
conclusion is that the prevention of currency crises in Turkey does not depend on the 
ability of the authorities to maintain a fiscal balance and that the timing of future 
currency crises in Turkey cannot be practically be predictable. The failure to detect any 
significant link between the variables of the first-generation models of currency crises 
and the likelihood of currency crises suggests that the crises in the sample period could 
be a result of the second- and the third-generation type self-fulfilling expectations. 
Indeed, the results suggest that the overvaluation of the Turkish lira (OVE), a variable 
related to the second-generation models of currency crises, has a significant and positive 
impact on the likelihood of currency crises in Turkey 254 . This is also in 
line with the 
results of Chapter 6. It is possible to explain this within the framework of the second- 
generation models of speculative attacks. As discussed earlier, sccond-gencration 
models link currency crises to market expectations and argue that speculative attacks 
can take place due to a sudden shift in market expectations, not necessarily coupled with 
any substantial deterioration in the fundamentals. According to the second-generation 
models, the likelihood of currency crises depends on the costs and benerits of the 
devaluation for the goverm-nent. An overvaluation of the domestic currency leads to a 
254 This finding lends support to Atasoy and Saxena (2006), who report empirical evidence that Turkish 
Lira was overvalued before the currency crises of 1994 and 2000-2001. 
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loss of competitiveness where imports increase and exports decrease. Given the 
exchange rate peg, real appreciations distort the relative prices in favour of imports 
versus exports leading to a worsening of the current account balance. As the real 
exchange rate appreciates, the government is less willing to abandon the peg fearing 
that this would trigger a sharp reversal of capital flows, which would increase the costs 
of the devaluation. In addition to this, as Stein and Streb (1999) and van der Ploeg, 
(1989) argue, corrections of the exchange rate misalignments are usually delayed before 
elections due to the significant political costs especially before elections. This fits the 
case of Turkey as there were parliamentary elections in 1991,1995 and 1999. On the 
other hand, overvaluation prompts the investors that a correction of the exchange rate, 
i. e. a devaluation, is imminent as the loss of competitiveness may prevent policy-makers 
from taking necessary measures such as increasing interest rates to defend the domestic 
currency. This leads to an increased likelihood of speculative attacks. Hence, the 
existence of a significant relationship between the overvaluation of the Turkish lira and 
the likelihood of currency crises in Turkey is indeed in line with the theory. 
The results also suggest that portfolio investments (PIN) is significant with a negative 
sign as expected. This lends support to the findings obtained in Chapter 6 and can be 
explained through the sudden stop theory of Calvo (1998), which suggests that a 
reversal in capital inflows, or the "sudden stops", of these inflows leads to an increased 
likelihood of currency crises. The reversal of capital flows means that investors sell 
Turkish assets, which puts a selling pressure on the Turkish lira. This results in an 
increase in the pressure on the exchange rate regime which eventually collapses at the 
point where the Central Bank can no longer withstand the pressure. This is indeed not 
surprising in the case of Turkey, where a large percentage of the capitalization of the 
stock market is owned by foreign investors, who can withdraw their funds any time. In 
addition, as the sudden stop theory suggests, reserve-loss policies of the Turkish Central 
Bank while fighting speculative pressure, might have induced a further flight from 
domestic assets. This is because, as soon as the investors perceive the trouble, they 
lower their demand for assets denominated in Turkish liras and resort to investing in 
other countries 25 5. This leads to an increased likelihood of a currency crisis. This also 
21' This is in line with the various studies such as Kibritcioglu el al (1998, Boratav and Yeldan (2002), 4D Gazioglu (2003), Ekinci and Erturk (2004) and Ghoshal (2006), Onis and Aysan (2000), Boratav ef al 
(1996), and Ekinci (2002), who provide similar empirical evidence. 
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reveals the difficulty of maintaining a stable exchange rate in an economic environment 
which is integrated with international financial markets. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that this situation is aggravated in the case the 
domestic banking sector has open positions. In the case of Turkey, banks had explicit 
currency mismatches on their balance sheets during the sample period as they borrowed 
in foreign currency and lent in Turkish liras. As discussed in Chapter 4, during most of 
the sample period, the banks replaced commercial lending with lending to the 
government. More precisely, they borrowed from foreign money markets and sold these 
short-term funds to the Treasury in return for government securities 256 . Meanwhile, they 
had mostly unhedged their exposures to exchange rate risk, which was encouraged by 
the fixed devaluation rate built in the currency peg. 
in the light of these findings, it can be advised that the Turkish practitioners and policy- 
makers should closely monitor the capital movements for any sign of reversals, whereas 
governments should not rely on hot money in their long-term plans, particularly for 
financing deficits as any unanticipated reversal in capital flows would increase the 
likelihood of a currency crisis. As discussed in Chapter 6, this finding also lend support 
to the views of Caprio and Summers (1993) and Stiglitz (1994), who argue that some 
degree of regulation is preferable to premature liberalization in developing countries. In 
this respect, capital controls might be imposed to limit capital flow fluctuations and 
achieve economic stability. This way, governments can limit volatile capital that may 
leave on short notice. In addition, especially in times of economic turbulence, capital 
controls may be of some use in buying time to recover. 
The findings of Chapter 6 has revealed that an important factor that have rendered the 
Turkish economy vulnerable to capital reversals is the presence of the weaknesses in tile 
banking sector stemming from the risk accumulation in the banking system. The results 
of this chapter also suggests the same conclusions. As can be inferred from the 
statistical significance of the banking sector variables, banking sector weaknesses 
rendered the system vulnerable to exchange rate risk and capital reversals. This is 
256 Hcnce, the banking system was heavily dependent on the arbitrage margins offered by the high interest C, 
spreads between deposit rates and T-bills caused by rapid inflation (Akyuz and Boratav, 2003). 
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indeed, in line with the third-generation models which focus on the role of banking 
sector weaknesses in giving rise to currency crises. 
In line with this genre of theoretical models, the results of this chapter have indicated 
that foreign assets to foreign liabilities ratio (FAL) is significant and it appears with a 
negative sign as expected. This suggests that as the amount of foreign assets relative to 
foreign liabilities decrease, likelihood of a currency crisis increases. Hence, it can be 
inferred that the predominance of foreign currency liabilities in the banks' balance 
sheets in Turkey leads to an increased' likelihood of having currency crises 257 . 
Similarly, the liabilities to capital equity ratio (LIC) and loans to capital equity ratio 
(LCA) are significant in all models with a positive sign as expected. Also, liquid assets 
to total assets ratio (LTA) is significant with a negative sign as expected. These results 
further suggest that an increase in banking sector weaknesses is associated with an 
increased probability of currency crises in Turkey 258 . 
These findings are in line with the postulations of the third-generation models of 
currency crises, where the full deposit insurance system results in a moral hazard 
problem as it prompts the banks to engage in riskier activities. At the same time, under 
the assumption of perfect foresight, an imminent banking crisis signals an enormous 
budget deficit in the near future, which will have to be financed through monetization. 
Hence banking sector weaknesses play a major role in driving rational speculative 
attackS259. 
These results can also be explained through the second-generation model of currency 
crises suggested by Sachs et al (1996), where a weak banking sector sets the stage for a 
self-fulfilling attack by inducing speculators to anticipate that the government would not 
257 Indeed, in the case of Turkey, banks had explicit currency mismatches on their balance sheets during 
the sample period as they borrowed in foreign currency and lent in Turkish liras. As discussed in Chapter 
4, during most of the sample period, the banks had replaced commercial lending with lending to the C, VD 
government. More precisely, they borrowed from foreign money markets and sold these short-term funds 
to the Treasury in return for government securities. Meanwhile, they had mostly unhedged their 
exposures to exchange rate risk, which was encoura ed by the fixed devaluation rate built in the currency C, 9 
peg (see Ozkan, 2005). 
25& This verdict lends support to the earlier studies on Turkish currency crises, such as Celasun (1998) and 
Ozatay and Sak (2002), which suggest the fragility of the banking sector as one of the leading causes of 
currency crises in Turkey. 
259 See Burnside et al (200 1 a). 
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dare to increase interest rates to defend the domestic currency since this would hurt the 
260 financial system through increasing the volume of past-due loans 
These findings necessitate an analysis of the underlying problems in the Turkish 
banking sector. In retrospect, the weaknesses in the sector in the sample period can be 
attributed to the inefficiency of its supervision. During this period, because of 
fragmented political system and the weak coalition governments, the authorities failed 
to initiate the much needed financial discipline during this period. Furthermore, there 
was a serious error in the supervisory and regulatory framework because the Treasury, 
which was involved in the regulation and supervision of the banking sector along with 
the Central Bank, had conflicting interests. It was in charge of inspecting the banks but 
was also obliged to finance the public sector deficits. Hence, it had less incentive to 
regulate the banks very strictly as they held a sizeable amount of government 
securities 261 . Furthermore, 
auring this period, the sector had been deregulated and 
granted deposit insurance without effective supervision 262 . 
Overall, the results suggest that, in the absence of prudential supervision coupled with 
balance sheet mismatches might have set the stage for self-fulfilling currency crises in 
the case of Turkey. In this respect, the findings suggest that, while currency crises are 
usually sudden in nature, they are a product of rational speculation with perfect 
foresight as the forward-looking investors who were aware of the weaknesses in the 
banking sector had an incentive to form a rational speculative attack due the potential 
gains from a currency crisis. 
Consequently, the results obtained in this chapter suggest that banking sector balance 
sheet inf6rmation is useful in identifying and correcting weaknesses before they lead to 
currency crises. In this respect, it is important that the banking sector regulators actively 
promote balance sheet protection, impose tighter credit limits on foreign currency- 
denominated loans to limit exposures stemming from currency mismatches, and limit 
260 What made matters worse in the case of Turkey was the fact that the currency mismatches and foreign 
currency liabilities in the banks' balance sheets, were not hedged (see Sengonul, 2005 and Karabulut and 
Bilgin, 2007). 
261 See Ozkan (2005). 
262 Indeed, the increase in the volume of credits and the resultant increase in past-due loans especially in 
the post-1994 period can be attributed to the full deposit insurance system as discussed earlier. 
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the implicit promise of government bail-outs of losses stemming from currency 
mismatches to discouraging heavy recourse to foreign cuffency-denominated loans. 
7.6 Conclusions 
Based on the consideration that the deten-ninants of currency crises may differ from 
those of exchange market pressure, this chapter has investigated the determinants of 
currency crises in Turkey from 1989: 09 to 2001: 04. 
For this purpose, binary and ordered logit models have been used. Also, in order to test 
the sensitivity of the results to the different exchange market pressure indices, two 
alternative indices have been used. The results obtained from the logit regressions and 
the ordered logit regressions are generally consistent and the coefficients obtained for 
the explanatory variables generally have the same sign although the parameter estimates 
seem to be slightly sensitive to the choice of the currency crisis index. 
The findings obtained in this chapter have shed light on the factors that increase the 
likelihood of currency crises in the case of Turkey. The most important finding that the 
present analysis has yielded is that, there exists no connection between crises and fiscal 
imbalances. The results suggest that fiscal balance variables such as the budget 
expenditures to budget revenues ratio, non-interest budget expenditures to budget 
revenues ratio and total borrowing to budget revenues ratio arc not significant. 
Likewise, excess real Ml balances and domestic credit to GDP ratio are not significant 
either. These results are not consistent with the findings obtained in Chapter 6. This 
suggests that currency crises and exchange market pressure have different underlying 
causes in the case of Turkey. These findings also suggest that the future crises in Turkey 
cannot be practically predicted through observing fiscal imbalance indicators as the 
first-generation models suggest. 
On the other hand, the rest of the results seem to be in line with the findings of Chapter 
6. For instance, the overvaluation of the Turkish lira, a variable related to the second- 
generation models of currency crises, seem to have a significant and positive impact on 
the likelihood of currency crises in Turkey. The findings also suggest that the currency 
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crises in Turkey are associated with short-term capital outflows as portfolio investments 
variable is significant with a negative signs in all models. This suggests that the sudden 
stop theory is relevant in the case of Turkey. 
Furthermore, the results has also shed light on the impact of the aggregate currency 
mismatches in banks' balance sheets on the likelihood of currency crises and lends 
support to the third-generation models of currency crises. More specifically, the banking 
sector variables such as foreign assets to foreign liabilities ratio, liabilities to capital 
equity ratio, loans to capital equity ratio and liquid assets to total assets ratio are 
significant with the expected signs. 
In the light of these results, it can be concluded that the main vulnerability to currency 
crises in the case, of Turkey is the banking sector fragility stemming from risk 
accumulation in the balance sheets. In the absence of the elements of the first- 
generation crises, it can be concluded that risk accumulation in the banking sector has 
set the stage for self-fulfilling currency crises in line with the third-generation models of 
currency crises. Therefore, it can also be concluded that unlike fiscal variables, banking 
sector balance sheet information may be useful in identifying and correcting weaknesses 
before they lead to future currency crises. 
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CHAPTER 8 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRISES USING THE SIGNALS APPROACH 
8.1 Introduction 
Although Chapter 7 has shed some light on the causes of currency crises in Turkey, it 
has failed to find a significant statistical relationship between the fiscal sector variables 
and the likelihood of currency crises in contradiction of the theoretical expectations. 
Although these variables are found to be statistically insignificant, it could be incorrect 
to rule out the possibility that they may be useful in pointing out the weaknesses in the 
economy before currency crises. Indeed, a major limitation of the logit analysis 
conducted in Chapter 7 is that it sorts the explanatory variables strictly as statistically 
significant or insignificant, ignoring the possible importance of these variables in 
signalling the vulnerabilities in the economy in the wake of currency crises. 
The present chapter takes this shortcoming of the previous chapter as its point of 
departure and employs the signals approach introduced by Kaminsky et al (1998) for 
Turkey to investigate the causes of currency crises in Turkey. Accordingly, the present 
chapter has two main purposes. 
First, it serves as a sensitivity analysis for the results obtained from the logit and 
ordered logit models in Chapter 7, assessing the robustness of the findings to the use of 
a different empirical approach. For this reason, the same variables employed in the 
previous chapters are considered for the same sample period spanning from 1989: 09 to 
2001: 04. 
Second, rather than testing specifically whether the explanatory variables under 
investigation are statistically significant or not, it examines the ability of the explanatory 
variables to serve as the leading indicators of currency crises through signalling the 
weaknesses in the economy. In particular, it allows the identification of the direct 
correlations between the individual indicators and the currency crises on a one-to-one 
basis, providing various performance measurements for each indicator. 
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For this reason, the present approach is better suited for finding the vulnerabilities in an 
economy without being particularly interested in exact probabilities and the significance 
of the explanatory variables. Accordingly, it may serve as a valuable tool for the policy- 
makers and the practitioners to assess the vulnerability of the economy to currency 
crises. 
8.2 Methodology 
As explained in Chapter 3, the signals approach introduced by Kaminsky el al (1998) is 
a non-parametric methodology which involves estimating individual threshold values 
for each leading indicator. The evolutions of variables in the period preceding the crises 
are then compared to that in tranquil periods, and when they exceed their individual 
threshold values, this is interpreted as a warning signal of a currency crisis. Kaminsky et 
al (1998) summarize the outcome for each indicator, as shown in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 Crises and Sip-nals (Trade-off between Tvt)e I and Tvne 11 ErrorS)263 
Crisis within the crisis No crisis within the crisis 
window window 
Signal issued ab 
No signal issued Cd 
Note: Cells b and c represent Type-11 and Type-I errors, respectively. 
Any fluctuations of an indicator beyond its individual pre-deten-nined threshold are 
considered as a signal that a crisis could occur within the crisis window. On the basis of 
the historical crisis episodes, these signals are classified into the four cells, a, b, c, and 
d, as shown in Table 8.1. The cell a denotes the number of times a true signal was sent, 
i. e. the ones that are followed by a crisis within the signalling horizon. The cell b 
denotes the number of times a false alarm signal was sent. The cell c denotes the 
number of times no signal was sent but a crisis followed. On the other hand, the cell d 
denotes the number of times no signal was sent and no crises followed. Therefore, a 
perfect leading indicator should have entries only in cells a and d. It should issue a 
signal in every month which is followed by a crisis, so that a>0 and c=0, and should 
263 See Kaminsky et al (1998: p. 18). 
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abstain from issuing a signal in every month which is not followed by a crisis, so that b 
=0 and d> 0264. 
Essentially, the results of the analysis depend on the weight given to the Type-I and 
Type-II errors. Depending on the threshold value chosen, an indicator which detects a 
large number of crises will tend to issue more false signals than the same indicator with 
a lower threshold. Therefore, this approach involves a trade-off between Type-I and 
Type-II errors by varying the specific thresholds for each variable. The threshold of the 
independent variable determines whether a Type-I or Type-11 error is likely to occur. 
The lower the critical threshold level, the higher is the probability of a Type-II error 
occurrence. On the contrary, the higher the critical threshold level, the higher is the 
65 probability of a Type-I error occuringý . 
In the present analysis, the same variables used in the previous chapters are employed in 
266 
monthly frequency spanning the period between 1989: 09 and 2001: 04 . Since the 
signals approach is essentially based on the visual inspection of the evolution of leading 
indicators and whether they go beyond a specific horizontal threshold or not, following 
the existing literature, the explanatory variables are first-differenced to render them 
mean-reverting and, hence, more comparable across time 267 . The only exceptions are 
OVE and ERM, which are considered in levels since they are already stationary, i. e. 
mean revertine 68 . First-differenced variables are denoted with aD in front of the 
variable such that D(ABQ represents the variable ABC in its first-differcnccd form. 
264 See Kaminsky el a/ (1998: p. 18). 
265 The higher the probability of Type-11, the more inefficient will be the predictive performance of the 
model. 
266 In the context of the signals approach, monthly data renders more information about the timing of the 
leading indicators, including differences among indicators in the first arrival and persistence of signals C, 0 tý (Goldstein et al 2000). 
267 See Chapter 5 for the time series properties of the variables. 
269 See Kaminsky el al (1998). 
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8.2.1 Setting the Crisis Window 
In order to observe whether a signal from the leading indicator is followed by a 
currency crisis or not, it is necessary to set an a priori time frame preceding the crisis. 
This period is referred to as a crisis window or a signals horizon 269 . This is the time 
interval where the leading indicators of a currency crisis are supposed to signal the 
imminence of a currency crisis. 
From a policy-maker's perspective, the crisis window should be wide enough so that the 
necessary preventive actions can be taken on time after a signal is issued. The wider the 
window, the higher is the possibility of having the warning signal early, but with the 
trade-off of having more false signal or noise. On the contrary, the shorter the window, 
the more clear signals can be obtained, but this may leave insufficient time for policy- 
makers and the practitioners to fend off a forthcoming crisis. 
In the existing literature, the crisis window spans from 6 months to 24 months 270 
depending on the frequency of the data used. In the present analysis, a 6-month crisis 
window is used. Nonetheless, in order to test the sensitivity of the results to the choice 
of the crisis window, a 12-month crisis window is also considered. . 
8.2.2 Setting Individual Thresholds 
Having established a crisis window, the next step is to determine a specific threshold 
value for each leading indicator. This threshold value categorizes the distribution of 
each leading indicator as normal and abnormal. If the observed outcome of an indicator 
falls into the abnormal category, that indicator is said to be sending a warning signal. 
Therefore, the individual threshold values are estimated in such a way as to maintain a 
balance between the risk of having many false signals and the risk of missing the crisis 
completely. Accordingly, setting individual thresholds for each variable is a 
complicated process. This is because, if an individual threshold is set too loose, the 
indicator will capture all of the crises, but will also issue too many false signals, i. e. 
269 See Kaminsky et al (1998). 270 For instance, El-Shazly (2002) uses a 6-month, Bruggemann and Linne (2002) use an I 8-month, and Zý 
Kaminsky et al (1998) use a 24-month signaling horizon. 
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noise. On the other hand, if the threshold is set too tight, the indicator will not issue any 
false signals, but it will also probably miss the crises. 
T'herefore, there is a trade-off between the Type-I and Type-11 errors in the sense that 
setting the threshold too high will increase the number of false signals but will reduce 
the number of missed crises, whereas, setting the threshold too low will increase the 
number of missed crises but will reduce the number of false signals. 
This complication is overcome by Kaminsky et al (1998) by setting the optimal 
threshold in such a way that the so-called adjusted "noise-to-signal ratio" (NSR) is 
minimized. NSR is estimated as follows: 
NSR = 
bl(b+d) 
al(a+c) 
(8.1) 
where, a, b, c, and d represent the four cells shown in Table 8.1. A higher value for 
ratio implies lower efficiency of an indicator in predicting currency crises. As a rule of 
thumb, a NSR which is lower than or equal to 1.0 shows that the indicator is efficient in 
signalling currency crises. 
Following Kaminsky et al (1998), critical threshold levels of the leading indicators are 
determined based on the percentile values of their observations using grid reference 
percentiles betweenIO percent and 20 percent. An optimal threshold is defined as the 
one that minimize NSR. The minimum NSR and the associated threshold of each 
indicator are estimated using a grid search procedure. More specifically, this involves 
calculating NSRs assuming different thresholds and finding the minimum one. For PIN, 
FAL and LTA a decline in the indicator is expected to increase the probability of a 
crisis, hence the threshold is below the mean of the indicator. In other words, the search 
is conducted at the lower tail of the distribution of the respective variable. For the rest of 
the leading indicators, the search is conducted at the upper tail since the indicators are 
positively correlated with the crisis probability. 
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8.2.3 Evaluation of the Leading Indicators 
The effectiveness of the leading indicators can be examined at the level of individual 
indicators by analyzing the various indicators according to their forecasting ability and 
examining the lead time and persistence of their signals. 
8.2.3.1 Conditional and Unconditional Probabilities of Crises 
An important measure for assessing the performance of the indicators is the probability 
of a crisis occurring within the crisis window conditional on a warning signal from a 
leading indicator. Kaminsky et al (1998) define this as the conditional probability and 
denote it by P(CIS). The authors calculate P(CIS) as follows: 
P(CIS) =a 
a+b 
(8.2) 
where a and b are as defined before. On the other hand, the authors denote the 
unconditional probability by P(C) and calculate it as follows: 
P(C) = a+c (8.3) 
a+b+c+d 
where a, b, c and d are as defined before. The P(C) is expected to be the same for all 
variables in aparticular signals model as they all have the same number of observations. 
The higher the conditional probability, the greater is the predictive power of an 
indicator. As a rule of thumb, if an indicator has useful information, its conditional 
probability should display higher scores than the simple probability of crisis. In other 
words, the conditional probability is greater than the unconditional probability only for 
effective and useful indicators 271 . 
271 See Kaminsky et al (1998). 
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8.2.3.2 Average Lead Times and the Persistency of the Leading Indicators 
Focusing on the crisis window prior to the onset of the crisis, the NSR criteria for 
ranking the indicators does not distinguish between an indicator that sends signals well 
before the crisis occurs and one that -signals only when the crisis is imminent. A 
variable with lower NSR can be a useful leading indicator of currency crises only if it 
sends warning signals sufficiently early to enable policyrnakers to take pre-emptive 
measures to prevent approaching crises. Ideally, a signals model should issue warning 
signals well in advance of the onset of a crisis. Therefore, in order to evaluate the 
performances of the leading indicators, the average number of months prior to crisis the 
first good signal occurs is estimated. 
Another desirable feature in the potential leading indicators is that signals be more 
persistent prior to crises during the crisis window than at other times. Ilence summary 
measures of the persistence of the signals measured as the average number of signals 
during the pre-crisis period compared to the average number of signals during the 
tranquil times are also estimated. 
8.3 Empirical Results 
Before moving on to carrying out the empirical analysis, it is necessary to determine 
what constitutes a currency crisis. In what follows next, the operational derinition of 
currency crises considered in the present analysis is discussed. 
8.3.1 Identification of the Currency Crises 
As in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, crises are identified ex post using two EMP indices, 
namely, those suggested by Eichengreen el al (1995) and Pentecost et al (2001), in 
order to test the sensitivity of the results to the different measures of exchange market 
pressure. 
As in Chapter 7, the observations of the index that exceed the threshold value of 1.5 
standard deviations above the sample mean are identified as instances of currency 
crises. As discussed earlier, this definition is comprehensive enough to include both 
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successful and unsuccessful attacks on the currency. FurthenTiore, it is suitable for 
capturing speculative attacks not only under a fixed exchange rate but also under other 
exchange rate regimes. 
An important difference between the crisis dating scheme used in Chapter 7 and the 
present analysis is that the former considered all instances of extreme speculative 
pressure as the episodes of currency crises, whereas the present analysis uses a 12- 
month exclusion window to identify the episodes of currency crises. This difference 
between the crisis dating schemes used in the two chapters stems from the 
methodological necessities of the used approaches. Namely, for the logit analysis, it is 
desirable to retain as many crisis observations as possible in order to improve the 
statistical properties of the regression models, whereas, for the signals approach, it is 
preferable to have fewer crisis episodes, which are as far away as possible from each 
other. In this respect, the findings obtained from the two chapters should be compared 
with caution in the light of the difference between the analyzed crisis episodes. 
Since the signals approach involves the observation of the behaviour of the variables 
within a certain crisis window, it is necessary to use an exclusion window to separate 
consecutive episodes of extreme speculative pressure. Accordingly, the present analysis 
considers an episode of extreme speculative pressure exceeding the threshold only 12 
months after the previous one as a separate currency crisis 272 . This practice can 
be 
justified by the fact that the signals issued by the leading indicators can not be regarded 
as early warning signals if they are issued during a crisis period as opposed to being 
issued within the crisis horizon preceding it. In this case, it is ambiguous whether the 
fluctuations of the variables are causing the crisis or the crisis itself is causing them. 
Within signals approach, this is important so that the NSRs can be estimated accurately 
using a crisis window. 
Accordingly, the crisis episodes identified using the EMP index suggested by 
Eichengreen et al (1995) are January 1991, December 1993, May 1995, August 1998 
272 See Moreno (1995), Eichengreen et al (1995,1996), Frankel and Rose (1996), Aziz el 01 (2000) and 
Zhuang and Dowling (2003) for applications of exclusion windows of various lengths. 
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and November 2000, whereas the crisis episodes identified using the index suggested by 
Pentecost et al (200 1) are March 199 1, February 1994 and December 2000273. 
83.2 Setting the Thresholds for the Leading Indicators 
Figure 8.1 shows the percentiles of the leading indicators. The horizontal and vertical 
axes in the graphs show, respectively, the empirical quantiles of the variables and the 
values of the variables. On the other hand, the vertical grey areas represent the interval 
between the I oth and the 20'h percentile values of the leading indicators, which is used in 
a grid search procedure to determine the individual thresholds. The percentile that lies 
within the grey area and that minimizes the NSR of the respective leading indicator is 
chosen as the individual threshold. For D(PIN), D(InFAL) and D(InLTA), the grid search 
is conducted at the lower tail of the distribution as a decline in the indicator increases 
the probability of a crisis. On the other hand, for the rest of the leading indicators, the 
search is conducted at the upper tail since the indicators are positively correlated with 
the crisis probability. 
273 The difference of crisis chronologies based on different crisis dating methods is encountered with very 
frequently in the existing literature. See, for example, Lestano and Jacobs (2007) for a comparison of the 
crisis chronologies among the Asian countries based on different currency crisis dating methods. 
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8.3.3 Estimating the Signals Models 
Since the most critical elements of the signals approach are the crisis dating scheme and 
the crisis window employed in the estimations of the models, the present chapter 
considers four different signals models with alternative crisis dating schemes and crisis 
windows in order to assess whether the findings are robust to the use of different crisis 
dating schemes and crisis windows. Table 8.2 summarizes the four signals models used 
in the present analysis. 
Table 8.2 Signals Models Used in the Analysis 
Model EMP index used Crisis window used 
Model I Eichengreen et al (1995) 6-month 
Model 2 Pentecost et al (2001) 6-month 
Model 3 Eichengreen et al (1995) 12-month 
Model 4 Pentecost et al (2001) 12-month 
As can be seen in the table, the model based on a 6-month crisis window and the crisis 
episodes identified using the EMP index suggested by Eichengreen et al (1995) is 
labelled as Model 1, whereas the model based on a 6-month crisis window and the crisis 
episodes identified using the EMP index suggested by Pentecost el al (2001) is labelled 
as Model 2. On the other hand, Model 3 is based on a 12-month crisis window and the 
crisis episodes identified using the EMP index suggested by Eichengreen el al (1995) 
and Model 4 is based on a 12-month crisis window and the crisis episodes identified 
using the EMP index suggested by Pentecost el al (200 1 ). 
Table 8.3 Thresholds of the Leadinp- Indicators 
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
OVE 4.00 4.00 6.5 6.5 
D(lnFAL) -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 
D(PIN) -800 -800 -880 1000 
D(lnDCG) 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.130 
ERM 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
D(InLTA) -0.25 -0.25 -0.20 -0.26 
D(InEXR) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 
D(lnNIE) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
D(InLIQ 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.065 
D(lnLCA) 0.025 0.025 0.10 0.03 
D(lnTBR) 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.110 
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Table 8.3 reports the estimated respective threshold values of the leading indicators 
based on the value that minimizes their NSR within the interval between the I 01h and the 
20th percentiles. 
Figure 8.2,8.3,8.4 and 8.5 show the individual thresholds of the variables and the 
signals issued by each variable within the crisis window for Models 1,2,3 and 4, 
respectively. In the figures, the vertical grey areas represent the respective 6-month and 
12-month crisis windows before the currency crises. If the observed outcome of an 
indicator crosses the estimated threshold as shown in Table 8.3, this is considered as a 
warning signal. 
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8.3.4 Evaluation of the Leading Indicators 
The effectiveness of the leading indicators are assessed based on Figures 8.2,8.3,8.4 
and 8.5 in terms of their NSR, persistency, average lead times, as well as their 
conditional and unconditional probabilities. Table 8.4 presents the ranking the potential 
early warning indicators of currency crises according to their NSRs for Models I and 2. 
Since NSR is a measure of the relative proportion of false signals to correct signals, the 
closer the NSR to zero, the better it is as a leading indicator in terms of its predictive 
power. 
Table 8.4 Noise-to-Sianals based on a 6-month crisis window 
Model I Model 2 
Variable a b c d NSR a b c d NSR 
0 VE 3 5 27 104 0.46 1 8 17 113 1.19 
DanFAL) 7 15 23 94 0.59 5 24 13 
. 
97 0.71 
D(PIN) 6 13 24 96 0.60 6 12 12 109 0.30 
D6nDCG) 8 18 22 91 0.62 5 16 13 105 0.48 
ERM 7 22 23 87 0.87 7 23 11 98 0.49 
DonLTA) 5 17 25 92 0.94 2 13 16 108 0.97 
DqnFXR) 7 26 23 83 1.02 5 30 13 91 0.89 
DflnNlE) 9 37 21 72 1.13 9 36 9 85 0.60 
DqnLIC) 12 50 18 59 1.15 11 41 7 80 0.55 
DqnLCA) 11 52 19 57 1.30 11 48 7 73 0.65 
DflnTBR) 5 37 25 72 2.04 4 36 14 85 1.34 
Note: a, b, c, and d represent thefour cells shown in Table & 1. 
As can be seen from Table 8.4, the variables with NSRs smaller than I are D(OVE), 
D(InFAL), D(PIN), D(InDCG), D(ERM) and D(InLTA) in Model 1. Based on the signals 
approach, these variables are efficient in issuing signals before a currency crisis. The 
rest of the variables are not helpful in predicting crises as they produce more false 
alarms than good signals. 
In the case of Model 2, almost all variables have their respective NSRs smaller than one 
with the exception of D(OVE) and D(lnTBR). Therefore, it can be argued that Model 2 
is more efficient in terms of providing information about vulnerability to a currency 
crisis with negligible noise. 
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Overall, comparing the rank and the NSRs of the indicators in Table 8.4, it can be 
concluded that the performance of most variables is quite sensitive to the choice of the 
currency crisis dating scheme used. Nonetheless, D(InFAL), D(PIN), D(lnDCG), 
D(ERM and D(lnLTA) stand out as the most efficient leading indicators in both models 
based on their respective NSRs. 
Table 8.5 Evaluation of the Leading Indicators based on a 6-month crisis window 
Model 11 Model 2 
Variable P(CIS) P(C) ALT Persistence ALT Persistence 
D(7nLIC) 0.19 0.22 4.60 0.87 0.21 0.13 4.67 3.33 
DflnLTA) 0.23 0.22 2.50 1.07 0.13 0.13 3.00 2.08 
DgnDCG) 0.31 0.22 4.20 1.61 0.24 0.13 4.00 2.04 
DýnLCA) 0.17 0.22 4.25 0.77 0.19 0.13 5.33 1.82 
DanFAL) 0.32 0.22 4.00 1.70 0.17 0.13 3.00 1.67 
0 VE 0.38 0.22 4.00 2.18 0.11 0.13 6.00 1.54 
D (PIN) 0.32 0.22 1.67 1.68 0.33 0.13 3.50 3.41 
DflnTBR) 0.12 0.22 3.50 0.49 0.10 0.13 2.00 1.12 
DanEXR) 0.21 0.22 3.50 0.98 0.14 0.13 3.00 1.03 
DflnNIE) 0.20 0.22 2.33 0.88 0.20 0.13 2.00 0.84 
ERM 0.24 0.22 3.25 1.16 0.23 0.13 2.00 0.75 
Notes: P(CIS) , P(C) and ALT denote conditional probability, unconditional probability 
and the average lead time of the variables, respectively. 
Table 8.5 reports the conditional probability, unconditional probability and the average 
lead time of the variables. The higher the conditional probability, the greater is the 
predictive power of an indicator. Also, the conditional probability should display higher 
274 scores than the simple probability of crisis if the indicator has useful infon-nation 
As evident from the table, the unconditional probability is the same for all variables as 
expected as they all have the same number of observations. Furthermore, the indicators 
for which the conditional probability of a crisis is lower than the unconditional 
probability are the same as those for which the NSE is higher than unity. As a rule of 
thumb, for effective leading indicators, the conditional probability must be greater than 
the unconditional probability. Based on this criteria, the most efficient variables seem to 
be DanLTA), ERM, D(InDCG), D(InFAL), OVE and D(PIN) in the case of Model 1. On 
the other hand, in the case of Model 2, they seem to be DflnEXR), DflnNIE), 
D(InLCA), D(PIN), D(InFAL), D(PIN), D(InDCG), ERM and D(InLIC). 
274 See Kam i nsky et al (199 8). 
260 
Table 8.5 also reports the average lead lime of the first good signal for each indicator. 
Based on this criteria, D(lnLIC), D(InDCG), D(InLCA), D(InFAL) and OVE seem to be 
the most useful leading indicators. These indicators produce the first warning signal 
roughly 3 to 5 months before a crisis. Hence, it can be argued that these variables seem 
to issue the first good signal sufficiently early for the policy-makers to take the 
necessary corrective and preventive measures. 
On the other hand, in terms of the persistency of the signals they issue, the most useful 
indicators are D(InDCG), D(PIN), D(InFAL), OVE and D(PIN) in Model 1, and 
D(InLIC), D(lnLTA), D(InDCG), D(PIN), D(InFAL), OVE and D(InLCA) in Model 2. 
Based on the comparison of the NSRs and the persistency of the variables, it can be 
concluded that the indicators issuing the most persistent signals are the same as the 
indicators that have the lowest NSRs as expected. 
Table 8.6 presents the NSRs of the respective potential early warning indicators of 
currency crises in Model 3 and Model 4 based on a 12-month crisis index. 
Table 8.6 Noise-to-Sianals Ratios based on a 12-month crisis window 
Modcl 3 Modcl 4 
Variable a b c d NSR a b c (I NSR 
DanLCA) 14 10 46 69 0.54 17 29 19 74 0.60 
D (PIN) 12 9 48 70 0.57 7 7 29 96 0.35 
DanLTA) 17 13 43 66 0.58 4 10 32 93 0.87 
DanLIC) 21 19 39 60 0.69 17 27 19 76 0.56 
DflnEXR) 15 14 45 65 0.71 9 21 27 82 0.82 
0 VE 5 5 55 74 0.76 1 7 35 96 2.45 
DflnTBR) 17 20 43 59 0.89 9 29 27 74 1.13 
DflnFAL) 17 21 43 58 0.94 8 22 28 81 0.96 
ERM 12 15 48 64 0.95 6 21 30 82 1.22 
DanDCG) 9 12 51 67 1.01 8 14 28 89 0.61 
DýnNIE) 15 21 45 58 1.06 12 26 24 77 0.76 
Note: a, b, c, and d represent thefour cells shown in Table 8.1. 
As can be seen from Table 8.6, all variables in Model 3 have their respective NSRs 
smaller than 1, with the exception of D(InDCG) and D(InNIE). However, in the case of 
Model 4, all variables have their respective NSRs smaller than one with the exception of 
OVE, D(InTBR) and ERM. A comparison of these findings with those obtained for 
Model I and Model 2 reveals that the NSR of the variables are generally robust to the 
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choice of the crisis window and the crisis dating scheme used. More specifically, 
D(PIN), D(1nFAL) and D(InLTA) are among the leading indicators in all models. 
D(InLIC), D(InLCA) and D(InEXR) are among the leading indicators in all models 
except Model 1. The rest of the variables are more sensitive. For instance, D(InDCG) is 
effective in all models except model 3; D(ERM is effective in all models except Model 
4; D(OVE) is effective only in Model I and Model 3; D(InNIE) is effective only in 
Model 2 and Model 4; and D(InTBR) is effective only in Model 3. 
Table 8.7 Evaluation of the Leading Indicators based on a 12-month crisis window 
Model 3 Model 4 
Variable P(CIS) P(C) ALT Persistence P(CIS) P(C) 
_ 
ALT Persistence 
D(7nLIC) 0.53 0.43 11.8 1.45 0.39 0.26 11.0 1.80 
DanLTA) 0.57 0.43 11.3 1.72 0.29 0.26 10.0 1.14 
DanDCG) 0.43 0.43 9.4 0.99 0.36 0.26 9.3 1.63 
DflnLCA) 0.58 0.43 9.5 1.85 0.37 0.26 12.0 1,68 
DanFAL) 0.45 0.43 8.6 1.06 0.27 0.26 6.7 1.04 
0 VE 0.50 0.43 5.5 1.32 0.13 0.26 7.0 0.41 
D (PIN) 0.57 0.43 9.7 1.75 0.50 0.26 11.5 2.86 
DOnTBR) 0.46 0.43 10.6 1.12 0.24 0.26 11.7 0.89 
DOnEXR) 0.52 0.43 9.2 1.41 0.30 0.26 11.0 1.23 
DflnNIE) 0.42 0.43 9.0 0.94 0.32 0.26 13.3 1.32 
ERM 0.44 0.43 7.2 1.05 0.22 0.26 4.7 0.82 
Notes: P(C IS) , P(C) and ALT denote conditional probability, unconditional probability 
and the average lead time ofthe variables, respectively. 
Table 8.7 reports the conditional probability, unconditional probability and the average 
lead time of the variables for Models 3 and 4. The variables for which the conditional 
probability is greater than the unconditional probability in Model 3 arc D(InLIC), 
D(lnLTA), D(lnLCA), OVE, D(InFAL), D(PIN), D(7nTBR), DanNIE), ERM and 
D(1nEXR). On the other hand, the variables for which the conditional probability is 
greater than the unconditional probability in Model 4 arc D(InLIC), D(InLTA), 
DqnDCG), D(InLCA), D(InFAL), D(PIN), DanNIE) and D(InEYR). Table 8.7 also 
reports the average lead time of the first good signal for each indicator. Based on this 
criteria, D(lnLIC), D(lnLTA), D(InDCG), D(InLCA), D(PIN), D(InTBR), D(InEVR) and 
D(1nNIE) seem to be the most useful leading indicators. These indicators produce the 
first waming signal roughly 9 to II months before a crisis, which is early enough for tile 
policy-makers to take the necessary corrective and preventive measures. On the other 
hand, in terms of the persistency of the signals they issue, the most useful indicators are 
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D(1nLIQ, D(PIN), D(InEXR), D(InLTA) and D(InLCA), in both Model 3 and Model 4. 
A comparison of these results with those obtained for Model I and Model 2 reveals that 
the performance of the variables is only slightly sensitive to the choice of the crisis 
window and the currency crisis dating scheme used. 
Overall, the results suggest that the NSR of the variables are only slightly sensitive to 
the choice of the crisis window and the crisis dating scheme used. Also, different 
models have yielded different performance measures such as average lead time, 
persistence and conditional probability. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some specific 
conclusions regarding the individual leading indicators. In what follows next, these 
conclusions will be discussed. 
8.4 Interpretation of the Empirical Results 
The most striking finding of the present chapter is that the reversal in capital inflows 
(PIN), foreign assets to foreign liabilities ratio (FAL) and liquid assets to total assets 
ratio (LTA) are among the top performing leading indicators in all models with 
relatively high average lead times regardless of the currency crisis dating scheme and 
the crisis window used. In a similar vein, the liabilities to capital equity ratio (LIQ and 
the loans to capital equity ratio (LCA) are among the most efficient leading indicators in 
all models except Model 1. These findings emphasize the importance of the banking 
sector variables and portfolio investments in the prediction and the prevention of 
currency crises. These results lend support to the third-gcneration models of currency 
crises, where a weak banking sector sets the stage for a currency crisis, and the sudden 
stop theory where the reversals or sudden stops cause a currency crisis. Indeed, this is in 
line with the results of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, as well as the earlier studies in the 
literature, which have frequently noted capital movements and the fragility of tile 
banking sector as one of the causes of currency crises in Turkey 275 . 
It goes without saying that, from the policy-makcr's perspective, it is advantageous to 
have an indication of economic weaknesses*and vulnerabilities as early as possible in 
275 See, for instance, Celasun (1998) and Ozatay and Sak (2002), Akyuz and Boratav (2003), Boratav and 
Yeldan (2002), Kibritcioglu et al (1998), Gazioglu (2003), Ekinci and Erturk (2004), Ghoshal (2006). 
Onis and Aysan (2000), Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan (2000), Boratav ef al (1996) and Ekinci (2002). 
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order to be able to able to take pre-emptive measures. Persistency of these variables is 
also quite satisfactory regardless of the currency crisis dating scheme and the crisis 
window used. This suggests that these variables consi. Stently issue more good signals 
than bad signals and, hence, they may be used as the leading indicators of the currency 
crises, provided that no major structural change takes place in the financial sector 276 
In this respect, the leading indicators identified in the present chapter suggest that, had 
the Turkish policy-makers monitored the warning signals given by the banking sector 
variables and the portfolio investments, the impact of the currency crises could have 
been mitigated or even avoided through a successful policy intervention and corrective 
measures. More specifically, with a prudent supervision of the banking sector, the 
balance sheet problems could have been alleviated. However, as discussed earlier, the 
banking sector in Turkey lacked strict regulation and supervision. The sector had been 
deregulated and granted deposit insurance without effective supervision during the 
period under investigation. Furthermore, because of a fragmented political system and 
the weak coalition governments, the authorities failed to maintain financial discipline 
during the sample period. 
Another reason why the banking sector weaknesses were not monitored closely by the 
authorities in charge is that the Treasury, which was involved in the regulation and 
supervision of the banking sector along with the Central Bank, had conflicting interests. 
As discussed earlier, the Treasury was in charge of inspecting the banks but was also 
obliged to finance the public sector deficits. Hence, it had less incentives to regulate the 
banks strictly as they held a sizeable amount of government securities. 
Turning to the performance of the fiscal sector variables, the budget expenditures to 
budget revenues ratio (EXR) is among the top performing leading indicators in three of 
the four estimated models. On the other hand, the non-interest budget expenditures to 
budget revenues ratio (NIE) is effective only in two of the four estimated models; and 
the total borrowing to budget revenues ratio (TBR) is effective only in one of the four 
276 These results support the argument set out in the earlier chapters that the banks in Turkey borrowed in 
foreign currency and lent in Turkish liras. More specifically. they replaced commercial lending with 
lending to the government, through borrowing from foreign money markets and selling these short-term 0 01 funds to the Treasury in return for government securities. They also had mostly unhedged their exposures 
to exchange rate risk, which was encouraged by the fixed devaluation rate built in the currency peg. 
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estimated models. For these'variables, warning signals come early enough to enable the 
authorities to take pre-emptive measures before a crisis. Therefore, it can be argued that 
even though fiscal sector variables did issue early warning signals to some extent, their 
performance was sensitive to the selection of the crisis dating scheme and the crisis 
window. Hence, they are not very reliable as leading indicators of currency crises. In 
fact, fiscal variables usually need more time to adjust even if they do indicate a crisis. 
Therefore, they can only, be regarded as longer-run indicators, at best. 
In this respect, to the extent that the signals approach is considered as an early warning 
system, they cannot be considered as reliable leading indicators as only the budget 
expenditures to budget revenues ratio (EXR) stands out as a helpful predictor as far as 
the fiscal sector variables are concerned as it is one of the top performing leading 
indicators in three of the estimated four models. Nevertheless, these findings can be 
interpreted as an indication that it would be misleading to classify explanatory variables 
strictly as statistically significant or insignificant in the context of currency crises, and 
that statistically insignificant variables could still convey information regarding the 
imminence of currency crises if used in a signals model. 
In this respect, it can be argued that the signals approach has overcome the limitations 
imposed by the binary logit and ordered logit models applied in the previous chapter in 
assessing the predictive powers of the fiscal sector variables. The binary logit and 
ordered logit models had identified these variables strictly as insignificant, whereas the 
analysis in the present chapter has evaluated their predictive powers, analyzing their 
capacity to issue correct warning signals as opposed to false signals, their average lead 
time and their persistency in issuing correct signals. 
As a result, the findings suggest that policy-makers should have taken budget 
expenditures to budget revenues ratio (EXR) into consideration in assessing the 
economy's vulnerability to currency crises in the sample period. This finding, is not 
surprising and can be attributed to a number of factors, such as the increased budget 
expenditures stemming from the total wage bill of the government, generous 
agricultural support policies, worsening performance of the state-owned economic 
enterprises, the increased cost of military operations in the south-castem region of the 
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country, persistent problems in the taxation system and increased interest payments on 
existing debt, especially after 1992. 
On the other hand, the poor performance of the non-interest the budget expenditures to 
budget revenues ratio (NIE) and the total borrowing to budget revenues ratio (TBR) can 
be attributed to the policy changes implemented by the govcnu-nent especially in the 
post-1994 period. During this period, the unsustainable nature of domestic debt forced 
the policyrnakers- to keep the primary balance in surplus. Accordingly, the disinflation 
programme adopted by the government in 1994 put limits on the primary balance of the 
public sector. This resulted in a consistently increasing level of primary surplus 
following 1994. This can also be due to the fiscal discipline imposed on the public 
finances by the IMF-led stabilization program which was launched in 1999. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this had resulted in an apparent fall in the public sector 
borrowing requirement after 1999. Indeed, there was a very significant increase in 
primary surplus in 2000, just a few months before the crisis of February 2001. Hence, 
the possible statistical impact of fiscal imbalances on the likelihood of crises is offset by 
the improvement of the fiscal imbalances after 1999. 
As explained in Chapter 7, the fact that the total borrowing to budget revenues ratio 
(TBR) is not significant can also be explained by the fact that domestic borrowing in 
Turkey is done through issuing government debt instruments, such as T-bills and 
governinent bonds, usually with very high interest rates. As a result, these high interest 
rates attract not only domestic investors but also foreign investors. As high interest rates 
on government debt instruments attract foreign capital, it leads to an increased demand 
for Turkish lira and hence to an appreciation of the Turkish lira. Therefore, the 
potentially negative effects of government borrowing on the riscal balance which is 
expected to increase the likelihood of currency crises are offset by the inflow of capital. 
Hence, the currency crises did not coincide with the period where TBR was issuing 
warning signals. 
The results suggest that the monetary expansion in excess of demand for money, i. e. 
excess real MI balances (ERM), is among the top performing leading indicators in three 
of the four estimated models. This finding is in line with the first-generation models, 
which postulate that monetary expansion is inconsistent with keeping the exchange rate 
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fixed and that the regime must eventually collapse. In addition, for this variable, 
warning signals come sufficiently early to take pre-emptive measures before a crisis. 
This suggests that had the Turkish monetary authorities not followed an expansionary 
monetary policy, the risk of having currency crises would have been lower. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the prevention of the future currency crises in Turkey 
may, among other factors, depend on the monetary authorities' ability to conduct 
favourable monetary policies. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Chapter 
6 and Chapter 7. 
On the other hand, two findings seem to contradict the results of Chapter 6 and Chapter 
7. For instance, the results of the present analysis suggest that the domestic credit to 
GDP ratio (DCG) is among the effective leading indicators in three out of four 
estimated models. This finding contradicts the findings of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, 
which have found this variable to be unrelated to the occurrence of currency crises and 
speculative attacks. This suggests that variables that have been identified as statistically 
insignificant in econometric approaches could still issue early warning signals before 
currency crises when used in a non-parametric approach such as the signals model. 
Indeed, the finding that the domestic credit to GDP ratio is among the leading indicators 
of currency crises in the case of Turkey suggests that, even if in Turkey, domestic credit 
was extended by the Central Bank to the Treasury primarily in the forrn of cash 
advances to the Treasury, the domestic credit to GDP ratio has signalled the 
vulnerability of the economy to currency crises as the first-gencration models of 
currency crises suggest. 
Another finding that seems to contradict the results of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 is that 
overvaluation of the Turkish lira (OVE) is effective only in two of the estimated models 
and is not robust to different crisis dating schemes. Hence, it can not be regarded as a 
reliable leading indicator. This can be attributed to the fact that the exchange rate 
overvaluation is usually an economic phenomenon that manifests in the long-run rather 
than'being a sudden event which could show abrupt fluctuations. Hence, this variable 
fails to issue early warning signals. This indicates the inappropriateness of this variable 
as a leading indicator of crises in a signals model. 
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Overall, the findings obtained in this chapter lead to the conclusion that the variables 
used in the analysis can generally be used as the leading indicators of currency crises in 
the case of Turkey. To the extent that the signals approach is considered as an early 
warning system, it can also be argued that had the Turkish policy-makers focused 
particularly on banking sector weaknesses and fluctuations of the portfolio investments, 
analyzed the warning signals issued by these variables and taken coffcctive actions, the 
crises could have been avoided through a successful policy intervention and coffcctive 
measures such as a prudent supervision of the banking sector. 
The results of the present chapter have revealed that even statistically insignificant 
variables could convey useful information regarding the imminence of currency crises 
when used in a non-parametric approach, such as the signals model. Hence it might be 
deceptive to sort explanatory variables strictly as statistically significant. or insignificant 
in the context of currency crises using an econometric analysis. Based on this 
consideration, it can be concluded that the signals approach is better suited to finding 
the vulnerabilities in an economy without being particularly interested in exact 
probabilities, and that it may serve as a valuable tool for the policy-makers and the 
practitioners in assessing the vulnerability of the economy to currency crises. 
8.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has applied the signals approach to shed more light on the causes of 
currency crises in Turkey. The purpose of the analysis was to test the sensitivity of the 
results obtained from the logit and ordered logit models in Chapter 7 to the use of a 
different empirical approach. Furthermore, rather than investigating specifically 
whether the explanatory variables in question are statistically significant or not, it has 
analyzed the capability of the explanatory variables to serve as the leading indicators of 
currency crises. The findings suggest the conclusion that it would be misleading to 
classify explanatory variables strictly as statistically significant or insignificant in the 
context of currency crises, and that even statistically insignificant variables could 
convey useful inforination regarding the imminence of currency crises when used in a 
signals model. 
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The results are generally consistent with the findings of Chapter 7. For instance, the 
present analysis has ranked reversal in capital inflows, the foreign assets to foreign 
liabilities ratio and the liquid assets to total assets ratio among the top perfonning 
leading indicators in all estimated models. Similarly, the liabilities to capital equity ratio 
and the loans to capital equity ratio are also found to be among the most efficient 
leading indicators in most of the models. In this respect, the present chapter has lent 
support to the findings obtained in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 that the third-generation 
models of currency crises, where a weak banking sector sets the stage for a currency 
crisis, and the sudden stop theory where the reversals or sudden stops cause a currency 
crisis, are relevant in the case of Turkey for the period under investigation. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION. 
9.1 Main Findings 
This thesis has investigated the causes of exchange market pressure and currency crises 
in Turkey for the post-capital account liberalization period spanning from 1989: 09 to 
2001: 04. The findings have revealed that speculative pressure in the foreign exchange 
market and currency crises in Turkey in the sample period cannot be attributed entirely 
to a single cause and that these two phenomena are a result of a diverse set of factors. 
Accordingly, they seem to carry the elements of more than one generation of currency 
crisis models. 
The findings of the thesis suggest that both speculative pressure in the exchange market 
and currency crises in Turkey are linked to the reversals in the capital flows. This 
finding lends support to the Sudden Stop theory and is in line with the findings of the 
earlier studies in the literature. 
The findings of the thesis also suggest that another important factor which has given 
rise to speculative pressure in the exchange market and currency crises in Turkey is the 
fragility of the banking sector. This thesis has documented empirical evidence that the 
weaknesses in the banking sector balance sheets, such as the over-exposure to foreign 
exchange, liquidity and credit risks, are linked to speculative pressure in the exchange 
market and currency crises in Turkey. This finding suggests that, while speculative 
attacks are usually sudden in nature, they are a product of rational speculation with 
perfect foresight in the presence of the explicit weaknesses in the banking sector 
balance sheets. In this respect, the findings lend support to the theory of self-fulfilling 
currency crises in the context of second- and the third-generation models of currency 
crises. This is indeed in line with the findings of the earlier studies in the literature. 
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The results of the thesis also suggest that currency crises and speculative pressure in the 
foreign exchange market are linked to the overvaluation of the Turkish lira. This finding 
seems to lend support to the second-generation models of currency crises in the sense 
that the loss of competitiveness for the economy caused by real exchange rate affects 
the objective function of the government. 
A novel finding of the thesis is that currency crises and speculative pressure in the 
foreign exchange market are not necessarily driven by common factors. More 
specifically, although fiscal balance variables are found to be in a long-run equilibrium 
relationship with the speculative pressure in the exchange market, they do not seem to 
be in a relationship with the currency crises. Likewise, excessive monetary expansion is 
found to drive speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market but not the currency 
crises. These results suggest that, while the first-generation models can be used to 
explain the mechanics of the speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market, they 
are unable to provide an explanation of the occurrence of currency crises. Therefore, the 
currency crises in Turkey seem more to be a product of self-fulfilling expectations of 
the market participants than driven by bad fundamentals, as the first-generation models 
of currency crises suggest. 
Another novel finding of the thesis is that it is misleading to classify explanatory 
variables strictly as statistically significant and insignificant in the context of currency 
crises. The findings of this thesis suggest that statistically insignificant variables could 
still convey information regarding the imminence of currency crises if used in a non- 
parametric signals model. For instance, this thesis has documented evidence that the 
domestic credit to GDP ratio, which does not appear significant in tile cointcgration and 
logit analyses, is indeed among the effective leading indicators in three out of four 
estimated signals models. In the light of this finding, it can be concluded that tile signals 
approach is better suited for finding the vulnerabilities in an economy without being 
particularly interested in exact probabilities and that it may serve as a valuable tool for 
the policy-makers and the practitioners to assess the vulnerability of the economy to 
currency crises. 
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9.2 Policy Implications 
The findings of this thesis suggest a number of implications for the policy-makers, not 
only in Turkey but also in other emerging market economies with similar structures. 
This thesis has yielded empirical evidence that a reversal in capital inflows is closely 
linked to speculative pressure in the foreign exchange market and currency crises in the 
period following the capital account liberalization of August 1989. This finding 
indicates the difficulty of maintaining a stable exchange rate regime in an economy 
which is integrated with the global capital markets 277 . As a result, this thesis 
has 
emphasized the well known theory of the trilemina, which imposes a severe trade-off 
among exchange stability, monetary independence, and capital market openneSS278. This 
suggests that the authorities faced with the structural constraints imposed by this 
trilemma, have to give up one of the three objectives: exchange rate stability, monetary 
independence or the integration with global financial markets. 
According to this theory, in order to maintain monetary independence and exchange rate 
stability, some degree of control over capital flows should be imposed. From a policy 
standpoint, this raises the issue of whether strict restrictions should be imposed over 
capital flows in order to eliminate the exposure of the economy to speculative capital 
movements. As discussed earlier, the Turkish economy is already dependent on capital 
inflows. Therefore, strict restrictions on capital flows, such as a full taxation scheme on 
all foreign exchange transactions as suggested by Tobin (1978), are not advisable as this 
would have a detrimental impact on the economy. Instead, policy-makcrs are advised to 
introduce policies to discourage speculative outflows of capital. For instance, they may 
decide to tax short-term flows such as portfolio investments much more heavily than 
long-term flows such as foreign direct investment and term loans. This can be done 
through imposing taxes that vary inversely with the maturity of investments to favour 
long-term flows over short-term flows and to penalize short-terrn speculative capital 
outflows. This way, exchange rates would be kept within a target range through taxation 
rather than the interventions of the central bank. 
277 This lends support to Mussa et al (2000), who argue that fixed exchange rate regimes can best be 
maintained if the level of integration with the global capital markets is low. 279 See Obsteld (2004a, 2004b). 
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From a policy perspective, the vulnerability of the economy to reversals in capital 
inflows can also be reduced through accumulating international reserves"9. This is 
because international investors will have more confidence in the central bank if the level 
of reserves is high 280 . International credit rating agencies will also be more 
likely give 
higher ratings for an economy where the level of international reserves is sufficiently 
high as the risk of default would be lower. This, in turn, would prevent massive capital 
outflows originating from a degradation in credit ratings, as Turkey experienced in 
January 1994, which resulted in a full-blown currency crisis. 
This finding also emphasizes the importance of political stability as a precondition for 
preventing currency crises. This is because market participants are highly sensitive to 
the news emanating from the politicians and the sustainability of capital inflows is 
conditional on the overall political conditions on the domestic economy. This is indeed 
evident from the crisis of February, 2001 which was triggered by a political dispute 
between the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Prime Minister Bulcnt Eccvit. 
Based on these considerations, practitioners and policy makers are advised to clqsely 
monitor the capital movements for any sign of reversals, especially when domestic 
banks have open foreign exchange positions, as capital outflows would lead to increased 
selling pressure on the Turkish lira. Needless to mention, this would increase the 
likelihood of a currency crisis, which would quickly increase the value of foreign 
exchange-denominated liabilities in the banking sector balance sheets and bring the 
sector to the edge of collapse. 
Indeed, the findings of this thesis have also highlighted the role of banking sector 
weaknesses in causing currency crises and speculative pressure in the exchange market. 
In particular, the lack of sufficient liquidity, poor credit quality and currency 
mismatches in the banks' balance sheets are closely associated with speculative pressure 
in the foreign exchange market and currency crises. These findings suggest that banking 
sector balance sheet infon-nation is useful in identifying and correcting weaknesses 
before they lead to speculative attacks and currency crises. Indeed, from a policy 
279 See Fischer (200 1). 
280 Hviding et al (2004) reports empirical evidence for 28 emerging economies that high reserve stock C, leads to a lower exchange rate volatility. 
standpoint, it is more advisable to avoid these weaknesses in the first place through 
active balance sheet protection rather than trying to address them once they have 
rendered the economy vulnerable to currency crises. Therefore, the regulators are 
advised to constantly monitor banking sector balance sheets for any signs of significant 
currency mismatches to take informed decisions on time. The policy-makers are 
particularly advised to impose tighter credit limits on foreign currency-denominated 
loans to limit exposures stemming from currency mismatches through introducing an 
aggressive and competent prudential regulatory system. In this respect, it is also 
important to enforce prudential regulation and supervision through imposing reliable 
accounting standards and disclosure requirements to ensure transparent and timely 
information disclosure. Needless to mention, this would also enable market participants 
to assess risk more accurately, which would stabilize market expectations and prevent 
overreaction due to herding behaviour281. 
Although these policy recommendations are rather common sense, they are not easy to 
implement in the case of the Turkish banking sector, where political interference and 
populist considerations are prevalent. In the sample period, the Turkish banking system 
had the problem of politicized licensing of private banks. Furthermore, the state banks 
were extremely politicized and badly managed 282 . During this period, with the 
fragmented political system and the weak coalition governments, the authorities failed 
to initiate the much needed financial discipline. The sector was deregulated and granted 
full-deposit insurance without effective supervision, which resulted in an increase in the 
volume of credits, especially in the post-1994 period. Furthermore, there was a serious 
blunder in the supervisory and regulatory framework of the sector because the Treasury, 
which was involved in the regulation and supervision of the sector along with the 
Central Bank, had conflicting interests. It was in charge of inspecting the banks but was 
also obliged to finance the public sector deficits. I Iencc, it had less incentive to regulate 
the banks strictly as they held a sizeable amount of government securities. These factors 
coupled with the implicit promise of government bail-outs resulted in risky banking 
practices, especially a heavy recourse to foreign currency--denominated loans. Therefore, 
the findings of this thesis have also highlighted the prevention of political interference 
281 In this respect, macro-stability is also very important as it would directly affect the balance sheets of 
the banks. 
282 The question is whether the privatisation of state banks should be a policy priority. 
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with the supervision and the regulation of the banking sector as a crucial prerequisite for 
83 
a strong banking sectorý . 
Another finding of this thesis is that currency crises in Turkey do not seem to be closely 
associated with fiscal imbalances. From a policy standpoint, this suggests that the fiscal 
discipline imposed on the public finances by the IMF-led disinflation and stabilization 
programmes introduced in 1994 and 2001 have been successful. Therefore, the policy- 
makers should continue following fiscal austerity programmes. On the other hand, the 
findings of this thesis have shown that speculative pressure in the Turkish foreign 
exchange market is in a long-run equilibrium relationship with fiscal imbalances. This 
suggests that currency crises and exchange market pressure in Turkey are not 
necessarily driven by common factors. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the prevention of currency crises in Turkey does not 
depend entirely on the ability of the authorities to maintain a fiscal balance and that the 
timing of future currency crises cannot be practically be predictable. Since the 
expectations of the market participants play a role in crises, speculative attacks do occur 
as market sentiment shifts and, possibly, herding behaviour takes over, sound 
macroeconomic management may not always suffice to ensure the maintenance of the 
stability of the exchange rate. In this respect, the crises can take place any time and t4e 
government should make sure that the financial crisis poses as little danger as possible 
to the level of output and employment. It should keep the exchange rate from jumping 
enough to cause massive bankruptcies but also to keep from raising the interest rate 
enough to totally disrupt investment. If the interest rate is kept too low, the exchange 
rate may jump and this, in turn, would make the burden of foreign debt unmanageable, 
leading to widespread bankruptcies and unemployment. 
283 In fact some of these policy recommendations have already been followed by Turkish policy-makers. 
A comprehensive banking sector restructuring and rehabilitation prog-ramme was launched in the wake of 
the 2000-2001 crisis in order to restructure and rehabilitate the banking sector through more stringent 
legal and institutional framework. Since then, the supervisory system has been strcn-thencd by legislative 
arrangements in accordance with the international standards, particularly in the areas such as foreign 
exchange exposures, capital adequacy, internal control, risk management, lending limits and accounting 0 Co 
standards. Furthermore, a limited deposit guarantee system was put into efTect in 2004. Also, the 
government has been committed to maintaining the independence of the central bank as an independent 
regulator and supervisor since October 200 1. 
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This also means that the speculative pressure and currency crises in Turkey largely 
reflect more or less arbitrary changes in economic agents' expectations of the ability of 
the central bank to maintain the exchange rate. If the economic agents believe that the 
central bank will do its best to maintain the existing exchange rate level, it might be 
possible to prevent currency crises. On the other hand, if the central bank appears to be 
willing to let the domestic currency depreciate, speculators will increase their pressure 
on the exchange rate. Therefore, the policy-makers are advised to adopt policies to 
enhance their credibility and to take account of the impact of their actions. on the 
expectations of the forward-looking investors. In this respect, from a policy standpoint, 
commitment to consistent and transparent macroeconomic policies explicitly designed 
to protect the domestic currency is crucial and even last minute steps might reduce 
speculative attacks on the domestic currency as the speculators know that they can 
obtain no gains if the exchange rate prevails. 
The findings of the thesis also suggest that currency crises and speculative pressure in 
the foreign exchange market are linked to the over-valuation of the Turkish lira. This 
can be attributed to the fact that the operations to correct the exchange rate 
misalignments are usually delayed before elections due to the significant political costs 
that an incumbent might have to incur by using this policy tool. Likewise, as Alesina 
and Drazen (1991) argue, delays in corrections and the implementation of the 
stabilization policies can also be caused by a stalemate brought about by a disagreement 
among the paxtners of a coalition government 284 . Therefore, from a policy standpoint, 
it 
is necessary to take the necessary actions on time to correct the ovcrvaluation of the 
283 
exchange rate without populist concerns in order to prevent further complications . 
This also suggests that a flexible exchange rate would be more effective as it would 
reduce the political concerns behind a devaluation. In other words, the exchange rate 
correction will automatically be done by the market forces and not necessarily upon the 
decision of the monetary authorities. 
284 For instance, in the case of Turkey, the governments in the sample period comprised the coalitions of 
the various combinations of DYP (True Path Party), SIIP (Social Democratic Populist Party), CIIP 
(Republican People's Party), RP (Welfare Party), DSP (Democratic Left Party), DTP (Democratic Turkey 
Party) and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party). These parties frequently had considerable differences in 
terms of their ideologies. 
285 Indeed, devaluations can improve the competitiveness of the country and, hence, the balance of trade 
by making exports cheaper and imports more expensive. 
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Last - but not least, as the timely detection of the possibility of a currency crisis is 
necessary for an effective policy response, policy-makers should particularly monitor 
the leading indicators of currency crises within the framework of quantitative early 
warning models, such as the signals approach applied in this thesis, as well as 
qualitative judgement in deciding whether or not a crisis is imminent. 
9.3 Limitations of the Thesis and Directions for Future Research 
The present thesis has several limitations which constitute potential avenues for future 
research. The most important limitation stems from the estimation of the exchange 
market pressure (EMP) indices used in the empirical analyses. As discussed earlier, the 
estimated EMP indices include the percentage change in the international reserves of 
the central bank. This is based on the assumption that the changes in the levels of the 
reserves sufficiently reflect the foreign exchange interventions of the central bank. 
However, the changes in international reserves may not always adequately capture these 
interventions as the central bank may also defend the domestic currency by not 
necessarily expending its international reserves. A central bank can attempt to defend 
the domestic currency by drawing on stand-by credits from the IMF and through off- 
balance sheet transactions. If the central bank draws resources from these lines to fend 
off a speculative attack, the intervention would not be reflected in the level of its 
international reserves. Therefore, future research in this area is advised to take this 
limitation into consideration. 
Another limitation deserving further research within the context of the EMP indices is 
that the weighting scheme used in Eichengreen el al's (1995) approach is time-invariant 
and assigns the same weights to the components of the index for the entire period. This 
weighting scheme would not allow capturing structural changes in the volatility of 
variables. Under the regimes of crawling peg and managed floating rates, market 
pressure will be indicated by reserves and interest rate spread perhaps more than the 
changes in exchange rates. However, because of the relatively low weight assigned to 
the changes in the interest rate spread for the entire period, this component conveys 
little information. Consequently, the resultant EMP index may miss some potentially 
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important information. In this respect, future research in this area is advised to focus on 
devising a time-variant weighting scheme. 
Another important limitation of the thesis primarily involves the logit analysis and the 
signals approach. Since these analyses include more than one occurrence of currency 
crises, the estimated models implicitly impose the assumption of homogeneity among 
the investigated crisis episodes. This raises the critical issue of whether the crises show 
an adequate degree of resemblance to permit aggregation of them into a binary currency 
crisis index. This thesis has failed to address this issue as there was no other choice 
available to facilitate an empirical analysis in a single-country context as the crisis 
observations were very few. However, further research is advised to consider the 
possibility that each crisis episode can be unique and can have different underlying 
dynamics, even if they take place in the same country. In this respect, future research is 
advised to focus more on the individual crisis episodes rather than aggregating them in a 
currency crisis index. 
Another noteworthy limitation of this thesis is the arbitrariness of the thresholds used in 
the operational definition of currency crises. As discussed earlier, identification of 
currency crises empirically is a challenging task because the use of the threshold is quite 
arbitrary and lacks a proper justification. Currently, the existing literature suggests no 
other means through which crises can be identified. Therefore, the present thesis has 
followed this definition. Nonetheless, future research on currency crises is advised to 
address this shortcoming through devising a theoretically-j usti fled threshold to identify 
crises. 
Last but not least, a relatively minor limitation of this thesis is about the choice of the 
explanatory variables used in the. empirical models. In the course of this thesis, this 
issud has revealed itself as a challenging task since a potentially large number of 
variables could have been used. This thesis has attempted to use as many alternative and 
informative variables as possible. However, beside tile variables used in this thesis, 
there exist a large number of alternative ways to build proxies for monetary policy. 
fiscal balance, banking sector and capital flows. Therefore, future research is advised to 
employ alternative variables in order to test the robustness of tile results documented in 
this thesis. In particular, future research could include variables on the size, maturity 
278 
and currency composition of the assets and liabilities in the banks' balance sheets, 
subject to availability of data. Furthermore, political factors are also likely to be relevant 
in the case of the Turkish economy. Hence, future research is advised to build a 
quantitative proxy for political instability and include it in empirical models. 
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